FOUNTAINHEAD MOTEL, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
DOROTHY MASSEY, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1976-08-03
No. 75-961
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.
336 So. 2d 397 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1976) Positive Treatment
Cited by 16 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A motel appeals a jury verdict awarding $35,000 in damages to a guest who slipped and fell on dog fecal matter on a staircase. The motel argues the evidence failed to prove it had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard for a sufficient time to remedy it, but the appellate court affirms the judgment, finding the trial court properly denied the directed verdict motions.


Holding

The trial court did not err in denying the motions for directed verdict, as viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, a jury could reasonably find the motel negligent. The final judgment pursuant to the jury verdict was proper, and the petition for new trial was properly denied.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court should grant motions for directed verdicts cautiously, only when the evidence, viewed most favorably to the non-moving party, leaves no room for reasonable…

[2] An appellate court must review the record and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the appellee when considering an appeal from an adverse judgment en…

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“It has been consistently held that motions for directed verdicts should be cautiously granted by a trial court, and only when, after viewing the evidence and testimony in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the court concludes that the jury could not reasonably differ as to the existence of a material fact or inference and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Establishes the strict standard for granting directed verdict motions that the trial court properly applied.

Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Appellee slipped and fell on a staircase at appellant's motel on dog fecal matter. The staircase lighting had allegedly been burned out for one to two…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
HENDRY, Judge.

HENDRY, Judge.

Appellant, defendant below, appeals an adverse final judgment entered by the trial court, pursuant to a jury verdict, awarding appellee, plaintiff below, $35,000 in damages for injuries sustained by her in a slip and fall case.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict and in ultimately entering judgment for appellee because the evidence was totally lacking in proof that appellant had actual or constructive knowledge or notice of the existence of the substance on its premises, which caused appellee to slip and fall, for a length of time sufficient to remedy the situation.

Appellee alleged in her complaint that she suffered serious personal injuries as a result of the negligence of appellant in maintaining and operating its motel. Ap-pellee’s allegation of negligence was predicated upon the following three theories: first, appellee contended that appellant was negligent by allowing the lights, which should have illuminated the staircase where she slipped and fell, to remain burned out for a period of one to two weeks prior to her accident; second, appellee contended that appellant was negligent in failing to provide appropriate facilities, supervision, rules, and regulations for pets staying at its motel (the testimony showed that the cause of appellee’s slip and resulting fall was dog fecal matter on the staircase); and, third, appellee contended that, because appellant advertised that pets were acceptable at its motels, it created a foreseeable need for adequate facilities, supervision, and rules which appellant failed to provide.

It has been consistently held that motions for directed verdicts should be cautiously granted by a trial court, and only when, after viewing the evidence and testimony in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the court concludes that the jury could not reasonably differ as to the existence of a material fact or inference and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Chowning v. Pierce, 174 So. 2d 42 (Fla.3d DCA 1965), and Deese v. White Belt Dairy Farms, Inc., 160 So. 2d 543 (Fla.2d DCA 1964). Further, it is not the function of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the jury on disputed questions of fact.

On appeal from an adverse judgment after a jury verdict, an appellate court must view the record and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the appellee. See Graves v. Wiggins, 257 So. 2d 268 (Fla.3d DCA 1972), and Krasny v. Richter, 211 So. 2d 612 (Fla.3d DCA 1968); and 2 Fla.Jur., Appeals § 308. We have considered the record, all points in the briefs, and arguments of counsel in the light of the controlling principles of law, and have concluded that no reversible error has been demonstrated in the instant appeal. In our opinion, appellant’s motions for directed verdicts ^were properly denied and the final judgment entered by the trial court pursuant to the jury verdict was correct.

Accordingly, appellant’s petition for a new trial was also properly denied.

Therefore, for the reasons stated and upon the authorities cited, the final judgment appealed is affirmed.

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Jaar v. The Univ. OF Miami, 474 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
    …verdict, an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for the jury’s verdict.1 Bermil Corporation v. Sawyer, 353 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Howe v. Estate of Howe, 349 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Fountainhead Motel, Inc. v. Massey, 336 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Warfield v. Sparks, 203 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967); White v. Acker, 155 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963). In the case of Bermil Corporation v. Sawyer, supra, this court in dealing with the question stated: “... Initially, it mu…
  • Bermil Corp. v. Sawyer, 353 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
    …emphasized and cannot, sub judice, be understated. Those principles include the caveat that the function of an appellate court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the jury on disputed questions of fact. Fountainhead Motel, Inc. v. Massey, 336 So. 2d 397 (Fla.3d DCA 1976). In addition, a judgment of the trial court reaches an appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness, Keith v. Amrep Corporation, 312 So. 2d 234 (Fla.lst DCA 1975), and will not be disturbed as long as there is any comp…
  • 194TH St. Hotel Corp. v. Hopf, 383 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
    …upon which the fall occurred had become dangerously worn, smooth, and therefore slippery, see Maas Bros., Inc. v. Bishop, 204 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), and that the entire area was insufficiently lighted. See Fountainhead Motel, Inc. v. Massey, 336 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Fletcher v. Petman Enterprises, Inc., 324 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Robinson v. Kiwanis Club of Delray Beach, 265 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). There was thus ample evidence that the defendant had negligently maintained it…

Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw