SHIRLEY TAPLIN, APPELLANT,
v.
SOL TAPLIN, APPELLEE
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Shirley Taplin appealed an order denying her motion to dismiss her ex-husband Sol's cross-petition for reduction in alimony. The court held that modification of alimony requires a showing of substantial change in circumstances, and that the rehabilitative concept from Florida's no-fault divorce law cannot be retroactively applied to pre-existing alimony decrees. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the cross-petition.
The court held that a fundamental prerequisite to modification of alimony is a showing of substantial change in circumstances, including financial circumstances of one or both parties. The rehabilitative thrust of the no-fault divorce law may not be retroactively applied to alimony awarded in decrees entered before the law's enactment. Since Sol's cross-petition pleaded only the rehabilitative concept and failed to allege the prerequisite substantial change in circumstances, the order denying the motion to dismiss was reversed.
[1] Modification of alimony payments requires a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of one or both parties.
[2] The rehabilitative provisions of no-fault divorce law cannot be applied retrospectively to alimony awarded in a pre-no-fault decree.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A fundamental prerequisite to modification of alimony payments is a showing of substantial change in circumstances, including financial circumstances of one or both of the parties.”
Establishes the legal standard required for any modification of alimony payments
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceShirley and Sol Taplin were divorced on May 29, 1962, with a judgment incorporating their agreement for Sol to pay $900 per month in alimony. On Janua…
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PER CURIAM.
Shirley Taplin appeals an order denying her motion to dismiss the cross-petition of her former husband, Sol Taplin, seeking a reduction in alimony payments.
Shirley and Sol Taplin were divorced on May 29, 1962 and the judgment incorporated an agreement of the parties whereby Sol consented to pay $900 per month as alimony. On January 22, 1975 Shirley petitioned for an increase in alimony on the grounds that her needs were greater and Sol’s income had substantially increased. Sol answered and filed a cross-petition to reduce the amount of alimony on the ground that Shirley has had ample time to rehabilitate herself and the law of Florida allows a wife only a reasonable time for rehabilitation; that such time has long passed and she can now support herself. Shirley moved to dismiss Sol’s cross-petition for failure to set forth as sufficient grounds that there has been a substantial change in his ability to pay and/or in her needs. The chancellor denied her motion to dismiss and she perfected this interlocutory appeal.
A fundamental prerequisite to modification of alimony payments is a showing of substantial change in circumstances, including financial circumstances of one or both of the parties. Brown v. Brown, 315 So. 2d 15 (Fla.3d DCA 1975). In addition, the rehabilitative thrust of the no-fault divorce law may not be retrospectively applied in the consideration of a petition for modification of alimony awarded in a decree entered prior thereto. Carmel v. Carmel, 282 So. 2d 6 (Fla.3d DCA 1973); Mosher v. Mosher, 321 So. 2d 450 (Fla.2nd DCA 1975). In his cross-petition for modification, Sol pled as the sole ground therefor the rehabilitative concept of the new no-fault divorce law and failed to allege the prerequisite substantial change in the circumstances of the parties. We, therefore, reverse the order of denial and remand the cause to the circuit court with directions to dismiss the cross-petition.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Johnson v. Johnson, 386 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…So. 2d 321 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980). Whether or not a sufficient change in circumstances occurred in this case requires the consideration of the totality of the parties’ circumstances. Taplin v. Taplin, 341 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Freeland v. Purcifull, 347 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). Where the alimony obligation is based on an agreement, a heavier burden is on the applicant to establish the change as sufficient.3 The lower court in this case disregarde…
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Greene v. Greene, 372 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…ifying an award of alimony; however, in our opinion, it is only one factor to be considered and, by itself, is insufficient to establish a change of conditions sufficient to justify an increase in an award of alimony. See generally Taplin v. Taplin, 341 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); and Carmel v. Carmel, 282 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Because the loss of the purchasing power of the dollar was the only factor shown in the instant case to justify the trial court’s order increasing original award of alimony,…
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Quackenbush v. Quackenbush, 47 Fla. Supp. 66 (Palm Beach Cty. Cir. Ct. 1978)…a petition for modificiation, and on November 12, 1976, when the former-husband filed a counter-petition for modification, each party assumed the burden of demonstrating that there had been “a substantial change in circumstances,” Taplin v. Taplin, 341 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) since the entry of the June 3rd final judgment. On January 10, 1977, the Honorable Culver Smith, referred the amended petition and counter-petition to the Honorable Stanley J. Narkier as special master. Pretrial proceedings were…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brown v. Brown, 315 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Carmel v. Carmel, 282 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Mosher v. Mosher, 321 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)