MEYER KOTLER AND HELEN G. RECHTSCHAFFER, APPELLANTS,
v.
MORRIS KROOP, INC., REALTORS, APPELLEE
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The court reversed a judgment awarding a real estate broker a commission because the broker was not the procuring cause of the sale, which was negotiated directly between seller and buyer without the broker's assistance.
A real estate broker is not entitled to a commission when the broker was not the procuring cause of the sale.
[1] A real estate broker holding an expired non-exclusive listing is not entitled to a commission when the sale is negotiated directly between seller and buyer without the br…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA real estate broker (Morris Kroop, Inc.) held an expired non-exclusive listing on property owned by Helen G. Rechtschaffer. Meyer Kotler purchased th…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered upon a jury verdict in favor of a real estate broker (Morris Kroop, Inc.) against a seller (Helen G. Rechtschaffer) and buyer (Meyer Kotler) of certain real estate for a brokerage commission allegedly due based on a sale of real estate, as well as for other claims grounded upon an alleged tortious interference with the broker’s contract to sell the realty in question.
We reverse the judgment appealed from because the evidence is uncontradicted that the broker herein was in no way the procuring cause of the real estate sale. The sale was separately negotiated between the seller and the buyer with no assistance from the broker who had previously worked under an expired non-exclusive listing on the property which did not preclude such a transaction.
Accordingly, the broker was not entitled to a commission or any recovery on his other causes of action. Shuler v. Allen, 76 So. 2d 879 (Fla.1955); Dixson v. Kattel, 311 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Symon v. Jay Rolfe Davis, Inc., 245 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). The judgment herein is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to enter appropriate judgments in favor of the appellants herein.
Reversed.
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State v. Brown, 395 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…seat and seizing two guns thereunder — after the police had validly ordered both defendants out of the car, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977); Brown v. State, 358 So. 2d 596 (Fla.2d DCA 1978); Stevens v. State, 354 So. 2d 110 (Fla.3d DCA 1978); and (c) the lack of standing contention raised by the state is not here reached as, in any event, the instant search was a reasonable one even assuming the defendants had standing to challenge the search, see Gray v. State, 177 So…
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Hochstetler v. State, 400 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…for. Newton v. State, supra, at 299. In fact, I believe a much stronger argument could be made for extending the Mimms rationale to the protective sweep situation than to the search involved herein. . The majority also relies on Stevens v. State, 354 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Although I believe the decision in Stevens is questionable, the facts therein are also distinguishable. In that case, an intoxicated detainee in the clear view of a police officer attempted to grab an object wrapped in a towel ly…1 / 2
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State v. Patrick, 437 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…he officer then looked underneath the towel and found a .357 Magnum. Based on those facts we held as follows: We also disagree with appellant’s second contention that the warrantless search that followed the stop was improper. In Stevens v. State, 354 So. 2d 110, 111 (Fla.3d DCA 1978), while appellant was checking his driver’s license, he “was observed making motions toward an object wrapped in a towel and concealed in the front seat.” Such facts reasonably justified conducting a search. Similarly, in Brown…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Symon v. J. Rolfe Davis, Inc., 245 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Shuler v. Allen, 76 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1955)
- Dixson v. Kattel, 311 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)