FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, PETITIONER,
v.
NEVA S. TODD, RESPONDENT
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The court reviewed an order affirming a determination that a claimant had insufficient wage credits to establish a valid claim, focusing on the definition of a 'week of unemployment' and the allocation of wages in lieu of notice.
The court held that wages paid in lieu of notice disqualify a claimant for benefits for the weeks to which those wages are allocated, as the claimant is considered constructively employed during those periods.
[1] Unemployment compensation benefits are reduced by the amount of retirement income and Social Security income when combined, if that combined amount is less than the other…
[2] A statute's plain language is presumed to express legislative intent, and courts cannot add qualifications or distinctions not present in the statutory text.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe claimant received wages in lieu of notice after his discharge. The Appeals Referee initially erred by not considering these weeks as employment, b…
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OTT, Judge.
We reverse the ruling of the Florida Industrial Relations Commission and reinstate the ruling of the claims examiner as affirmed by the appeals referee.
Respondent was employed by the state for 28 years. While employed she contributed to her retirement fund. The state — as a base period employer — also contributed to her pension. Upon voluntary retirement in 1974, respondent began receiving state retirement benefits as well as social security benefits.
After retirement, respondent obtained other employment, but was laid off. Her claim for unemployment compensation was denied by the claims examiner on the ground that the total of her state retirement and social security benefits exceeded the weekly unemployment benefit amount. The appeals referee affirmed, citing the Florida Unemployment Compensation Law — Section 443.06(8), Florida Statutes which provides in relevant part that:
[a]n individual shall be disqualified for benefits for any week with respect to which ... he has received, or is eligible to receive, from a base period employing unit, income . . . . Provided, however, that for any week in which income . . . when combined with [Social Security] income is less than the weekly benefits which would otherwise be due under this chapter he shall be entitled to receive for such week, . . . benefits reduced by the income . . . combined with the United States Social Security Act retirement income, prorated to a weekly basis.
The Industrial Relations Commission reversed, holding that “the claimant is not disqualified from receipt of unemployment compensation benefits until she has exhausted her contribution to her retirement fund.”
The Florida Statute at issue does not qualify or distinguish the disqualification or reduction of benefits on the basis of whether the retirement funds are contributory or noncontributory. When the legislature passes laws it is deemed to have expressed its intent by the words found in the statute. Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693 (1918). That is their prerogative. Courts and other tribunals may not “write in” legislative intent in the absence of the direct or indirect language in support of such intent.
The ruling of the Industrial Relations Commission was hinged upon whether respondent was “receiving back her investment in [the] fund.” Since the controlling statute is devoid of any reference to such a criterion, the Industrial Relations Commission’s order deviates from the statute and is contrary to the essential requirements of law.
Certiorari granted.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and GRIMES, J., concur.