IN THE INTEREST OF J. W. H. J. H. N., AND T. A. B., CHILDREN, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Juvenile appellants challenged their delinquency adjudications, arguing they were denied speedy trial rights due to a four-month delay between arrest and intake complaint filing. The court held that the mandatory three-day reporting requirement in Florida Statutes Section 39.03(2) cannot be circumvented, and reversed the trial court's denial of their discharge motions.
The three-day reporting requirement in Section 39.03(2) is mandatory, not merely directory. The state cannot circumvent this requirement and the 90-day speedy trial rule by waiting an indefinite period before filing a complaint with the intake officer. The trial court erred in denying the discharge motions.
[1] The word "shall" in a statute is generally interpreted as mandatory, not merely directory.
[2] A juvenile's right to a speedy trial is a substantial right that can lead to discharge if violated.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the person [taking the child into custody] shall, within three days, make a full written report to the appropriate officer, stating the facts by reason of which the child was taken into custody”
Establishes the mandatory statutory requirement at issue in the case
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThree juveniles were arrested in April and late April 1976. Complaints were not received by the Division of Youth Services intake officer until August…
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RAWLS, Judge.
The primary issue involved in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying appellant-juveniles’ motions for discharge. We are here confronted with whether the legislative intent of the word “shall” in Section 39.03(2), Florida Statutes, is mandatory or directory.
J.W.H. and T.A.B. were arrested on April 17, 1976, and J.H.N. was arrested on April 27, 1976. The complaints were received by the Division of Youth Services intake officer on August 2, 1976, and petitions were filed in the Circuit Court of Wakulla County on August 19 and August 20, 1976.
On October 5, 1976, appellants filed motions for discharge alleging, primarily, that they had been denied their rights to speedy trial. The trial court denied their motions for discharge, and subsequently appellants entered pleas of nolo contendere specifically reserving their right to appeal. The trial court adjudged appellants to be delinquent and placed them on probation under the supervision of the Division of Youth Services for an indefinite period.
Appellants contend that when Section 39.03(2), Florida Statutes, is read in pari materia with Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.120, they were entitled, upon the facts of this case, to be discharged from Division of Youth Services supervision. We agree and reverse.
Section 39.03(2), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, that “the person taking the child into custody shall, within three days, make a full written report to the appropriate officer, stating the facts by reason of which the child was taken into custody” (emphasis supplied). Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.120 provides that a juvenile case must be brought to trial within 90 days of the day a complaint is filed with the Division of Youth Services intake officer. The state contends that the three-day requirement as provided in Section 39.03(2), Florida Statutes, is merely a direction in procedure and that a technical violation does not affect any substantial rights of a juvenile.
In the recent Florida Supreme Court opinion of S.R., a child v. State, Fla., 346 So. 2d 1018, 1977, the court held that “shall” as contained in Section 39.05(7) is mandatory and thus a petition alleging delinquency must be dismissed with prejudice if it-is not filed within 30 days from the date the complaint was received by the Division of Youth Services intake officer. Juveniles have certain rights, one of which is speedy trial.1 In the instant case, appellants were arrested in April, 1976; however, the complaints were not received by the intake officer until August, 1976. We hold that the three-day requirement of Section 39.03(2) is mandatory, and the state cannot circumvent the provisions of that section and the 90-day speedy trial rule (Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.120) by waiting an indefinite period of time before filing a complaint with the Division of Youth Services intake officer. The trial court erred in not granting appellants’ motions for discharge.
REVERSED.
BOYER, C. J., and SMITH, J., concur. . In State v. Benton, 337 So. 2d 797 (Fla.1976), the Supreme Court held that when a juvenile is certified as an adult, the 180-day speedy trial rule (Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191) runs from the date the juvenile is taken into custody.
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In the Interest of G. L. T., JR. v. State, 366 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1978)…ustice. These consolidated petitions for writ of certiorari are before this Court to review two decisions of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,1 which are alleged to be in direct conflict with In the Interest of J.W.H., et a1. v. State, 345 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). We exercise our discretionary review pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. In the Interest of R.P.C. v. State, supra, involved a minor who was charged by Petition Seeking Adjudication of Delinquency with…
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In the Interest of R. P. C., 352 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)…n report with the intake office. No other error having been shown, the adjudication of delinquency is affirmed.1 AFFIRMED. MAGER, C. J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur. . We have not overlooked the recent opinion from the First District, In re J. W. H., 345 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1st DCA opinion filed May 18, 1977). That case is distinguishable because there the child was prejudiced by the delay in filing the written report as provided in Section 39.03(2).…
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In the Interest of G. L. T., Jr. v. State, 352 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)…after the taking into custody occurred. Section 39.-03(2), Florida Statutes (1975). The intake report was not filed until March 3, 1976, therefore the child should have been discharged. In the Interest of J. W. H., et al., etc. v. State of Florida, 345 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1st DCA, opinion filed May 18, 1977). I am aware of the opinion from our court referred to in the majority opinion here, to which I would have dissented if I were a member of that panel. The legislature used the word shall and as was said in…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In the Interest of S. R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1977)
- State v. Benton, 337 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1976)