STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CARLIE NOLAN MANCIL, JR., APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed a trial court order placing Mancil on probation, arguing it was illegal because it constituted a sentence reduction entered outside the 60-day window prescribed by Florida Criminal Procedure Rule 3.800. The court agreed, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence and that probation does not constitute a valid sentence reduction.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to reduce Mancil's sentence because the May 16, 1977 order was entered well beyond the 60-day period prescribed by Rule 3.800(b). Additionally, even if the court had jurisdiction, placing Mancil on probation does not constitute a reduction of sentence as contemplated by the rule.
[1] A trial court must act on a motion to mitigate a sentence within the time period prescribed by Fla.R.Crim.P. …
[2] A trial court exceeds its authority by vacating a sentence when Fla.R.Crim.P. …
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court had jurisdiction to reduce it for only sixty days following the mandate issued by this court upon affirmance of the judgment and sentence upon Mancil's direct appeal. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(b).”
Establishes the strict 60-day jurisdictional deadline for sentence reduction after appellate affirmance
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMancil was convicted of assault and battery and sentenced to one year in jail. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, with the mandate received…
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RYDER, Judge.
The state appeals an order mitigating appellee Mancil’s sentence. The state contends this order was illegal as it was entered after the expiration of the period of time prescribed in Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800 within which a sentence may be reduced. We agree and reverse.
Maneil was originally tried and convicted of assault and battery and sentenced to one year in jail. This court affirmed the judgment and sentence on his direct appeal, Mancil v. State, 338 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); our mandate was received by the trial court on October 22, 1976. That same day Mancil filed a motion to mitigate his sentence, pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800. After a hearing on the motion, the trial judge entered an order on December 17, 1976 vacating the original sentence and setting a new sentencing hearing to be held in April, 1977 before the original trial judge. This was done over the state’s objection.
The state subsequently filed a petition for rehearing, which was granted. After hearing, the trial court concluded it had erred in its December 17, 1976 order. Accordingly, on May 16,1977, the court vacated its December 17, 1976 order and placed Mancil on probation for one year with certain special conditions. It is this May 16, 1977 order which the state here appeals.
Insofar as it purports to “reduce” Mancil’s sentence by placing him on probation, the May 16, 1977 order is illegal. Since the original sentence imposed was a legal sentence, the trial court had jurisdiction to reduce it for only sixty days following the mandate issued by this court upon affirmance of the judgment and sentence upon Mancil’s direct appeal. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(b). The trial court must act on a motion to mitigate within the applicable time period prescribed in the rule, regardless of when the motion to mitigate is filed. State v. Sotto, 348 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Sayer v. State, 267 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). Moreover, even if the trial court had jurisdiction to reduce Mancil’s sentence, it exceeded its authority by placing him on probation since the granting of probation does not constitute the reduction of a sentence. Cuneo v. State, 335 So. 2d 278 (Fla.1976); State v. Evans, 225 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969), cert. denied, 229 So. 2d 261 (Fla.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1053, 90 S.Ct. 1393, 25 L.Ed.2d 668 (1970).
However, the May 16, 1977 order was valid insofar as it vacated the December 17, 1976 order because that order was also illegal. Although it was entered within the sixty-day period prescribed by Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.800; the trial court acted without authority when it vacated Mancil’s sentence. While the rule says a trial court may reduce a sentence, it does not say a court may vacate a sentence. State v. Evans, supra.
Accordingly, that portion of the order appealed which purports to reduce Mancil’s sentence by placing him on probation is quashed, and the cause is remanded with instructions to reinstate the original sentence.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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White v. State, 404 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…urisdiction to reduce the sentence at the time the second motion was filed. The sixty-day period following the original sentence had expired on August 3, 1979. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800; State v. Sutton, 371 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); State v. Mancil, 354 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). At the revocation hearing, the state contended that appellant consented to the trial court’s maintaining jurisdiction in this matter and that therefore he is now es-topped from raising that issue. However, it is well settled tha…
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Grosse v. State, 511 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…tate v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 885 (Fla.1978); Sayer v. State, 267 So. 2d 42 [*689] (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); Wilson v. State, 487 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 496 So. 2d 143 (Fla.1986); State v. Mancil, 354 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); State v. Sotto, 348 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1219 (Fla.1978). Appellant contends that he has suffered an injustice, as it was not his fault that his motion sat in the court file while the time pe…
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State v. Golden, 382 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)…On September 9, 1979 the judge entered his order modifying the sentence of July 28 and the State appealed, relying on State v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); De La Paz v. State, 358 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978); and State v. Mancil, 354 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). We affirm the order before us. The hearing of July 16, 1979 was within the 60-day limit. At that time the judge effectively enlarged the period of time in which he could enter the order modifying sentence. Rule 3.050, Fla. R. Cri…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Evans, 225 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Evans v. State, 229 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1969)
- State v. Aníbal Sotto and Joaquin A. Amor, 348 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Sayer v. State, 267 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Ponce v. California, 397 U.S. 1053 (U.S. 1970)
- Primous v. United States, 397 U.S. 1053 (U.S. 1970)
- Cuneo v. State, 335 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1976)