Notable Florida Decisions

A final judgment in a dissolution of marriage case is legally insufficient and must be reversed and remanded when it fails to attach a parenting plan and contains internal inconsistencies regarding parental responsibility and timesharing that fail to adequately comply with section 61.13(2)(a)–(b), Florida Statutes.

A capital defendant's method-of-execution claim based on a medical condition discovered years before the death warrant is untimely under Rule 3.851(d)(1) unless the defendant demonstrates that the facts were unknown or could not have been ascertained by due diligence, and such a claim fails on the merits if it does not establish a substantial and imminent risk of needless suffering under the Baze-Glossip test and does not identify a known and available alternative method of execution that significantly reduces the risk of pain. A categorical exemption from execution based on advanced age is no

A postconviction court may summarily deny a successive rule 3.851 motion without an evidentiary hearing when the motion, files, and records conclusively show the movant is entitled to no relief. Professional resolutions, consensus opinions, and new expert reports reviewing existing trial records do not constitute newly discovered evidence under Florida law. Claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings are procedurally barred in successive motions and cannot be revived through cumulative error arguments based on evidence deemed not newly discovered.

A death row inmate's second successive postconviction motion raising Giglio and Brady claims based on newly discovered evidence from a jailhouse informant's federal deposition testimony was properly denied as untimely and procedurally barred. Previously known evidence does not become newly discovered merely because additional details emerge or the witness testifies again in a different proceeding.

District courts of appeal have jurisdiction to review a trial court's final order denying a downward departure sentence. The Legislature has not clearly limited appellate review of such denials, and sentencing orders are final orders appealable as a matter of right under the Florida Constitution.

Two former officials (Cabrera and Bermudez) who were still serving when the retirement ordinance was enacted acquired vested rights in their pensions because the pension became part of their compensation earned during active service and did not violate Florida Statutes § 215.425, and the City's subsequent repeal impaired those vested rights in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the Florida Constitution. Two other former officials (Ruiz and DiPietro) who had already retired before the ordinance was enacted did not acquire vested rights because their pensions constituted extra compensation fo

Florida Statute section 790.06(2)(b), which categorically prohibits adults aged 18 to 20 from obtaining concealed carry permits, is facially unconstitutional as applied to that age group in violation of the Second Amendment. The plain text of the Second Amendment covers 18- to 20-year-olds' right to public carry, including concealed carry, because they are part of 'the people' and are legal adults under Florida law. The state failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the age-based restriction is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, and the restriction

The trial court exceeded its authority by compelling mediation as a condition precedent to arbitration; once an enforceable arbitration agreement is established, the arbitrator must decide whether mediation is a condition precedent and whether it has been fulfilled. The trial court properly denied the motion to dissolve the temporary injunction because it was entered after notice and a contested hearing, and the appellant failed to show substantive error or clear legal error.

A trial court's award of appellate attorney's fees must be supported by competent substantial evidence demonstrating that the hours claimed were reasonably and necessarily expended, and cannot rest on conclusory testimony, generalized characterizations of complexity, or evidence that fails to account for potential duplication or inefficiency from overlapping legal work.

A lis pendens cannot be filed in a family law enforcement proceeding for child support and alimony arrearages where the property is not directly involved in the litigation and may only be subject to future execution to satisfy a judgment, because such property lacks the required fair nexus to the dispute. The litigation privilege does not provide immunity for tort claims, including slander of title and abuse of process, where the asserted tort itself challenges the propriety of filing the lis pendens, as the privilege extends only to the content of litigation pleadings, not to the wrongful act

A defendant's specific sworn waiver of pretrial motions during a comprehensive plea colloquy conclusively refutes an ineffective assistance claim based on counsel's failure to file such a motion, and a trial court may summarily deny a claim of uncommunicated plea offer where the objective circumstances of record conclusively demonstrate the court would not have accepted the offer.

A trial court must conduct an in-camera review of documents claimed to be privileged when a nonparty asserts a blanket attorney-client privilege objection without document-specific objections or a privilege log, particularly in postjudgment discovery where judgment creditors have expansive rights to discover assets. Asset-related information in a law firm's possession is not automatically shielded by attorney-client privilege.

A trial court's order to sell a marital home as part of equitable distribution must include written findings explaining why a buyout alternative was rejected and must address responsibility for mortgage, taxes, insurance, and other carrying costs pending sale. The failure to assign a specific value to the home, while technically error, is harmless when the judgment directs equal division of sale proceeds.

The Court adopted amendments to rules 8.203 and 8.330 allowing UCCJEA information to be included in the first pleading and clarifying that courts must dismiss dependency cases or find allegations unsustained when evidence is insufficient after all evidence is presented.

