SHELTON LEBRONC HANNA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Shelton Hanna appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically challenging his attorney's decision not to sever firearm charges from armed robbery, carjacking, and burglary counts. The Florida appellate court affirmed the denial, finding the tactical decision fell within the broad range of professional judgments and did not meet the ineffective assistance standard.
Counsel's decision to oppose severance was a tactical judgment that fell within the broad range of professional decisions and was not objectively unreasonable; the decision did not result in a likelihood of different outcome. The trial court properly denied the motion to hold the Rule 3.850 motion in abeyance because the federal limitations period is tolled during pendency of properly filed state post-conviction applications.
[1] A criminal defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's tactical decisions is presumed to be within the range of professional judgment, absen…
[2] A motion to hold state post-conviction proceedings in abeyance to preserve federal habeas corpus time frames is unnecessary because the federal limitations period is toll…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Hanna's motion under Rule 3.850 fails because of the strong presumption that a tactical decision of the sort made by his counsel (and approved by Hanna himself during the proceedings on February 4, 2003) falls within the broad range of professional judgments made by defense counsel preparing a case for trial.”
Establishes the applicable legal standard for reviewing counsel's tactical decisions in ineffective assistance claims.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHanna was charged with multiple counts including possession of a firearm by a career criminal, armed robbery, armed carjacking, and burglary with assa…
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PER CURIAM.
Shelton Lebronc Hanna, pro se, appeals the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Hanna alleged ineffective assistance of his counsel in connection with his counsel’s decision to oppose the severance of a count for the possession of a firearm by a career criminal from three other counts for armed robbery, armed carjacking and burglary with assault while armed.
Hanna also appeals the trial court’s denial of his “Motion to Hold Rule 3.850 Motion in Abeyance for Purposes of Preserving AEDPA Time Frames and Supplementation,” which was filed while the Rule 3.850 motion was pending, as well as the denial of his motion to strike the State’s response to that motion. Finding no error in any of these rulings, we affirm.
Hanna’s motion under Rule 3.850 fails because of the strong presumption that a tactical decision of the sort made by his counsel (and approved by Hanna himself during the proceedings on February 4, 2003) falls within the broad range of professional judgments made by defense counsel preparing a case for trial. That decision exposed Hanna to a single trial rather than two trials, and the pretrial stipulation regarding his status as a three-time convicted felon limited the State’s ability to offer extensive details regarding the underlying violent crimes. The record below does not demonstrate that defense counsel’s decisions on these matters were objectively unreasonable, and it does not establish that the outcome likely would have been different but for counsel’s decisions; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Hanna’s motion to hold his Rule 3.850 motion in abeyance and his motion to strike the State’s response to that motion are based on a flawed assumption. Hanna claims that the limitations period for a post-conviction federal petition might expire while his state remedies are pending, but that is incorrect. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), that limitations period is tolled during the pendency of “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” relating to the underlying judgment.
Affirmed.
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Citator
Cited By
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Alford v. State, 166 So. 3d 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…ly prejudice appellant by becoming a feature of the trial if admitted as collateral crime evidence. Regardless, under certain circumstances, defense counsel’s agreement to consolidation can constitute a reasonable trial strategy. See Hanna v. State, 970 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Johnson v. State, 942 So. 2d 415, 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). However, a finding that some action or inaction by defense counsel was tactical is generally inappropriate without an evidentiary hearing. Williams v. State, 872 So.…
Authorities Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984)