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Fla.·
decided 2026-08-12
A defendant's valid waiver of postconviction proceedings in 2012 bars successive postconviction motions filed after a 2022 rule change requiring reappointment of counsel, except for claims limited to the execution process itself. Florida law does not recognize a statutory or constitutional right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel, and the requirement that postconviction counsel be competent means only that counsel meet minimum qualifications, not that counsel provide effective assistance. Speculative claims about potential drug shortages in lethal injection protocols, unsupporte
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Fla. 4th DCA·
decided 2026-08-12
A trial court abuses its discretion in granting additur when the jury's verdict is supported by evidence and jury instructions that gave the jury discretion to award damages, even if unrefuted evidence supports a higher amount. The jury instructions and closing arguments in this case gave the jury discretion to award an amount that the greater weight of evidence showed would fairly and adequately compensate the claimant, and the jury could have logically arrived at its $55,652 award by excluding damages attributable to claims against other subcontractors and a counterclaim unrelated to the def
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Fla. 4th DCA·
decided 2026-08-12
Section 627.428, Florida Statutes (2015), authorizes attorney's fees for a prevailing insured in litigation involving a breach of a Drew repair contract because such a contract is executed by the insurer and any dispute concerning it arises under the policy. Section 631.70, Florida Statutes (2022), does not preclude an award of attorney's fees where FIGA denies a covered claim or portion thereof by affirmative action other than delay, and here FIGA's pre-answer partial payment denial, affirmative defenses asserting non-coverage, corporate testimony, pretrial stipulation assertions, and summary
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Fla. 3d DCA·
decided 2026-08-12
An enforceable express oral contract existed between the parties with sufficiently definite essential terms—Ruiz's payment of $600,000 in commissions in exchange for Diaz's $600,000 tree credit—and therefore unjust enrichment is unavailable as a matter of law. The parties' failure to specify which particular trees would be selected or the precise time for their removal does not defeat contract formation because these details are not essential terms. Where an express contract exists, the remedies of breach of contract and unjust enrichment are mutually exclusive, and a plaintiff cannot recover