THE FLORIDA NATIONAL BANK OF JACKSONVILLE, A NATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION, AS EXECUTOR OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF EMMA M. HOBBS, DECEASED, AND BEATRICE GRAICHEN, THE RESIDUARY DEVISEE AND LEGATEE UNDER THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF EMMA M. HOBBS, DECEASED, PETITIONERS,
v.
WILBUR W. PUGH, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a circuit court erred in denying motions to dismiss a complaint seeking declaratory relief regarding the construction of two wills and a promissory note, because the documents were not genuinely ambiguous and thus did not warrant a declaratory judgment action.
The court held that the chancellor erred in denying the motions to dismiss because the documents were not susceptible of the claimed construction and required no declaratory judgment. The first will's meaning was clear, the second will unambiguously excluded the Pughs with stated reasons, and the promissory note was in conventional form.
“It needs no construction. It was admitted to probate without objection. The promissory note (Exhibit No. 2) is in conventional form.”
Establishes that the documents are unambiguous and do not require declaratory judgment construction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEmma M. Hobbs executed two wills. Her first will left all property to Wilbur W. Pugh and his wife or survivor. Her second will of March 16, 1955 made …
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ANDERSON, Associate Justice.
The respondent filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Pinellas County for the construction of two Wills of Emma M. Hobbs, deceased, and of a promissory note for $4,500 given by him and his deceased wife, to Emma M. Hobbs, in her lifetime and for a declaratory decree thereon asking the Court to construe the provisions of the two wills and the promissory note “in the light of the services rendered” by him to Mrs. Hobbs “taking into consideration the conditions under which said note was executed and delivered and the conditions under which the said Last (the later in point of time) "Will and Testament of March 16, 1955 was executed by the testatrix, and to enter an appropriate decree fixing and determining the rights and liabilities of the plaintiff under said documents [sic] insofar as the defendants might have any right or claim against the plaintiff.”
The Chancellor denied motions to dismiss the complaint upon the ground' that it “states a cause of action warranting the court in entering a declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiff because paragraph nine of plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 3 (the Will of March 16, 1955) is susceptible of the construction claimed by plaintiff, to-wit: that the items mentioned therein represent compensation moving to the plaintiff from the testatrix, and therefore no consideration existed for the execution of the promissory note shown as plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 2 to the complaint.”
The defendants applied for a writ of certiorari.
The writ must be granted and the order denying the motions to dismiss quashed.
No reason is apparent why there exists any doubt as to the first will of Emma Hobbs. It left all of her property to Wilbur W. Pugh and his wife, or the survivor. Her Last Will (of March 16, 1955 — Exhibit No. 3) made a different disposition of her property and assigned clear and unequivocal reaons why the Pughs were left out. It needs no construction. It was admitted to probate without objection. The promissory note (Exhibit No. 2) is in conventional form. In the event a suit were brought on it any defenses would be open to the respondent that would be available to him under his complaint for declaratory decree. We expressly refrain from indicating what such defenses would be. We therefore hold that the Chancellor erred in denying the motions to dismiss.
In Columbia Casualty Co. v. Zimmerman, Fla.1953, 62 So. 2d 338, 340 the Court said: “The complaint in this case shows on its face that there is no doubt as to the meaning of the contract. The only doubt which is shown to exist is whether or not the automobile was being driven with, or without, the knowledge and consent of the insured. This is not a doubt as to the meaning of the contract or as to the proper interpretation of the contract. It is simply a doubt as to what will be the ultimate outcome of a consideration of the facts bearing on the question of whether or not the automobile was being driven with ,the knowledge and consent of the insured.”
To like effect see Ready v. Safeway Rock Co., 157 Fla. 27, 24 So. 2d 808; Bowden v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., Fla. 1950, 47 So. 2d 786; Halpert v. Oleksy, Fla.1953, 65 So. 2d 762; Mountain v. National Airlines, Fla.1954, 75 So. 2d 574 and Bullema v. Losey, Fla.1956, 84 So. 2d 715.
There is nothing in Bloomfield v. City of St. Petersburg Beach, Fla.1955, 82 So. 2d 364, or Modernage Furniture Corp. v. Miami Rug Co., Fla.1955, 84 So. 2d 916, that is inconsistent with these views.
Accordingly the writ of certiorari is granted, and the order denying the motions to dismiss the complaint is quashed with directions to dismiss the complaint.
DREW, C. J., and THOMAS and O’CONNELL, JJ., concur.
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M & E Land Co. v. Siegel, 177 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)…0). . Jackson Tom, Inc. v. Carlton, 133 So. 2d 752 (Fla.App.1st, 1961). . Florida Hotel and Restaurant Commission v. Marseilles Hotel Co., 84 So. 2d 567 (Fla.1956). . Barrett v. Pickard, 85 So. 2d 630 (Fla.1956). . Florida National Bank v. Pugh, 88 So. 2d 284 (Fla.1956). . Mayes Printing Co. v. Flowers, 154 So. 2d 859, 862 (Fla.App.1st, 1963). . Stark v. Marshall, 67 So. 2d 235 (Fla.1953).…
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The Equitable Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bradford Builders, Inc., 174 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)…* “Under the circumstances, Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for declaratory decree and the cause should he dismissed under authority of Halpert v. Olesky, Fla., 65 So. 2d 762, and Florida National Bank of Jacksonville v. Pugh, Fla., 88 So. 2d 284, and Plaintiff left to its traditional and sufficient remedy at law.” * * * * * * We do not find that the order, in its entirety, indicates a ruling by the chancellor on the merits sufficient to support a defense res judicata to bar a subsequent s…
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Kaczuwka v. The Home Ins. Co., 219 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed on the authority of May v. Holley, Fla.1952, 59 So. 2d 636; Deen v. Weaver, Fla. 1950, 47 So. 2d 539; Florida National Bank of Jacksonville v. Pugh, Fla.1956, 88 So. 2d 284; Saks v. Smith, Fla.App.1962, 145 So. 2d 895; and Colby v. Colby, Fla.App. 1960, 120 So. 2d 797. WALDEN, C. J., and McCAIN and REED, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ready v. Safeway Rock Co., 157 Fla. 27 (Fla. 1946)
- Columbia Cas. Co. v. Zimmerman, 62 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1952)
- Bloomfield v. City OF ST. Petersburg Beach, 82 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1955)
- Halpert v. Oleksy, 65 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1953)
- Bowden v. Seaboard Air Line RR Co., 47 So.2d 786 (Fla. 1950)
- Mountain v. Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 75 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954)
- Felton Y. Jernigan v. Hicks, 84 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1955)
- Modernage Furniture Corp. v. Miami RUG Co., 84 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1955)
- Miner v. Miner, 84 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1956)
- Gerhardus Bullema v. Losey, 84 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1956)