RICHMOND H. NEALE, APPELLANT,
v.
ELIZABETH B. NEALE, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the trial court enforced a settlement agreement between the parties but interpreted it to exclude certain real property and a diamond ring owned separately by the wife, awarding them to her. The husband appealed, arguing the court could not vary the terms of an enforceable agreement.
The court held that the trial court, as trier of law and fact, had authority to interpret the language of the agreement to exclude property owned separately by the wife. The court also held the denial of attorney's fees was proper because the husband secured all jointly-held property of the parties, which was extensive.
[1] A court has the authority to interpret the language of a property settlement agreement to determine the intent of the parties.
[2] A court may enforce a property settlement agreement while also interpreting its terms to determine the scope of obligations.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the court, as the trier of law and fact, had the authority to interpret the language of the agreement, as it did, so as not to include these parcels of property owned separately by the wife”
Establishes that trial courts have discretionary authority to interpret settlement agreement language and need not include property owned separately by a spouse
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRichmond and Elizabeth Neale entered into a letter agreement during dissolution proceedings whereby the husband would pay the wife $20,000 in full set…
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PEARSON, Judge.
The appellant was the respondent husband in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. During the course of the litigation, the parties, by a letter agreement, sought to make a property settlement. The appellant moved the court to enforce the agreement and the court granted the motion with provisions not relevant to this appeal. The letter agreement provided, in part, as follows:
“My client offered $20,000 to be paid to your client, in full and complete settlement of all obligations he has or may have in this situation, including but not limited to alimony, support, rehabilitation and/or property settlement and in addition child support. That in return your client shall transfer to Mr. Neale clear title to all real and personal property owned by the parties.” The court subsequently entered its judgment which contained the following provision concerning certain property:
“3. That in accordance with the agreement of September 13,1976 and the testimony and evidence received during the final hearing, the Court determined that the property legally described as:
Lot 17 in Block 15 of ESSEX VILLAGE THIRD ADDITION, according to the Plat thereof, recorded in Plat Book 47, at Page 94 of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida,
and the mortgage resulting from the sale of the property legally described as:
The North 66 feet of the South 330 feet of the West xk of the West lh of the Northwest Vi of the Southeast Vi of Section 28, Township 56 South, Range 29 East, lying and being in Dade County, Florida.
and the diamond ring owned by the parties shall be the property of the Petitioner, ELIZABETH B. NEALE, free and clear of the claim of the Respondent, RICHMOND H. NEALE.”
The burden of appellant’s argument is that the court, having held the agreement enforceable, could not vary the terms of the agreement. He relies on Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 281 (Fla.1953); and Davis v. Davis, 301 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
We hold that the court, as the trier of law and fact, had the authority to interpret the language of the agreement, as it did, so as not to include these parcels of property owned separately by the wife. See the principles of law in Pipkin v. FMC Corporation, 427 F. 2d 353 (5th Cir. 1970).
A second point claims error upon the denial of the husband’s motion for attorney’s fees. The denial was proper where, as here, the husband secured by the agreement all of the jointly-held property of the parties, which was extensive.
Affirmed.
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Ender Oguz v. Olyar Oguz, 478 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Neal v. Neal, 403 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), rev. denied, 412 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1982); Mills v. Mills, 339 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). . See Hogshead, 444 So. 2d at 76 (Orfinger, J., dissenting); Neale v. Neale, 360 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1371 (Fla.1979). . See Fort v. Fort, 90 So. 2d 313 (Fla.1956); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 385 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 392 So. 2d 1381 (Fla.1980); Fagan v. Lewis, 374 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3rd D…
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Cameron v. Cameron, 591 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…entitled to share in the success of the real estate investments they engaged in after their marriage. This appears to be a plausible interpretation of this agreement, based on this record, and as an appellate court we should affirm. Neale v. Neale, 360 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1371 (Fla.1979). Phyllis argues that the trial court erred by not equitably distributing all the parties’ marital assets: specifically, the appreciation in value of Richard’s businesses, in real estate o…
Authorities Cited
- Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1953)
- Davis v. Davis, 301 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Brown v. State, 301 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Pipkin v. FMC Corp., 427 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1970)