MILLIE CUSHMAN FEATHERSTON, AS EXECUTRIX AND TRUSTEE OF THE ESTATE OF MARY CUSHMAN FEATHERSTON, DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
H. W. TOMPKINS, JR., APPELLEE
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A trustee appeals an order authorizing partition and sale of trust property held for three minor beneficiaries. The court reversed, holding that a trust cannot be terminated before its terms are satisfied and all beneficiaries are parties to the termination action.
The court held that the chancellor erred in authorizing the sale because the trust clearly specified that no distribution should be made until all three children reached age 21. A court cannot terminate a trust when all beneficiaries are not parties to the termination action and without determining that the trust's purpose has been accomplished.
[1] A testamentary trust cannot be prematurely terminated by authorizing the sale and distribution of its proceeds when a beneficiary has not yet attained the age specified f…
[2] A court cannot terminate a trust when all beneficiaries are not parties to the termination action, nor without a determination that the trust's purpose has been accomplis…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Mary's testamentary trust clearly provides that no distribution is to be made until the three children have attained the age of 21 years. Thus, the termination of the trust is plainly specified.”
Establishes that the trust instrument explicitly stated when distributions could be made, and thus when the trust could terminate.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBetty Featherston Tompkins and H.W. Tompkins acquired a marital residence as tenants in common following their divorce. After Betty's death, her one-h…
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PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Millie Featherston, appeals an order authorizing the partition and sale of real property thereby terminating a testamentary trust of which she is trustee.
Plaintiff, H.
W. Tompkins, married defendant’s sister, Betty Featherston Tompkins, and during their marriage, they acquired a marital residence which is the subject of this litigation. Betty and H. W. were divorced and pursuant to the final decree, they became owners of the residence as tenants in common.
H. W. was given occupancy of the house along with custody of the three minor children of the marriage. Thereafter Betty died and left her entire estate including the one-half interest in the marital residence to her mother, Mary Featherston. When Mary passed away, she devised all the property received from Betty’s estate to the three children born of the marriage between Betty and H.
W. These properties,1 pursuant to the terms of Mary’s will, were placed in trust and her daughter, Millie Featherston, appellant herein, was named trustee. The properties were to be held in trust until each of the children attained the age of 21. As the three children attained the age of majority,2 they each signed a quit claim deed purporting to release their respective interests (as beneficiaries under the trust) in the marital residence to their father, H.
W. Thereafter, H. W. filed for partition of the residence against Millie Featherston, as trustee, and prayed that he be permitted to sell the house. Defendant answered alleging a disability on the part of the youngest child at the time of the execution of his quit claim deed. After hearing argument of counsel, the chancellor entered an order authorizing H. W. to sell the subject real property, with % of the net proceeds of the sale going to him and the remaining to be held in trust by him until such time as the court makes a determination as to the disposition of the funds.
We reverse.
Mary’s testamentary trust clearly provides that no distribution is to be made until the three children have attained the age of 21 years.
Thus, the termination of the trust is plainly specified. Cf. Johns v. Townsend, 160 Fla. 213, 34 So. 2d 565 (1948). It is conceded by the parties that the youngest child is not only under guardianship, but has not yet attained the age of 21 years.
Thus, we conclude that the chancellor erred in the entry of his order prematurely terminating the trust by authorizing the sale and distribution of the net proceeds. Further, a court cannot terminate a trust when all the beneficiaries are not parties to a termination action, and without a determination that the purpose for which the trust was established has been accomplished. See Smith v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 116 Fla. 390, 156 So. 498 (1934); Florida National Bank and Trust Company v. Blake, 155 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963).
Reversed.
. Including the 'A interest as tenant in common in the marital residence.
. I. e., 18 years in Florida.
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Citator
Cited By
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Peck v. Peck, 133 So. 3d 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…m. Heart Ass’n of Greater Miami, 541 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (holding trial court had no authority to terminate testamentary trust prematurely where settlor’s intent was to postpone corpus distribution for ten years); Featherston v. Tompkins, 339 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (holding trust termination improper where distribution condition that all child beneficiaries reach age twenty-one had not been fulfilled; trust purpose had not been accomplished and minor beneficiary had no capacity to agree); Fl…
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City OF Islandia v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 362 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…been accomplished or have been so frustrated that the trust serves no lawful purpose, the trustee may petition for the dissolution of the trust. See the rule in Clement v. Charlotte Hospital Association, Inc., supra; and see Featherston v. Tompkins, 339 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). The complaint of Metropolitan Dade County may be interpreted as a petition to dissolve the trust. But the record is devoid of any proof and finding of the court that the trust is no longer in lawful existence. It is entirely pos…
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Sec. Exch. v. Mut. Benefits Corp (S.D. Fla. 2020)…request the relief, the relief Acheron seeks is inconsistent with the language of the Trust instrument. The Magistrate Judge also correctly added that Acheron’s request contravenes the purpose of the Keep Policy Trust. See Featherston v. Tompkins, 339 So. 2d 306, 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (stating a court cannot terminate a trust without a determination that the purpose for which the trust was established has been accomplised). To reiterate, the purpose of the Keep Policy Trust was to allow the victims of th…
Authorities Cited
- Smith v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 Fla. 390 (Fla. 1934)
- Johns v. Townsend, 160 Fla. 213 (Fla. 1948)
- The Fla. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. AT Miami v. Blake, 155 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)