DOROTHY W. WOOLZY AND DAVID WOOLZY, APPELLANTS,
v.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, ETC., APPELLEE
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Appellants challenged a trial court's dismissal of their third-party complaint seeking declaratory judgment regarding an insurer's failure to renew an insurance policy. The court affirmed the dismissal on the merits but reversed the prejudicial nature of the dismissal, holding that the complaint should have been dismissed without prejudice because the applicable statute addressed only cancellations, not nonrenewals.
The court held that the trial court properly considered documents that were part of the pleadings under the rules of civil procedure, properly interpreted the applicable statute as a matter of law, and correctly dismissed the complaint because Section 627.728(12) addressed only cancellations and not nonrenewals. However, the dismissal should have been without prejudice rather than with prejudice.
[1] Documents incorporated by a party into their complaint may be considered by the court as part of the pleadings.
[2] A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action when, even assuming the facts alleged are true, the applicable statute provides no relief.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court, in effect, ruled that, even assuming the facts alleged to be true, the statute upon which appellants sued afforded them no relief. This is the appropriate test under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(b)(6).”
Establishes the proper standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss—determining whether the law provides relief even if facts are accepted as true.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants Dorothy W. Woolzy and David Woolzy brought an action for declaratory judgment against GEICO seeking adjudication of their rights relating t…
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KEHOE, Judge.
Appellants, third party plaintiffs below, bring this appeal from an order dated September 28, 1977, entered by the trial court dismissing with prejudice their third party complaint against appellee, third party defendant below.
Appellants brought an action for a declaratory judgment seeking an adjudication of their rights relating to appellee’s failure to renew a policy of insurance. Thereafter, appellee filed a motion to dismiss which the trial court granted with prejudice. From the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion, appellants appeal.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred (1) by considering extraneous documents attached to appellee’s motion to dismiss, and (2) by dismissing their third party complaint with prejudice.
Our review of the record shows that the trial court did not consider any “extraneous documents” in ruling on appellee’s motion to dismiss. The trial court did consider certain documents which appellants incorporated into their third party complaint, but pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.130(b), these documents were properly considered by the trial court as a part of the pleadings.
Further, appellants argue that the trial court improperly made determinations of fact in its ruling. The record shows that the trial court merely interpreted the applicable statute [Section 627.728(12), Florida Statutes (1975)] in conjunction with the facts pleaded. The trial court, in effect, ruled that, even assuming the facts alleged to be true, the statute upon which appellants sued afforded them no relief. This is the appropriate test under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(b)(6).
Appellants sought relief below pursuant to Section 627.728(12), Florida Statutes (1975). This Section provides certain guidelines for cancellations and nonrenew-als; however, subsection (12) relates solely to cancellations. The pleadings in this case show that the policy in question was not renewed (as distinguished from being can-celled); accordingly, the trial court ruled that the facts alleged by appellants did not warrant relief under that portion of the statute, i. e., Section 627.728(12), dealing with cancellations. Such a finding went to the statutory basis for the cause of action which appellants attempted to assert. In this posture, we feel that a question of law was presented to the trial court which it properly resolved adverse to appellants. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140(b)(6). Appellants second point on appeal attacks the trial court’s dismissal of its action with prejudice. Under the circumstances of this case, we believe that the trial court should have granted appellee’s motion to dismiss, but without prejudice.
Accordingly, the order appealed is affirmed, except it is reversed to the extent that it dismissed appellants’ third party complaint with prejudice.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
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