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535 F.2d 950·
5th Cir.·
1976-07-26
·cited 74×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove specific intent to escape and that the admission of the full prior conviction for bank robbery was unduly prejudicial.
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585 F.2d 1087·
D.C. Cir.·
1978-07-12
·cited 32×
The court held that the trial court erred by improperly instructing the jury on the definition of escape and by refusing to allow the jury to consider the defense of duress based on an erroneous application of a 'return requirement'.
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542 F.2d 728·
8th Cir.·
1976-10-07
·cited 32×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the defendant wilfully escaped from federal custody with the intent to avoid confinement, and that the trial court did not err in its instructions or rulings.
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509 F.2d 769·
5th Cir.·
1975-03-17
·cited 22×
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451 F.2d 969·
8th Cir.·
1971-12-09
·cited 20×
The court held that the appellant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by monitored communications and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying subpoenas for witnesses.
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392 F.2d 567·
4th Cir.·
1968-03-18
·cited 20×
The court held that copies of Judgment and Commitment papers, though technically copies, were admissible as originals for Lorton's business records and that sufficient evidence proved confinement was by direction of the Attorney General.
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830 F.2d 628·
7th Cir.·
1987-09-04
·cited 17×
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) was not violated and that the defendant's pro se claims lacked merit.
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687 F.2d 952·
7th Cir.·
1982-08-23
·cited 16×
The court held that the nature of the custody or confinement is an essential element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a), which must be alleged in the indictment and proven at trial.
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625 F.2d 144·
7th Cir.·
1980-06-27
·cited 12×
The dissenting judge would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial, finding plain error in the failure to instruct the jury on duress and ineffective assistance of counsel regarding prejudicial evidence.
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444 F.2d 510·
4th Cir.·
1971-06-28
·cited 10×
The court held that the defendants were properly sentenced under the general escape statute, 18 U.S.C. § 751(a), not the juvenile escape statute, 18 U.S.C. § 751(b).
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933 F.2d 307·
5th Cir.·
1991-06-03
·cited 9×
The court held that a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is not irrevocable and can be withdrawn, and that standby counsel does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a critical stage like sentencing.
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643 F.2d 394·
6th Cir.·
1981-02-23
·cited 8×
A prisoner transferred under a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum remains in the custody of the Attorney General for purposes of escape statutes, and the duress defense requires a bona fide effort to return to custody.
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912 F.2d 1058·
9th Cir.·
1990-08-24
·cited 6×
A defendant who fails to report to begin a court-ordered sentence is considered to have escaped from custody, even if the sentence had not yet commenced physically.
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592 F.2d 1035·
9th Cir.·
1979-01-26
·cited 6×
-
585 F.2d 1130·
D.C. Cir.·
1978-07-12
·cited 6×
-
436 F.2d 1066·
5th Cir.·
1971-01-14
·cited 6×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for attempted escape and that the confessions were admissible.
-
977 F.2d 1412·
10th Cir.·
1992-10-21
·cited 4×
The court held that the defendant was in federal custody for the purposes of the federal escape statute, and his actions constituted an attempt to escape.
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965 F.2d 353·
7th Cir.·
1992-06-04
·cited 2×
The court held that there was no fatal variance between the indictment and the proof at trial, as the evidence sufficiently demonstrated the defendant's confinement was by virtue of a 1983 conviction.
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901 F.2d 1201·
3d Cir.·
1990-04-24
·cited 2×
The court held that applying the Sentencing Guidelines to an escape that occurred before their promulgation does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because escape is a continuing offense. The court also affirmed the denial of acceptance of responsibility and the criminal histor
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498 F.2d 683·
D.C. Cir.·
1974-05-07
·cited 2×
-
110 F.4th 1246·
11th Cir.·
2024-08-08
The court held that the jury instructions were erroneous because they failed to include the 'willfulness' requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a), which requires proof that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful.
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793 F.2d 786·
6th Cir.·
1986-06-19
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) for escape by force, and that this conviction was not barred by a prior conviction for bank robbery under subsections (a) and (d) because the escape constituted a separate offense.