STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. WAYNE P. DEAN, JR., RELATOR,
v.
THE HONORABLE JOHN W. BOOTH, JUDGE CIRCUIT COURT, FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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A Florida appellate court denied a petition for writ of prohibition seeking to prevent trial where the defendant claimed the speedy trial period had expired. The court held that an initial brief investigative custody at a police station for questioning, from which the defendant was released without arrest, does not trigger the 180-day speedy trial clock under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(1).
The court held that while the relator was 'in custody' for Miranda purposes during the police station questioning, he was not 'in custody' within the meaning of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1). The speedy trial clock begins running when the defendant is formally arrested or indicted, not when taken in brief investigative custody. The relator's custody commenced on March 14, 1977, when he was arrested immediately after indictment.
[1] A brief period of protective or investigative custody does not necessarily trigger the commencement of the speedy trial period.
[2] The speedy trial clock does not begin to run when a suspect is taken to a police station for questioning and subsequently released without being arrested.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the police initially questioned the relator at the station, he was 'in custody' for purposes of being entitled to Miranda warnings. However, we do not believe he was 'in custody' within the meaning of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1).”
Establishes the distinction between Miranda custody and speedy trial rule custody
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn January 6, 1977, police responded to a burglary and shooting report. At the scene, police found the victim with a leg wound, a witness who identifi…
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ON SUGGESTION FOR PROHIBITION
GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge.
On January 6, 1977, the police responded to a report of a burglary and a shooting. At the scene, the police found a victim who was lying on the ground with a leg wound, a witness who told the police that the relator had shot the victim, and the relator who had a gun stuck in his belt. Relator lived at the scene of the shooting, and the victim was suspected of having committed the burglary.
The police placed the relator in the patrol car. The officer first locked him in but later locked the car so it could not be entered from outside because relator expressed fear for his safety at the hands of several onlookers. The relator was driven to the police station for questioning. At the station, the police advised the relator of his Miranda rights and obtained a statement from him. He was not placed in a cell, nor was he fingerprinted. The relator was then allowed to leave without being placed under arrest.
On March 14,1977, the relator was indicted for aggravated battery in violation of Section 784.045(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1975). Immediately after being indicted, the relator was arrested.
On July 6, 1977, the relator moved for discharge pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191 on the ground that more than 180 days had passed since January 6,1977, when the relator had been taken into custody for the criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged. The motion was denied.
The relator has now filed in this court a suggestion for writ of prohibition seeking to prevent, his trial on the aggravated battery charge. If the speedy trial time has run, prohibition is a proper remedy. Sibert v. Hare, 276 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
When the police initially questioned the relator at the station, he was “in custody” for purposes of being entitled to Miranda warnings. However, we do not believe he was “in custody” within the meaning of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1). A short protective dr investigative custody is often advisable where, as in the instant case, a person is a suspect but the police do not believe they have enough evidence to arrest him. Here, there was some evidence that the relator had acted in self-defense; After questioning, the relator was permitted to leave the station without restraint. To construe the speedy trial-rule to mean that the time starts running every time the police take a suspect to the station for questioning could have a deleterious effect because the police might then feel compelled to make an arrest on less than sufficient evidence in order to activate the wheels of the prosecutorial process before the time runs out.
Our case is somewhat like Snead v. State, 346 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), in which the court said:
“. . . [A]ppellant was taken to the jail and held for a short period for investigation with no charge for the murder being on file. He was then released without a charge being filed. His subsequent arrest on March 26 was on an unrelated charge upon which he was held until an indictment was returned against him on September 16 for murder. Under these circumstances, the time within which he, could be tried under the speedy trial rule began to run on. September 16, 1975.”
The relator’s reliance on Deloach v. State, 338 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), is misplaced because there the defendant was formally placed under arrest on the date the speedy trial time was deemed to have commenced running.
The suggestion for writ of prohibition is denied.
SCHEB and OTT, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (18 total)
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Sherrod v. The Honorable Arthur J. Franza, 427 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1983)…2d 3 (Fla.1968). The various district courts of appeal have also reached similar conclusions. See Bates v. Keating, 396 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State ex rel. Smith v. Nesbitt, 355 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); State ex rel. Dean v. Booth, 349 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1978); Turner v. Olliff, 281 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Sibert v. Hare, 276 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). For the reasons stated in this opinion, the district court was correct in declini…
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Williams v. State, 757 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…t not for purposes of the speedy trial rule. Griffin v. State, 474 So. 2d 777 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1094, 106 S.Ct. 869, 88 L.Ed.2d 908 (1986); Christian; State v. Miller, 437 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); State ex rel. Dean v. Booth, 349 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1978). And, a seizure may trigger fourth amendment protection and yet not be a technical arrest. Griffin. In Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d 291, 294 (Fla.1954), the Florida Supreme Court defined an…
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State v. Robbins, 359 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…allowed to leave without being placed under arrest, he has not been placed “in custody” within the meaning of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1), although he has been placed “in custody” for purposes of the Miranda requirements. State ex rel. Dean v. Booth, 349 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). See also Snead v. State, 346 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 953 (Fla.1977). Although respondent was temporarily detained on the night of the offense, he was not formally arrested or incarcerated. Moreov…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Snead v. State, 346 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Deloach v. State, 338 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Sibert v. Hare, 276 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)