JIMMY FLOYD WRIGHT, PETITIONER,
v.
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION, RESPONDENT
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A state prisoner petitioned for habeas corpus after prison officials forfeited his accumulated gain-time following his escape and guilty plea to escape charges, without notice or hearing. The court held that Florida law permits such forfeiture without due process protections and denied the petition, though it declined to address whether gain-time forfeiture should have been disclosed before accepting the guilty plea.
The court held that Section 944.28(1) of the Florida Statutes permits forfeiture of gain-time without notice or hearing and does not violate due process rights. The court declined to decide whether the potential forfeiture of gain-time constitutes part of the minimum mandatory or maximum possible penalty that should be disclosed before accepting a guilty plea.
[1] A statute allowing forfeiture of earned gain-time upon a prisoner's conviction for escape, without requiring notice or a hearing, does not violate due process.
[2] A statute expressly providing for forfeiture of gain-time without notice or hearing precludes a statutory remedy for a hearing on the forfeiture.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If a prisoner is convicted of escape, or if the clemency or parole granted to him is revoked, the Department of Offender Rehabilitation may, without notice or hearing, declare a forfeiture of all gain-time earned and extra gain-time allowed such prisoner, if any, prior to such escape or his release under such clemency or parole, as the case may be.”
The statutory provision permitting forfeiture of gain-time without notice or hearing that the court upheld as constitutional.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWright escaped from a state road prison and was apprehended. He pleaded guilty to escape charges, and the trial judge sentenced him to one year and on…
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SMITH, Acting Chief Judge.
Wright, a state prisoner, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that respondent Wainwright has taken his liberty, in the form of gain-time, without due process of law.
Wright escaped from a state road prison, was apprehended, and pleaded guilty to a charge of escape. The trial judge accepted his guilty plea, without informing him that he might lose his accumulated gain-time upon his return to prison, and sentenced him to serve one year and one day to run consecutively with his existing sentence. Wright alleges that, on returning to prison, officials told him he had “automatically” forfeited 260 days of gain-time on his prior sentence because of his escape and conviction. Wright seeks restoration of his forfeited gain-time because he was not given notice or a hearing to contest the forfeiture, which Wright urges is guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provides that:
(1) If a prisoner is convicted of escape, or if the clemency or parole granted to him is revoked, the Department of Offender Rehabilitation may, without notice or hearing, declare a forfeiture of all gain-time earned and extra gain-time allowed such prisoner, if any, prior to such escape or his release under such clemency or parole, as the case may be.
The Florida Supreme Court recently held that Section 944.28(1) does not offend constitutionally guaranteed due process rights. Morgan v. Cook, 344 So. 2d 577 (Fla.1977), followed by this court in Hanks v. Wainwright, 360 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1st. DCA 1978). Moreover, the statute’s express provision for forfeiture without notice or hearing forecloses any hearing remedy Wright might otherwise have under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1977), as a person whose substantial interests are determined by an agency. See Florida Dep’t of Offender Rehab. v. Jerry, 353 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
We do not pass on whether the potential forfeiture of gain-time, discretionary under the present statute but allegedly automatic in practice, is in law or in practice part of the minimum mandatory or maximum possible penalty contemplated by Rule 3.172(c)(i), Fla.R.Crim.P., of which the trial judge should have advised Wright before accepting his guilty plea. See Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d 267, 271 (Fla.1975). That issue must be raised, if at all, by an appropriate attack on the judgment and sentence.
The petition is DENIED.
ERVIN and BOOTH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Sandsbury LEE v. Dugger, 902 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1990)…., Ellis v. Wainwright, 428 So. 2d 785, 786 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983); Morris v. Wainwright, 409 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982); Holman v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm’n, 407 So. 2d 638, 638-39 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981); Wright v. Wainwright, 359 So. 2d 11, 11-12 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978); cf. Florida Dep’t of Rehab. v. Jerry, 353 So. 2d 1230, 1233-34 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (discussing applicability of Administrative Procedure Act to prison disciplinary proceedings), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1215 (Fla.19…
Authorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1975)
- The Fla. Dep't OF Offender Rehab. v. Leroy Jerry and the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, 353 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Morgan v. Al Cook, 344 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1977)
- Hanks v. Louie L. Wainwright, 360 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)