RICHARD NASRALLAH HOMES, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
CARL G. RASSLER AND AMARILYS G. RASSLER, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Mechanic'S Lien Foreclosure cases and more on FLexlaw
BOARDMAN, Chief Judge.
By this appeal we review the amended final judgment rendered pursuant to a jury verdict in a suit brought by appellant/cross-appellee/plaintiff, Richard Nasrallah Homes, Inc., against appellees/cross-appel-lants/defendants, Carl G. and Amarilys G. Rassler, to foreclose a mechanic’s lien.
After a review of the evidence in its entirety, consideration of the briefs, and after hearing oral arguments, we hold that there was sufficient, competent evidence to support the jury verdicts. We cannot, however, sustain the award of the trial court of prejudgment interest in the sum of $531.36 to appellant. See, e. g., Newcombe v. South Florida Business Negotiators, Inc., 340 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). We, therefore, direct the trial court to delete that item from the amended final judgment. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED as modified with directions.
OTT and DANAHY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Cates v. Orlando R. Graham, M.D., Ponder & Assocs. Emergency Physicians, P.A., 427 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…w. We affirm upon the Supreme Court reasoning contained in Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Company, 357 So. 2d 401 (Fla.1978). The question of the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law for the court. City of St. Petersburg v. Austin, 355 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); 30 Fla.Jur., Statutes § 76. In performing that function the court may determine, under the facts of the case, whether or not the party was afforded a reasonable time in which to act before being barred under the applicable statu…
-
McCOY v. Hollywood Quarries, Inc., 544 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…left undefined, McCoy asserts that the drafters intended to include temporary striping within the meaning of a “safety device.” Since statutory interpretation is a matter of law to be determined by the trial court, City of St. Petersburg v. Austin, 355 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), it was incumbent upon the court below to examine the MTCSP to determine whether the drafters intended to include temporary striping within the meaning of a “safety device.” Furthermore, since administrative rules have the force a…
-
State v. Roland, 577 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…ldren move on to the first grade when they graduate. Thus, the issue is solely one of statutory interpretation. Therefore, because “[s]tatutory interpretation is a matter of law to be determined by the trial court,” City of St. Petersburg v. Austin, 355 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), the trial court did not err in resolving the issue on a motion to dismiss. The language of the instant statute, unlike the language of other statutes, does not expressly include kindergartens or preschools. See section 228.…
Authorities Cited
- Newcombe v. S. Fla. Bus. Negotiators, Inc., 340 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)