JERRY LAMPERT REAL ESTATE, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION AND LEONARD DAVIDSON D/B/A SECURITY REAL ESTATE, APPELLANTS,
v.
JEROME D. FRANKLIN, TRUSTEE, AND ANNE DRECKSLER, APPELLEES
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Real estate brokers appealed a summary judgment entered in favor of purchasers in a dispute over a claimed brokerage commission. The brokers alleged they were the procuring cause of a sale but were defrauded through conspiracy by the purchasers and seller. The court reversed, finding the purchasers did not meet their burden on summary judgment to show no genuine issue of material fact regarding the conspiracy claim.
The summary judgment for the purchaser-defendants was improperly entered because they failed to carry their burden of showing, when giving the plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences, that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning the alleged conspiracy. A prima facie case of conspiracy need not be established, but the moving party must demonstrate the complete absence of any issue on that allegation.
[1] A conspiracy claim against purchasers of real property cannot be resolved by summary judgment if the purchasers fail to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of mate…
[2] Summary judgment is improper when the moving party fails to carry the burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact exists concerning an alleged conspiracy.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The only reason apparent on this record for the entry of a summary judgment for the purchasers, as a summary judgment was not entered in the entire case, is that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning the alleged conspiracy to defraud.”
Establishes the standard the trial court appeared to apply in granting summary judgment
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJerry Lampert Real Estate, Inc. and Leonard Davidson, real estate brokers, claimed they were the procuring cause of a real estate sale. They sued the …
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PEARSON, Judge.
The appellants are real estate brokers who seek to recover a claimed brokerage commission. The brokers sued the seller and the purchasers claiming that they (the appellants) were the procuring cause of a sale from which they were precluded by way of a conspiracy to defraud them of their commission. See Moylan v. Estes, 102 So. 2d 855 (Fla.3d DCA 1958).
The trial court entered a summary judgment for defendant-purchaser Jerome D. Franklin, trustee, and for defendant Anne Drecksler, who was a prospective purchaser and subsequent participant in the trust which purchased the real property involved. The summary judgment left pending the case against the defendant-seller. The only reason apparent on this record for the entry of a summary judgment for the purchasers, as a summary judgment was not entered in the entire case, is that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning the alleged conspiracy to defraud. An examination of the depositions before the trial judge makes it clear that the defendants-appellees did not carry the burden on summary judgment of showing, as the moving party, that in giving the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences, there was no issue as to conspiracy. We do not mean to state that a prima facie case of conspiracy was established, but simply that it was not demonstrated that there was no issue on that allegation. We, therefore, hold, under the authority of Stringfellow v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 295 So. 2d 686 (Fla.2d DCA 1974); and Megdell v. Wieder, 327 So. 2d 781 (Fla.3d DCA 1976), that the summary judgment was improperly entered for the defendant-purchasers, and we return the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
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Citator
Cited By
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Jerry Lampert Real Est., Inc. v. Growth Equities, Ltd., 361 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…(Fla.1953); and Wilkins v. W. B. Tilton Real Estate and Insurance, Inc., 257 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). Affirmed. . A previous appeal from a summary final judgment for the purchasers is reported at Jerry Lampert Real Estate, Inc. v. Franklin, 349 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). This court reversed the summary judgment. At that time, there had been no determination of the issue of whether appellants were the procuring cause of the sale.…
Authorities Cited
- Moylan v. Sophronia I. Estes, 102 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)
- Stringfellow v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 295 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Sol Megdell v. Wieder, 327 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)