Notable Florida Decisions

Due process does not require a clemency proceeding specifically tied to the particular death sentence being carried out; a prior clemency consideration, even for different convictions, satisfies any minimal due process requirement. A defendant challenging a method of execution under the Baze-Glossip test must adequately raise the alternative-method prong in the initial brief, and failure to do so waives the argument; Thompson failed to satisfy the alternative-method prong because he did not show that firing squad would significantly reduce the substantial risk of severe pain as applied to him.

Hearsay statements attributed to a deceased third party do not qualify for the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule when the statements were made in a bragging or boastful manner that advanced the declarant's violent reputation in a lawless community, and the statements lack sufficient corroborating circumstances to demonstrate trustworthiness. Newly discovered evidence that would be inadmissible at retrial cannot satisfy the Jones standard for postconviction relief in capital cases.

The Florida Supreme Court adopted new Rule 6-32 establishing standards for board certification in Insurance Coverage Law, requiring applicants to demonstrate five years of practice with at least 40 percent substantial involvement in insurance coverage law, practical experience through specified tasks, peer references, continuing legal education, and passage of an examination, with limited exemptions for highly experienced practitioners.

A general magistrate abuses her discretion by denying a timely-filed motion for continuance when the magistrate fails to rule on or hear the motion until the date and time set for trial, effectively preventing the movant from obtaining relief even if the motion has merit, particularly where the movant filed the motion well in advance for valid non-dilatory reasons and the opposing party would not be prejudiced by a brief continuance. Additionally, a trial court errs by awarding a timesharing arrangement that was not requested in the pleadings and is unsupported by competent substantial evidenc

A trial court reviewing a motion to amend to assert punitive damages must evaluate both the pleading component and the evidentiary component, considering whether the proposed amended pleading contains sufficient allegations of intentional misconduct and whether the claimant's proffered evidence would provide a reasonable basis for a reasonable person to conclude the defendant committed intentional misconduct or gross negligence as defined by statute. For employer vicarious liability under section 768.72(3), the employer's liability for an employee's intentional misconduct requires proof that a

A trial court reviewing a motion to amend a pleading to assert punitive damages must analyze both the pleading component—whether the proposed amended complaint contains sufficient allegations of intentional misconduct or gross negligence—and the evidentiary component—whether the claimant has proffered reasonable evidentiary support for those allegations. For an employer's vicarious liability under section 768.72(3), the claimant must show that a managing agent (someone with ultimate decisionmaking authority, such as a corporate president or primary owner) knowingly condoned, ratified, or parti

Motions to dismiss under Rule 3.190(d)(2) must be sworn and allege facts specifically.

A trial court is not required to impose a departure sentence below the lowest permissible sentence even when the defendant establishes facts that satisfy a statutory departure ground; proof of a departure ground merely lowers the floor of the sentencing range but creates no entitlement to any particular sentence within that range. A trial court is not required by statute or rule to articulate on the record its reasons for declining to impose a departure sentence, and the failure to apply the Banks two-step analysis on the record does not constitute reversible error.

Although a trial court's inadvertent failure to recognize record activity within the 60-day safe harbor is cognizable under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(1), relief must still be sought within a reasonable time, and a motion filed more than seven weeks after dismissal without explanation for the delay constitutes an abuse of discretion absent evidence of due diligence.

A trial court errs in revoking probation when findings of violation are based solely on hearsay evidence unsupported by non-hearsay evidence, and when an alleged false statement to a probation officer is made before the underlying conduct allegedly establishing its falsity occurs.

To obtain an injunction for protection against stalking based on harassment allegations, a petitioner must establish that the respondent's conduct caused substantial emotional distress using an objective reasonable person standard, not a subjective standard, and mere annoyance, frustration, or embarrassment is insufficient.

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(k) is amended to add a new subdivision (k)(2) providing that other parties have no duty to act on unsigned discovery disclosures, requests, responses, or objections until signed, and the court must strike them unless a signature is promptly supplied after the omission is called to the attorney's or party's attention.

To obtain an injunction for protection against stalking based on harassment allegations, a petitioner must establish that the respondent's conduct caused substantial emotional distress using an objective reasonable person standard, not a subjective standard, and mere annoyance, frustration, or embarrassment is insufficient.

A defendant has a constitutional right to be present at resentencing when the trial court has discretion over the sentence imposed, and an oral waiver by counsel does not satisfy the requirement for a knowing and voluntary waiver by the defendant.

