CHARLES COOPER AND FLORENCE COOPER, HIS WIFE,
v.
EMOGENE MAYNARD, ALSO KNOWN AS MRS. W. F. MAYNARD
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed a lower court's decree, holding that a lease agreement with an option to purchase was not specifically enforceable because it was not executed by the husband, Charles Cooper, who held the property as an estate by the entirety with his wife. The court found insufficient evidence of agency for the wife to bind her husband to the option to purchase.
No, the lease agreement was not a valid and enforceable contract for specific performance because it was not executed by both co-owners of the property, and the wife did not have sufficient authority to act as her husband's agent for the purpose of binding him to the option to purchase.
“We are unable to agree with the decree of the court below, because we think the contract of lease including an option to purchase by the lessees was not one on which specific performance could be based in that it was not executed by the husband, Charles Cooper; nor did it purport to be executed by anyone acting as his agent.”
Establishes the primary reason for disagreement with the lower court's decree regarding specific performance.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCharles and Florence Cooper jointly owned property as an estate by the entirety. Florence Cooper signed a lease agreement with an option to purchase, …
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We are unable to agree with the decree of the court below, because we think the contract of lease including an option to purchase by the lessees was not one on which specific performance could be based in that it was not executed by the husband, Charles Cooper; nor did it purport to be executed by anyone acting as his agent. Such possession as the plaintiffs held was possession under the lease and was not delivery of the property under a contract of sale.
As we read the record, the evidence is insufficient to establish the authority of Mrs. Cooper as agent for her husband to execute the lease, but, on the contrary, the record shows that Mrs. Cooper signed the lease with option to purchase in duplicate and left one copy with the lessees or their agents and *535took the other copy to Key West for the purpose of having it executed by Charles Cooper. He declined to execute it because of the inclusion of the option to purchase. The property was held by the Coopers as an estate by the entireties and for a contract to be binding it had to be executed by both parties, or by persons in their behalf duly authorized as their agents.
We think the decree should be reversed.
So ordered.
BROWN, THOMAS and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
CHAPMAN, C. J., TERRELL and ADAMS, JJ., dissent.
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Douglass v. Jones, 422 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…rfeit, or encumber any part of the estate without the consent of the other, nor can one spouse alone lease it or contract for its disposition without such consent. Richart v. Roper, 156 Fla. 822, 25 So. 2d 80 (1946); Cooper v. Maynard, 156 Fla. 534, 23 So. 2d 734 (1945); Stecher v. Franklin, 405 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Parrish v. Swearington, 379 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Murray v. Sullivan, 376 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). An exception to the aforesaid rule is applicable when it is proved b…
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Ayers v. Thompson, 536 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…Johnson, 403 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). The well settled rule in Florida is that neither spouse vested to an estate by the entireties, can alienate or encumber any part of the estate without the consent of the other spouse. Cooper v. Maynard, 156 Fla. 534, 23 So. 2d 734 (1945); Schmidt v. Matilsky, 490 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Parrish v. Swearington, 379 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Murray v. Sullivan, 376 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). However, an exception occurs if in the transaction on…