LEVERAL "SPARKY" RAFFIELD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Raffield appeals his conviction, challenging whether he consented to a warrantless search of his barn. The court holds that Raffield's acquiescence to the search—merely responding to officers' announcement that they would search—does not constitute valid consent, and reverses his conviction.
Raffield did not consent to the warrantless search. His acquiescence—passive submission to the officers' announced search—does not constitute the free, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights required for valid consent to a warrantless search.
[1] The State bears the burden of proving that consent to a warrantless search was freely and voluntarily given, not mere acquiescence to apparent authority.
[2] Consent to justify a warrantless search must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where consent is relied upon to justify a warrantless search, the State has the burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given and was not mere acquiescence to apparent authority.”
Establishes the legal standard for valid consent to warrantless searches and allocation of burden to the State.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceNine law enforcement officers from various agencies went to Raffield's farm to search his barn. When officers arrived, Raffield was at his house. An a…
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MILLS, Judge.
The facts of this case are sufficiently set forth in prior opinions entered in this cause.1 Pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court, the sole issue for our determination is whether Raffield consented to the warrantless search of his barn.
Where consent is relied upon to justify a warrantless search, the State has the burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given and was not mere acquiescence to apparent authority. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). Such consent must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Talavera v. State, 186 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).
The transcript of the suppression hearing reveals that the State was not relying on consent to justify the warrantless search. What was said and done at Raf-field’s farm immediately prior to the search was not even mentioned in the State’s presentation. After the State rested, John Van Tronk, an agent of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, was called by the defense. He stated that nine law enforcement officers from various state, local and federal agencies in four or five vehicles went to Raffield’s farm after receiving instructions to search the barn. Raffield was in front of his house when the officers arrived. Van Tronk told Raffield that the officers were going to search the barn and asked Raffield if he wanted to go down to the barn with them. Raffield got in the car with Van Tronk. When they arrived at the barn Van Tronk said, “We’re going to search the barn now”, and Raffield replied, “Well, it’s in there” or “I’m guilty” or words to that effect.
“Acquiescence which is resignation — a mere submission in an orderly way to the actions of arresting agents — is not that consent which constitutes an unequivocal, free and intelligent waiver of a fundamental right.” United States v. Gregory, 204 F.Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y.1962).
Clearly, there was no consent to the war-rantless search at Raffield’s barn. The trial court erred in denying Raffield’s motion to suppress the evidence, and therefore the judgments of conviction and sentences are reversed.
McCORD, C. J., concurs.
BOYER, J., dissents.
. Raffield v. State, 333 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), quashed in part and remanded, 351 So. 2d 945 (Fla.1977).
BOYER, Judge,
dissenting.
In my view Raffield’s words coupled with his actions constituted consent rather than mere acquiescence, submission or resignation. I would affirm.
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State v. Morsman, 394 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1981)…m the record. The defendant showed that the plants were located and seized without a warrant, at which point the burden shifted to the state to justify the search and seizure. Raffield v. State, 351 So. 2d 945 (Fla.1977); reversed on other grounds, 362 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). The plants were not open to view. There were no exigent circumstances to allow the officer to enter defendant’s backyard and seize the marijuana plants to prevent destruction or removal of evidence. The policeman had time to tal…
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Major v. State, 389 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…y Florida law, Norman v. State, 379 So. 2d 643, 647 (Fla.1980), that the defendant permitted, invited or agreed to the police search. As in the remarkably similar cases of Luxenburg v. State, 384 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) and Ratfield v. State, 362 So. 2d 138, 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), see also, Ingram v. State, 364 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), we therefore hold that the defendant did not validly consent to the warrantless search.2 As there is no other even arguable basis to support the seizure of the…
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Correa v. State, 389 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…not say whether defendant Correa heard or understood his rights. At no time did defendant Correa verbally consent to the search. The state, therefore, failed to meet its burden of proving consent by clear and convincing evidence. Raffield v. State, 362 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). We need not reach the issues concerning any unlawful detention prior to the search because our holding that defendant Correa gave no consent makes the determination of those issues unnecessary. We reverse the judgment below and…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (U.S. 1968)
- Lelis v. State, 186 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Leveral Raffield v. State, 351 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1977)
- Leveral "Sparky" Raffield v. State, 333 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)