HONORABLE ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A COUNTY COURT JUDGE IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
ROBERT W. HARDIN, RESPONDENT
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a circuit court's writ of prohibition that had blocked a county court from proceeding with trial of a municipal ordinance violation. The court held that the municipal court complied with the statutory three-day transfer requirement, which measures from the clerk's receipt of the judge's order, not from the date the order was signed.
The three-day transfer requirement was satisfied because it pertains to the clerk's transfer of the record after receipt of the judge's order, not three days from the date the order was signed. The county court therefore acted within its jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss and proceeding with trial.
[1] A statutory requirement for a clerk to transfer a record within three days of receiving a judge's order pertains to the time after receipt, not after the date of the orde…
[2] A writ of prohibition is improperly issued when a court acts within its jurisdiction.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 932.61, Florida Statutes (1975), requires a municipal judge to forthwith entertain a petition for transfer to a court providing jury trials and, upon finding the petition to be correct, order by written endorsement on the petition, the transfer of the cause to the appropriate court. The statute goes on to provide that the Clerk of the Municipal Court shall within three days from receipt of the judge's order transfer the original record to the appropriate court.”
Establishes the statutory framework governing transfer of cases and the timing requirement the dispute centers on.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee requested transfer of his municipal ordinance violation case from Municipal Court of Pembroke Pines to County Court of Broward County. The mu…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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DOWNEY, Chief Judge.
The State of Florida has appealed the issuance of a writ of prohibition in which the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit prohibited the County Court from proceeding to trial of appellee for violation of a municipal ordinance.
Appellee filed a request for transfer of his ordinance violation from the Municipal Court of Pembroke Pines to the County Court of Broward County. The Municipal Judge signed the order of transfer and seven days later the Clerk of the Municipal Court received the order and effected the transfer on that same day. Appellee sought a writ of prohibition in the Circuit Court to prohibit the Appellant County Judge from proceeding with a trial of his case. It was appellee’s contention that the Municipal Court had not complied with the three day requirement for transfer of the record to the County Court.
Section 932.61, Florida Statutes (1975), requires a municipal judge to forthwith entertain a petition for transfer to a court providing jury trials and, upon finding the petition to be correct, order by written endorsement on the petition, the transfer of the cause to the appropriate court. The statute goes on to provide that the Clerk of the Municipal Court shall within three days from receipt of the judge’s order transfer the original record to the appropriate court.
There is no claim here that the municipal judge did not entertain the petition forthwith or that the clerk did not transfer the record within three days as required by the statute. On the contrary, appellee alleged in his petition for writ of prohibition in the Circuit Court that “the municipality had failed to transfer the said cause to the County within the requisite three (3) days from the date of the signing of the order of transfer, pursuant to F.S. 932.61(4).” Ap-pellee argued the three day requirement was mandatory and jurisdictional and, thus, the County Court should not be allowed to proceed.
We need not reach the merits of appel-lee’s contention regarding the mandatory versus directory aspect of the statutory section involved because the three day time specification was complied with. That requirement pertains to the clerk’s transfer of the record after receipt of the judge’s order, not three days after the date of the order. In view of the foregoing the County Court acted within its jurisdiction in denying appellee’s motion to dismiss the charges and the issuance of the writ of prohibition was error and is accordingly reversed. CROSS, J., concurs.
DAUKSCH, J., dissents without opinion.