The Court amended Florida Probate Rules 5.015, 5.630, and 5.648 to add a definition of "elisor," require disclosure of conflicts of interest in petitions for approval of acts, and clarify the elisor's duties in emergency temporary guardianship proceedings.

An interlocutory order is reviewable under rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) only if it actually adjudicates and determines the personal jurisdiction issue conclusively; an order that merely denies a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without settling the jurisdictional question does not meet this threshold.

When a petitioner alleges incidents of repeated violence or stalking with sufficient specificity regarding the facts and circumstances, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing under Florida Statute § 784.046(5) rather than summarily denying the petition.

For a person to be held in contempt of a court order, the language of the order must be clear and precise, and the behavior must clearly violate the order; the trial court erred in finding A.C. guilty of indirect criminal contempt because no Florida court order specifically prohibited her actions on April 14 and May 2025, and her September 25, 2025 petition filing did not violate the letter of the no-contact order even if it violated its spirit.

A homeowner insured for replacement cost of personal property need not present a complete professional inventory to establish damages; testimony, photographs, receipts, and other evidence of ownership and replacement value are sufficient to survive a directed verdict motion. A statutory cap on an insurer's obligation to pay does not prohibit the insured from presenting evidence of damages exceeding that cap at trial; the cap operates as a post-verdict ceiling, not a pre-trial evidentiary limitation.

Police officers conducting an investigatory stop must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the totality of circumstances; a citizen informant's description of a suspect's appearance alone, when corroborated only as to innocent identifying details with no evidence of actual criminality, does not establish the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a seizure and detention.

The confession of judgment doctrine does not apply when an insured races to the courthouse to seek attorney's fees after an insurer has accepted coverage, elected appraisal, and timely paid the appraisal award, because the insured was not forced to sue and the lawsuit did not act as a necessary catalyst to resolve the dispute.

The Court adopted amendments to Rule 1.410(d) requiring proof of service to be made consistent with section 92.525, Florida Statutes, and adopted amendments to five court forms to standardize signature block requirements and align notarial certificates with section 117.05(13), Florida Statutes. The Court declined to adopt proposed amendments to Rule 1.442 because they would regulate substantive law regarding settlement proposals and attorney's fees, which are matters governed by section 768.79, Florida Statutes, not procedural rules.

The Court replaced "pro se" with "unrepresented" in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure to align with Federal Rules terminology. The Court added subdivision (b)(6) to rule 1.351 requiring that objections to nonparty subpoenas state grounds with specificity, including reasons. The Court amended rule 1.351(c)(7) to clarify that when a nonparty subpoena is objected to, the requesting party must seek a ruling under rule 1.351(d), reach an agreement, or request production at a deposition under rule 1.310.

Florida Probate Rule 5.171 is deleted as duplicative of statutory law, and Rule 5.205 is amended to require filing of evidence of death under section 731.103, Florida Statutes, rather than specifically an official death certificate, and to prohibit courts from requiring such evidence earlier than prescribed unless there is reasonable cause to believe the decedent is alive.

The Schumacher Defendants were liable for misappropriation of Napleton's trade secret customer list under the "reason to know" standard of section 688.002(2)(a), as subsequent acquirers who knew or had reason to know the trade secret was acquired by improper means. The Schumacher Defendants were jointly and severally liable for unjust enrichment damages under section 688.004(1) because they acted in concert with the primary wrongdoers to misappropriate the same trade secret. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fees and punitive damages against the Schumacher Defe

A lay witness with personal knowledge of a discrete cultural group's common superstitions may testify about those beliefs when the testimony is based on the witness's personal knowledge and does not require specialized expertise, provided the witness has adequate foundation through lived experience in that culture. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the victim's daughter's testimony about a Haitian superstition regarding wearing a dead person's clothes, as her fifteen years of childhood residence in Haiti, regular return visits, and familiarity with Haitian cultural norm

Section 316.6135(4) requires proof that a defendant knowingly left a child unattended in a motor vehicle, not merely that the child was left unattended and suffered great bodily harm. Third-degree felony murder cannot be predicated on an underlying felony that does not require proof of intent. The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the State had to prove the defendant acted knowingly or consciously.

A mandatory surcharge under section 938.04, Florida Statutes, need not be orally pronounced at sentencing and may be imposed in the written sentencing order based on all fines imposed, including those not mentioned during the cost recitation.

A routine toxicology report prepared as part of an autopsy performed pursuant to statutory duty does not violate the Confrontation Clause when testified to by a substitute witness because the report is not testimonial in nature.

A trial court is bound by the parties' stipulated income in calculating child support and does not award support beyond a party's ability to pay when using that stipulated income.