LEE RUWITCH AND JAMES SEILER, APPELLANTS,
v.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI, APPELLEE
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The appellants challenged an award of $15,000 in attorneys fees to First National Bank of Miami following the court's prior reversal of a larger judgment. The court held that the awarded fee was unreasonable in relation to the judgment amount obtained and reduced it to $8,000.
The court held that the $15,000 fee award did not bear a reasonable relation to the result obtained and reduced the reasonable attorneys fee to $8,000 based on the $22,352.46 judgment.
[1] An award of attorneys' fees must bear a reasonable relation to the result obtained.
[2] The opinion of an expert witness on attorneys' fees is persuasive but not binding on the court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the fee awarded by the trial court does not bear a reasonable relation to the result obtained”
Establishes the standard that attorneys fees must be proportional to the judgment recovered
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThis was the second appeal in the same case. In the first appeal, the court reversed a $120,000 judgment and awarded the bank a judgment of $22,352.46…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellants, Lee Ruwitch and James Seiler, seek reversal of a final judgment awarding attorneys fees in the amount of $15,000 to the appellee, First National Bank of Miami.
This is the second appearance before the court. See Ruwitch v. First National Bank of Miami, Fla.App.1974, 291 So. 2d 650, in which opinion this court reversed a money judgment in favor of appellees and the insurance company, Insurance Company of North America, in the sum of $120,000, plus attorneys fees in the sum of $17,500 by denying the right of Insurance Company of North America to recover any sum of money against appellants and holding that the bank was entitled to $22,325.-56.
The court, in so doing, stated at page 653:
“This leaves a remaining question regarding attorneys’ fees. Prior to the trial court’s entry of an order, the parties stipulated at a post-trial conference that $17,500 constituted the reasonable value of attorneys’ fees, based upon a $120,000 judgment. In light of our holding that the Bank is entitled only to a judgment of $22,352.46, this cause will be remanded to the trial court for additional proceedings to set a reasonable fee based on this latter sum.”
The trial court, then, pursuant to the mandate of this court, heard testimony to determine reasonable attorneys fees and entered the judgment herein appealed. While counsel performed extensive and valuable services for the bank, the fee awarded by the trial court does not bear a reasonable relation to the result obtained. We are of the opinion, based on the record and circumstance in this case, that an attorneys fee in the sum of $8,000, based on a $22,356.46 judgment, is reasonable and proper. See Baruch v. Giblin, 1935, 122 Fla. 59, 164 So. 831. The cases are clear that while the opinion of an expert witness testifying on attorneys fees is persuasive, it is not binding on the court in determination of a reasonable fee. Dade County v. Oolite Rock Company, Fla.App.1975, 311 So. 2d 699.
Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand with directions to modify the amount of attorneys fees consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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Citator
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All-Star Ins. Corp. v. Scandia, Inc., 353 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…and, in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of such discretion, an appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge. See, e. g. Krasner v. Krasner, 339 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Ruwitch v. First National Bank, 327 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Pennsylvania National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Doyon, 323 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Dade County v. Oolite Rock Co., 311 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), and Belman Hotel Corp. v. Maher, 170 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). In th…
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Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. v. Anthony and Patricia Dote, 740 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…cond, the trial court was not bound by the testimony of the expert as to the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee, even though there was no opposing expert. Baruch v. Giblin, 122 Fla. 59, 164 So. 831 (1935) and Ruwitch v. First Nat’l Bank of Miami, 327 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). We have considered the other issues raised by appellant and find them to be without merit. Affirmed. TAYLOR, J., and BLANC, PETER D., Associate Judge, concur.…
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Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Quintana, 366 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…s of an attorney’s fee award is the beneficial results, if any, of the services. [*530] Provus v. Provus, 44 So. 2d 656 (Fla.1950). The fee awarded must bear a reasonable relationship to the results obtained. Ruwitch v. First National Bank of Miami, 327 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). The amount of the award should square with fairness and justice to all alike under similar conditions and circumstances. Donner v. Donner, 281 So. 2d 399, 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). In the case at bar the total liability of Lumberme…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sailing W. Baruch v. Giblen, 122 Fla. 59 (Fla. 1935)
- Dade Cnty. v. Oolite Rock Co., 311 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Ruwitch v. First Nat'l Bank OF Miami, 291 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)