SENTINEL ENTERPRISES, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
HARRINGTON & COMPANY, INC., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Sentinel Enterprises imported wire coils from Japan through the Port of Miami and engaged Harrington & Company as stevedore and inbound agent. When fire damaged wire coils stored in bonded storage awaiting transshipment to Venezuela, Sentinel sued Harrington for damages as bailee; the trial court granted Harrington's directed verdict motion, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that Harrington's bailment responsibility had terminated before the loss and the outbound carrier Transytur had assumed bailee status.
Harrington was not the bailee of the goods at the time of the fire and was therefore entitled to a directed verdict. Harrington's bailment responsibility as inbound agent and stevedore terminated when the inbound purpose was completed, and the outbound carrier Transytur assumed bailee status and responsibility for the goods awaiting transshipment, including liability for detention charges.
[1] A bailee's responsibility for goods terminates when the purpose of the bailment ends and the goods become the responsibility of another party.
[2] A stevedore acting solely for loading outbound goods is not the agent for the outbound shipper.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The record conclusively refutes this allegation and, therefore, Harrington was entitled to a directed verdict.”
Establishes that the evidence did not support Sentinel's bailee theory and justified the directed verdict.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSentinel imported wire coils from Japan delivered to the Port of Miami, with Harrington acting as inbound agent and stevedore. Thirty-five coils were …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
BARKDULL, Judge.
The appellant (plaintiff in the trial court), who was in the import-expert business, received a quantity of wire coils from Japan which were delivered to the Port of Miami.
The appellee, Harrington & Company, Inc., acted as its agent and stevedore.
Upon the goods being unloaded they were stored in outside storage in a usual and customary place for such goods.1 Thirty-five coils of the wire were to be transshipped to Venezuela so, to avoid payment of duty therein, they were placed in bonded storage.
The outgoing carrier for this shipper was Transytur Line; Harrington was to act only as stevedore on this shipment.
While the wire was on bonded storage pending transshipment, the wrappings caught fire resulting in damage thereto.
The appellant thereupon brought the instant suit against Harrington and Transy-tur, seeking to recover these damages.
Pri-or to trial, Transytur and the appellant arrived at a settlement and the action against Transytur was voluntarily dismissed.
The cause proceeded to trial against Harrington.
Thereafter, pursuant to Harrington’s motions for directed verdict made at the close of the appellant’s case and at the close of all the evidence, the trial court entered the final judgment for Harrington which is the subject of this appeal.
The appellant’s cause of action is predicated upon the allegation that Harrington was bailee of the goods at the time of the fire.
The record conclusively refutes this allegation and, therefore, Harrington was entitled to a directed verdict.
When goods are left on the Port of Miami in excess of the free time2 accorded them by the Port, it is the responsibility of the agent for either the inbound or outbound carrier to collect the detention charges.
The evidence in the instant action shows that after the purpose of the bailment [for which Harrington had received the goods inbound] terminated, the goods then became the responsibility of Transytur as the outbound shipper. In this connection, Harrington was the stevedore for loading the outbound goods but was not the agent for the outbound shipper. The evidence indicated that the detention charges while the goods were awaiting transshipment were the responsibility of Transytur.3 Harrington’s responsibility, as the bailee of the inbound goods, had terminated prior to the date of the loss.
Transytur had the responsibility for collecting the detention charges as of the date of the loss and, therefore, it was the bailee of such goods at this time and responsible as such.
ITT Consumer Services Corporation v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 256 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); Hollander v. Nolan Brown Motors, Inc., 272 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Fruehauf Corporation v. Aetna Insurance Company, 336 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
Therefore, the judgment appealed is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed. .
The owner of the goods picked up a substantial portion of the goods from the site where they were stored and made no objection to the fact that the goods were stored outside. .
See footnote , .
Albert Menacho, President of Transytur Line, Florida, testified as follows on cross-examination: ♦ * # * * “Q Your company at the time of this shipment as well as today were the agents for the shipping company.
Is that not correct? “A Yes, sir. “Q Does that cargo get to stay there without any charge for a certain period of time? “MR. WILLIAMS: Objection. “THE COURT: Fourteen days. ^ * sfc * * * “THE COURT: Overruled.
Go ahead. “Q [By Mr. Ralph] How many? “A Fourteen days free including Saturday and Sunday. “Q What would happen if the cargo is there more than that free time? “A It is subject to demurrage. “Q Who is that demurrage owed to? “A To the seaport. “Q Who collects that for the seaport? “A The seaport. “Q Who collect it? “A On behalf of the seaport?
The steamship company. “Q In this case, it would be you, the agent for Transytur? “A Yes, sir.” * * * ij! * 5(8
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Monroe Sys. FOR Bus., Inc. v. Intertrans Corp., 650 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…e selected any of a number of ways to structure the transportation and storage arrangements. It may not now assert that it was not in control of the goods solely because they were not stored under its roof. Sentinel Enter., Inc. v. Harrington & Co., 353 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 3d DCA) (goods left at port damaged while awaiting transshipment were responsibility of outbound shipper; agent arranging for outbound shipment was bailee), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1219 (Fla.1978). Compare Florida Small Business Corp. v. Miam…
Authorities Cited
- Fruehauf Corp. v. AETNA Ins. Co., 336 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- ITT Consumer Servs. Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 256 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- David v. State, 272 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)