MANFRED H. DULLE, APPELLANT,
v.
MARILYN R. DULLE, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1976-01-20
Nos. 75-478, 75-1080
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and HEN-DRY and NATHAN, JJ.
325 So. 2d 441 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1976) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

In this 1976 Florida family law appeal, the husband challenged a divorce decree involving custody of three children, child support obligations, and a conveyance of the marital home. The appellate court affirmed the custody and support awards but reversed the trial court's ratification of a deed to the marital home, finding the record insufficient to support its validity.


Holding

The court affirmed the custody and child support awards as supported by substantial evidence, affirmed the denial of the petition for rehearing (finding it was actually a modification petition based on post-judgment circumstances), but reversed the trial court's ratification of the deed to the marital home because the record did not adequately support its validity and the matter required further testimony.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court may properly deny a petition for rehearing when the relief sought is based on circumstances arising after the final judgment, which would necessitate a modi…

[2] A trial court's custody and support awards will be affirmed if supported by ample substantial evidence.

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Key Quotes

“It affirmatively appears that the relief sought by the husband is by way of a petition for modification based on a change of circumstances rather than rehearing. It is clear that the matters of which the husband complains happened after the final judgment and were not existent prior to or at trial.”

Establishes that post-judgment changes in circumstances require a modification petition, not a rehearing petition.

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Facts & Procedural History

Manfred and Marilyn Dulle had three children. Before reconciliation following a matrimonial dispute, the husband executed a deed to his interest in th…

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Opinion of the Court
NATHAN, Judge.

NATHAN, Judge.

This cause is brought before us on the consolidated interlocutory and plenary appeals of Manfred H. Dulle in which he contends in his plenary appeal that the court erred in denying his petition for rehearing, granting to the wife custody of two of the three children of the marriage, failure to set aside his conveyance by deed to his wife of the marital home and the court’s award of support money for the children. The husband, in his interlocutory appeal, complains that the court erred in requiring him, in a post trial hearing, to pay his arrearages in child support for the children pursuant to the wife’s motion to compel payment thereof because the wife left the State of Florida with the children. There was no court order prohibiting her from so doing.

There was ample substantial evidence to support the trial judge’s award to the wife of custody of two of the three children and the amount of money for their support, as well as the award of the third child (the oldest, age 11) to the husband. Immediately subsequent to the final judgment of divorce, the husband filed a timely petition for rehearing on the basis of newly discovered evidence urging the court to rehear the case pertaining to custody and support money because the ex-wife, the appellee, had taken the children out of the State and had refused him visitation rights. The court properly denied the petition for rehearing. It affirmatively appears that the relief sought by the husband is by way of a petition for modification based on a change of circumstances rather than rehearing. It is clear that the matters of which the husband complains happened after the final judgment and were not existent prior to or at trial.

Prior to this petition for dissolution, the parties had a matrimonial dispute and then reconciled. Before reconciliation, the husband executed a deed to his interest in the marital home which apparently was the only real property owned by either of them. The deed was signed, witnessed and notarized without filling in the description of the property. Afterwards, the wife filled in the description of the property and recorded the deed. She alleges this was done with the consent of the husband. In the final judgment, the trial court ratified and confirmed the deed and “granted her the home by virtue of the warranty deed.” While the depositions of both parties make reference to some of the facts and circumstances in connection with the existence of the deed, neither the depositions nor testimony were offered in evidence at final hearing in this regard. The trial judge stated in the record that the reason for ratifying and confirming the deed was for the benefit of the minor children in custody of the wife. In view of the scant record and further that the wife has left the home and is residing out of this state, it is felt that the trial court should take further testimony as to the disposition of the marital home because the record does not support the validity of the deed and the final judgment does not reflect the trial judge’s view that the house should be solely the wife’s because of the need to house and support the minor children.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part with directions.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Mistretta v. Mistretta, 31 So. 3d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
    …ive or impeaching.” Bray v. Elec. Door-Lift, Inc., 558 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (citation omitted). Importantly, the allegedly “newly discovered evidence” cannot simply show some change in circumstances since the trial. See Dulle v. Dulle, 325 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (affirming denial of former husband’s postjudgment motion for rehearing on basis of allegedly newly discovered evidence, viz., that former wife took the children out of state and refused former husband visitation rights, stat…
  • Leon v. Gema Elda Leon, 553 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
    …cript of the hearing on the appellant’s motion for rehearing with respect to the modification. The relief sought by the appellant is by way of a petition for modification based on the change of circumstances rather than by rehearing. Dulle v. Dulle, 325 So. 2d 441 (Fla.3d DCA 1976). We find no error in the trial judge’s finding the appellant in contempt for failure to pay arrearages in his child support payments. The record supports the trial judge’s conclusion that the appellant has the means to pay those…
  • Doane v. Doane, 330 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
    …, Fla.App.2d 1972, 258 So. 2d 489. Reversed in part and affirmed in part and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. McNULTY, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur. . See, e. g., Dulle v. Dulle, Ma.App.3d 1976, 325 So. 2d 441; Reinhart v. Reinhart, Fla.App.1st 1974, 291 So. 2d 103; Pollak v. Pollak, Fla.App.3d 1967, 196 So. 2d 771; Brackin v. Brackin, Fla.App.1st 1966, 190 So. 2d 816.…

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