RUBY ANDERSON FISHER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1978-07-20
No. GG-148
BOYER and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
361 So. 2d 203 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1978) Caution
Cited by 5 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Ruby Fisher was convicted of third-degree murder and grand larceny for her role in a stabbing death. The Florida appellate court reversed her murder conviction because the medical examiner testified, without scientific basis, that the knife wounds were characteristic of those inflicted by a woman—impermissible stereotypical opinion evidence.


Holding

The court reversed the murder conviction because the medical examiner lacked qualification to offer the opinion and it was not based on scientific evidence, knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. The opinion was based solely on stereotyped cultural notions about men and women and bore no legitimate relationship to the defendant.


Headnotes

[1] A medical examiner's opinion testimony regarding the gender of the perpetrator of stab wounds is inadmissible if not based on scientific evidence or established fact.

[2] Expert testimony based on vague notions of stereotyped characteristics rather than specific knowledge or facts is inadmissible.

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Key Quotes

“The medical examiner admitted that he had no knowledge of a scientific nature from which he could justify the opinion he offered. He acknowledged that his assumption that the stab wounds were inflicted by a woman was not based on any scientific evidence or established fact.”

Establishes the examiner lacked any scientific foundation for the opinion

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Facts & Procedural History

Mrs. Fisher and her husband were charged with first-degree murder and grand larceny in a stabbing death. Her husband pleaded guilty to second-degree m…

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Opinion of the Court
MILLS, Acting Chief Judge.

MILLS, Acting Chief Judge.

The issue determinative of this appeal is whether the trial court erred in allowing a medical examiner to testify for the State, over the defendant’s objection, that in his opinion the knife wounds found on the victim’s body were inflicted by a woman.

Mrs. Fisher and her husband were charged by indictment with first degree murder and grand larceny. In return for a statement implicating his wife in the death of the victim, Fisher was permitted to plead guilty to second degree murder with an understanding that he would receive a sentence of no more than ten years in prison. A jury found Mrs. Fisher guilty of third degree murder and grand larceny. She was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment for the murder conviction and five years imprisonment for the larceny conviction, the sentences to be served consecutively. She appeals.

At the trial, Fisher testified that his wife, who was seated on the rear seat of the victim’s car, began arguing with the victim, who was seated on the passenger side of the front seat, got a knife from somewhere and began stabbing the victim.

The medical examiner, a forensic pathologist, described the stab wounds and over objection stated that the knife wounds were more characteristic of those made by a woman than those made by a man. On cross-examination, the medical examiner admitted that he didn’t know whether it was true that men were more handy with a knife than women and that his opinion that the knife wounds were more characteristic of those made by a woman was not based on scientific evidence but was merely his general belief.

We reverse. The medical examiner admitted that he had no knowledge of a scientific nature from which he could justify the opinion he offered. He acknowledged that his assumption that the stab wounds were inflicted by a woman was not based on any scientific evidence or established fact. He admitted that he had no knowledge of the individual strength and capacity of Mrs. Fisher and her husband. He agreed that his opinion was simply based on vague notions of stereotyped characteristics of the men and the women in our culture and it bore no relationship to Mrs. Fisher other than she was a woman.

The witness was not qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to express the opinion stated. Nor were there facts adduced at trial to support the opinion. Under the facts of this case, many unstated here because unnecessary to this decision, the opinion was damaging and prejudicial to Mrs. Fisher. Mrs. Fisher contends the trial court made other errors. We have considered her arguments, both oral and written, and do not find substantial merit in them. A recitation of the reasons here would add nothing to the law of our State or to this decision.

The issue resolved by this appeal has nothing to do with the larceny conviction. We, therefore, affirm the judgment adjudicating Mrs. Fisher guilty of larceny.

We reverse the judgment adjudicating her guilty of third degree murder and remand this case for a new trial on this issue.

BOYER and ERVIN, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Delap v. State, 440 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1983)
    …hen it overruled his objection to Dr. Schofield’s opinion concerning the cause of death of the victim, arguing that the expert can only present an opinion when it is expressed in terms of “reasonable medical certainty”. He relies on Fisher v. State, 361 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and Wright v. State, 348 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 679 (1977). In Fisher and Wright, convictions were reversed because the evidence adduced in each one of these cases was beyond the expertise of the expe…
  • Williams v. State, 209 So. 3d 543 (Fla. 2017)
    …she was not an expert regarding the mechanism or speed that silicone migrates through the body, did not review any literature regarding the effects of silicone in the body, and could not point to anything to support her conclusion); Fisher v. State, 361 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (it was error to allow the medical examiner to opine that the victim’s knife wounds were more characteristic of those made by a woman than a man because this opinion was “simply based on vague notions of stereotyped characte…
  • Sharnika Lashay Moore-Bryant v. State, 386 So. 3d 567 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024)
    …” Gilliam v. State, 514 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 1987). In each of the three cases cited by appellant, the court concluded that the expert witness’s testimony was neither reliable nor scientific and should not have been allowed. Id.; Fisher v. State, 361 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Wright v. State, 348 So. 2d 26, 29, 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Because the detective was a lay witness, these cases are inapplicable to the instant case. We find the trial court did not err in allowing the detective to testif…

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