TAYLOR CREEK VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
LESLIE HOUGHTON ET AL., APPELLEES
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Taylor Creek Village Association appealed a judgment invalidating restrictions and liens on homeowners' property. The trial court found that declaration of restrictions filed for one plat (Plat Book 5, page 103) did not apply to the appellees' lots, and the appellate court affirmed this finding as not clearly erroneous.
The declaration of restrictions did not apply to appellees' property because the restrictions in Plat Book 5, page 103 should impose restrictions only on property within that plat, not on other property. Therefore, the association could not enforce the liens or require payment of dues.
[1] A declaration of restrictions recorded against a subdivision does not impose restrictions on property or property owners outside of that specific subdivision.
[2] A chancellor's findings of fact and conclusions of law are presumed correct on appeal and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the restrictions in Plat Book 5 should not impose any restriction on property or property owners other than in said Plat Book 5, page 103.”
The trial court's key finding that the declaration of restrictions was limited in scope to the specific plat where it was recorded.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe original developer, Key Largo Mobile Homesites, Inc., filed a declaration of restrictions in 1966 requiring buyers to join an association and pay …
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HENDRY, Chief Judge.
Appellant, defendant-counter-plaintiff below, appeals from a final judgment rendered in favor of appellees, plaintiffs-counter-defendants below.
Appellees’ amended complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief sought declaratory relief concerning the applicability of a certain declaration of restrictions placed upon certain mobile homesites by the original developer of the tract, Key Largo Mobile-Homesites, Inc. Appellees also sought a permanent injunction requiring appellant to remove all liens placed by it on appellees’ property for failure to comply with the provisions of the declaration of restrictions, which required both member ship in, and payment of dues to an association composed of the purchasers of the subdivision lots.
Appellant counterclaimed, asking the court to determine whether it had the right to continue to enforce the declaration of restrictions and whether it could enforce liens placed upon appellees’ lots for nonpayment of association dues and services.
In a lengthy final judgment containing findings of fact, the learned chancellor ruled, inter alia, that the restrictions were not applicable to appellees’ property under the exhibits and testimony presented to the court and discharged the liens placed on said property. The court also ordered that appellees were not required to pay dues for certain recreational and common areas. The applicable findings of fact are as follows:
“The Court heard the testimony of the witnesses and considered the exhibits filed in evidence and finds as follows:
“a. The Declaration of Restrictions filed as Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 1 discloses that the restrictions were placed on record by Key Largo Mobile Home-sites, Inc., on May 3, 1966, and imposes restrictions on a subdivision known as Key Largo Mobile Homesites, Inc., recorded in Plat Book 5, at page 103, of the Public Records of Monroe County, Florida. Said Declaration of Restrictions provides that all buyers in said subdivision shall apply and be approved for membership in Mobile Homesites Club of Key Largo, and that said buyer shall buy the lot subject to rules and regulations of the Club, and that the Club shall maintain all recreational and common areas and vacant lots, and dues for this purpose shall be paid to the Club.
“b. Defendant’s Exhibit No. 2 discloses a Warranty Deed from Key Largo Mobile Homesites, Inc., to Mobile Homesites Club of Key Largo for a parcel of land which appears not to be in the same subdivision described in the above finding of fact. The Court finds that the said Warranty Deed dated November 15, 1971, conveys a club house tract adjacent to Blocks 12 and 13, Key Largo Mobile Homesites, Plat 4, recorded in Plat Book 6, at page 15, of the Public Records of Monroe County, Florida.
“c. The Court finds that Mobile Homesites Club of Key Largo in turn conveys the same club house tract to Taylor Creek Village Association and provides that the said property conveyed is given together with all the rights and privileges conferred upon it by the Declaration of Restrictions in Plat Book 5, page 103. The Court finds that these restrictions in Plat Book 5 should not impose any restriction on property or property owners other than in said Plat Book 5, page 103.”
After carefully reviewing the record, we must agree with the chancellor’s ruling that the exhibits placed before the court were insufficient to show that the restrictions of record applied to appellees’ lots. It is well settled that a chancellor’s findings of fact and conclusions of law come to an appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous. Marx v. Goldfinger, 187 So. 2d 380 (Fla.3d DCA 1966).
No such error having been made to appear, the final judgment is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Marx v. Goldfinger, 187 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)