An employer/carrier must affirmatively invoke the 120-day pay-and-investigate option by sending written notice to preserve its right to deny compensability; absent such invocation, the carrier is deemed to have accepted the employee's injury as compensable. Once an injury is accepted as compensable, the employer may challenge only the causal link between that injury and particular treatments, not compensability of the injury itself. An employee seeking psychiatric benefits must prove medical necessity of the requested treatment, and failure to establish medical necessity alone supports denial

A trial court must make written findings of fact to support an award of temporary alimony under section 61.08(1)(b), Florida Statutes, specifying the obligee's need for the amount awarded and the obligor's ability to pay that amount. When awarding temporary attorney's fees under section 61.16, a trial court must make specific findings regarding the statutory factors of need, ability to pay, and reasonableness (including hourly rate and hours expended or anticipated), and the record must contain competent, substantial evidence to support the award; unsworn statements by counsel do not constitut

Per curiam affirmances (PCAs) are a legitimate and necessary appellate disposition method appropriate for cases presenting no reversible error and raising only routine applications of settled law. PCAs serve important institutional functions including judicial economy, preservation of precedential clarity, and respect for trial court discretion, and should not be replaced by unpublished or nonprecedential written opinions. The absence of a written opinion does not indicate that an appeal received insufficient consideration, as every appeal receives full judicial review regardless of whether a

A defendant granted immunity for lawful self-defense killing cannot be prosecuted for accessory after the fact to a capital felony because the immunity precludes proof that a capital felony occurred, an essential element of that offense. However, immunity for the underlying killing does not preclude prosecution for making false reports to law enforcement concerning a capital felony, as that offense targets the defendant's conduct toward law enforcement rather than the commission of the underlying crime.

A replevin claim for return of property does not require filing a notice of claim under section 733.702 when the decedent was in permissive possession of the property without asserting ownership and the personal representative first asserted ownership after the decedent's death.

A trial court has discretion under the Criminal Punishment Code to impose a prison sentence below the lowest permissible sentence when mitigating circumstances reasonably justify departure, and cannot restrict downward departure options to probation alone.

A postconviction court denying a rule 3.853 DNA testing motion based on the record must attach the portions of the record that conclusively show the movant is not entitled to relief, and a facially insufficient motion should be denied without prejudice rather than on the merits.

Under section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, a trial court evaluating a motion to amend to add punitive damages claims must consider only the evidence proffered by the claimant and should not entertain counter-submissions from the opponent. The trial court must determine whether a reasonable person could conclude, based on the claimant's evidence, that the defendant committed intentional misconduct or gross negligence as defined in section 768.72(2), without applying the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof that governs the trial-level determination of punitive damages. The trial cour

A pro se defendant cannot later complain of ineffective assistance of standby counsel, even if standby counsel was present during trial. Postconviction claims that could have been raised on direct appeal are procedurally barred from collateral review. A Brady violation claim is insufficiently pleaded when the defendant fails to allege that the prosecution made the information unavailable to the defense, particularly where the defendant had access to his own mental health records. Appellate counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise an unpreserved claim unless the alleged error constitutes

The Florida Supreme Court adopted amendments to Rules 9.210, 9.310, 9.800, and 9.900 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, including a new requirement for jurisdictional statements in initial briefs, clarifications regarding stay bond calculations, and updated case citation formats.

A lawyer who admits to aiding in the filing of a false certificate in federal court is guilty of professional misconduct justifying discipline, but when the underlying criminal conviction has been fully exonerated under a sister state's law, a public reprimand is appropriate rather than suspension.

Tamara Cadet was pulled over for displaying an illuminated blue Uber sign on her dashboard in violation of Florida Statutes section 316.2397, which prohibits non-police vehicles from displaying blue lights. The trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence from the subsequent search that revealed drugs, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that an illuminated Uber sign qualifies as a "device" displaying blue light under the statute and that ride-share drivers are not excepted from the prohibition.

The Florida Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to grant a constitutional writ to intervene in a First District Court of Appeal's pending appeal of a trial court's order denying a temporary injunction, as the doctrine of all writs does not provide an independent basis for the Court's jurisdiction. A temporary injunction decision involves only procedural discretion regarding preservation of jurisdiction rather than substantive constitutional rights, and therefore does not necessarily implicate constitutional provisions that would establish the Court's discretionary jurisdiction. The First District

A jury verdict determining contractual damages in an underlying breach of contract action does not preclude a subsequent first-party bad faith action under section 624.155, provided the insured has established a determination of the insurer's liability for coverage, a determination of the extent of contractual damages, and has filed the required civil remedy notice. The insured may seek extra-contractual damages in the bad faith action that were not recoverable in the breach of contract action, but may not relitigate the contractual damages already determined by verdict. The Fridman rule requi

Section 194.036(1)(c) requires the Department of Revenue to investigate an assertion of consistent and continuous violations by a value adjustment board and determine, based on a preponderance of the evidence, whether such a violation has actually occurred, not merely whether probable cause exists. The statute's plain language—requiring the DOR to "find upon investigation" that a violation "has occurred" and conspicuously omitting the phrase "probable cause"—reflects a legislative choice to impose a more demanding standard than probable cause. The DOR's decision must be set aside and remanded

When a trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence conflicts with the written sentencing order, the oral pronouncement prevails, and the written order must be corrected to conform to it.