IN RE THE ESTATE OF ELIZABETH W. BLAKEY, DECEASED. VIRGINIA S. HODGES, APPELLANT,
v.
FLAGSHIP FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ETC., ELEANOR WEBB MANSOLILLO, DOROTHY W. DELAWDER, MARY W. MURRELL AND GLADYS W. YANCEY, APPELLEES
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Virginia Hodges, a niece excluded from Elizabeth Blakey's 1972 will, appealed the probate court's admission of the will and denial of her petition for revocation based on alleged lack of testamentary capacity. The appellate court affirmed the probate order, finding competent substantial evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the decedent possessed testamentary capacity at execution or during a lucid interval.
The trial court properly concluded that Mrs. Blakey possessed the requisite testamentary capacity at execution or, alternatively, that she executed the will during a lucid interval when she possessed such capacity. The appellate court will not substitute its judgment for the trial judge's when competent substantial evidence supports the finding of testamentary capacity.
[1] Testamentary capacity is to be judged solely at the time of the execution of the will.
[2] A trial court's finding of testamentary capacity will be affirmed if supported by competent substantial evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Testamentary capacity is to be judged solely at the time of the execution of the will, and as there was competent substantial evidence to sustain the trial judge's conclusion of competency, we will not substitute our judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.”
Establishes the legal standard for testamentary capacity and the deferential appellate review standard
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceElizabeth Blakey executed a will on November 10, 1972, when she was approximately 85 years old and in poor physical health. The testatrix had been a n…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant/petitioner, the niece of the testatrix’s deceased husband, appeals from an order admitting a challenged will to probate and denying her petition for revocation of said will. Appellees/respondents are Flagship National Bank of Miami Beach, the designated personal representative of the deceased’s estate, and deceased’s four nieces, beneficiaries under the will.
On June 4, 1976, Flagship National Bank of Miami Beach filed a petition for administration of the Estate of Elizabeth W. Bla-key. Shortly thereafter, on June 8,1976, an order admitting the testatrix’s will of November 10,1972, to probate was entered by the trial court. This 1972 will had been executed by Mrs. Blakey when she was approximately eighty-five (85) years of age and in poor physical health. Appellant was a named beneficiary in the prior will of the testatrix but was excluded from the will of 1972.
On September 7, 1976, appellant filed a petition for the revocation of probate on the grounds that, at the time of the execution of the will, Mrs. Blakey lacked the requisite testamentary capacity. After a two day hearing on the petition, during which time the very able trial judge heard much contradictory testimony concerning the de ceased’s powers of comprehension, a lengthy order was entered, replete with findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the order, the judge concluded that Mrs. Blakey possessed the requisite testamentary capacity in the execution of her last will and testament or, alternatively, that Mrs. Blakey executed her will during a lucid interval at which time she did possess the requisite testamentary capacity.
While appellant strenuously emphasizes that the greater weight of the evidence supports the view that Mrs. Bla-key lacked testamentary capacity, the record does reveal competent substantial evidence to the effect that the deceased at least possessed testamentary capacity during a lucid interval during which time she executed the will.
Testamentary capacity is to be judged solely at the time of the execution of the will, and as there was competent substantial evidence to sustain the trial judge’s conclusion of competency, we will not substitute our judgment for the judgment of the trial judge. In re Carnegie’s Estate, 153 Fla. 7, 13 So. 2d 299 (1943); Skelton v. Davis, 133 So. 2d 432 (Fla.3d DCA 1961).
Accordingly, the order admitting the last will and testament of Elizabeth W. Blakey to probate is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Shamas v. Dorthea E. Ritter, 432 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…ctive role in the testatrix’s affairs, especially in the preparation of a new will, is supported by competent and substantial evidence and thus, will not be disturbed. See In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697 (Fla.1971); In re Estate of Blakey, 363 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Affirmed.…
Authorities Cited
- Skelton v. Davis, 133 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)
- In re Est. OF Alice Bell Carnegie, 153 Fla. 7 (Fla. 1943)