RICHARD M. GRUNWALD, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE ET AL., APPELLEES
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A Florida taxpayer challenged the Department of Revenue's assessment of additional intangible taxes and penalties for the 1970 tax year, arguing the assessment was barred by the statute of limitations. The court affirmed the assessment, holding that while the three-year limitation ordinarily applies, an investigation initiated within the refund period tolls the limitation.
The assessment was not barred by the statute of limitations. Although Section 199.232(4) generally prohibits assessments after three years from the return's due date or filing date, Section 199.232(7) permits investigations to proceed if conducted within the period in which the taxpayer's right to a refund remains available. Since the refund period extended three years from the date of payment and the investigation was initiated within that period, the assessment was timely.
[1] An intangible tax assessment is permissible if made pursuant to an investigation, even if it falls outside the general three-year limitation period from the due date or f…
[2] An investigation into intangible tax liability may be conducted for any year in which the taxpayer's right to a refund is still available.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“no intangible tax assessment shall be made except pursuant to an investigation after the expiration of three years from the due date of filing a return or the date of filing, whichever is later”
States the general three-year statute of limitations for intangible tax assessments under Section 199.232(4)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGrunwald filed an intangible personal property tax return on March 20, 1970 (due April 1, 1970) and paid taxes on November 30, 1970. The return omitte…
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RAWLS, Acting Chief Judge.
Grunwald (appellant-taxpayer) is of the firm opinion that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the time limitation for the Department of Revenue to additionally assess intangible taxes and penalties.
We adopt as the opinion of this court salient portions of the learned trial judge’s well-reasoned opinion, viz:
“ . . .2. The Plaintiff Richard M. Grunwald is and has been at all times relevant hereto a resident of the State of Florida.
3. On March 20,1970, the Plaintiff Richard M. Grunwald filed an intangible personal property tax return pursuant to Chapter 199, Florida Statutes.
4. The due date for filing the aforesaid return was April 1, 1970, Chapter 199, Florida Statutes, 1969. On November 30, 1970, the Plaintiff Richard M. Grunwald paid the intangible taxes shown to be due on the return.
5. The attachments to Plaintiff’s Complaint reflect correspondence between Plaintiff and the Department of Revenue of the State of Florida beginning sometime on or before July 24, 1973, continuing through November 6,1973, and culminating with a Notice of Determination dated December 19, 1973. This correspondence reveals that the Department of Revenue had notified Plaintiff Richard M. Grunwald prior to November 30, 1973, that his intangible tax liability for the 1970 tax year was under investigation by the Department of Revenue. 6. It is undisputed that on the return filed by the Plaintiff Richard M. Grun-wald for the 1970 tax year, shares of stock of a value of $143,200 as of January 1, 1970, were omitted from said return.
7. The intangible tax attributable to these omitted shares of stock was $143.20. The penalty attributable to said omission was properly computed as $100.
8. Florida Statutes, Section 199.232(4), 1971, 1973, provides that no intangible tax assessment shall be made except pursuant to an investigation after the expiration of three years from the due date of filing a return or the date of filing, whichever is later. 9. The intangible tax assessment in question for the 1970 tax year was not made within three years from the due date for filing the return or the date of filing the return.
10. The assessment in question, however, was made pursuant to an investigation. Florida Statutes, Section 199.232(7) provides that an investigation of intangible tax liability may be made against the person for any year in which that person’s right to a refund is available.
11. The right to a refund for intangible taxes is available for a period of three years from the date of payment Florida Statutes, Sections 199.252 and 215.26.
12. The Plaintiff in question, Richard M. Grunwald, was notified that an investigation of his intangible tax liability was being conducted for the 1970 tax year within the period in which his right to a refund was available.
13. Accordingly, the assessment and penalties against the Plaintiff in the amount of $243.20 were not barred by the statute of limitations. . . .”
AFFIRMED.
MILLS and SMITH, JJ., concur.
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Stewart Arms Apts., Ltd. v. State of Fla. Dep't OF Revenue & Off. of Comptroller, 362 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…ime after the refund accrues, the time period commences when the tax is paid. State ex rel. Victor Chemical Works v. Gay, 74 So. 2d 560 (Fla.1954); State ex rel. Tampa Electric Co. v. Gay, 40 So. 2d 225 (Fla.1949); Grunwald v. Department of Revenue, 343 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); see Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1350 (1956). The Final Agency Order appears to us to be the correct decision in this case. We perceive the conclusion in the Hearing Officer’s Recommended Order to have gone astray because some of his co…