ECONOMY SUPPLIERS AND FABRICATORS, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
CENTENNIAL HOMES, INC., APPELLEE
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A sub-contractor sued to enforce a mechanic's lien against a property owner, but the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal due to insufficient pleading but reversed the prejudicial dismissal to allow the sub-contractor an opportunity to amend the complaint.
The trial court properly dismissed the complaint due to insufficient pleading regarding privity, fraud, agency relationship, notice, and the equitable lien claim. However, the dismissal should not have been with prejudice, and the case should be remanded to permit amendment of the complaint.
[1] A subcontractor must plead privity with the owner or an express or implied assumption by the owner of a contractual obligation to pay for labor or materials to establish…
[2] A complaint alleging fraud and deceit must plead facts sufficient to make a clear case for such claims.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to create privity under the lien statute, there must be, in addition to knowledge of the owner that a certain person is furnishing labor or material for the contractor to be used in the execution of his contract, and express or implied assumption by the owner of a contractual obligation to pay for the labor or materials furnished.”
Establishes the legal standard for privity required under the mechanic's lien statute—the complaint must allege both owner's knowledge and assumption of contractual obligation.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEconomy Suppliers and Fabricators, a sub-contractor, recorded a mechanic's lien against property owned by Centennial Homes. The plaintiff sought to en…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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WALDEN, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff sub-contractor appeals from a trial court order dismissing its complaint with prejudice and discharging the mechanic’s lien plaintiff had recorded against the defendant owner. We affirm the dismissal on the grounds the complaint was not adequate to support plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff did not properly plead privity between plaintiff and owner, Foley Lumber Co. v. Koester, 61 So. 2d 634 (Fla.1952):
“ ‘In order to create privity under the lien statute, there must be, in-addition to knowledge of the owner that a certain person is furnishing labor or material for the contractor to be used in the execution of his contract, and express or implied assumption by the owner of a contractual obligation to pay for the labor or materials furnished.’ ” Id. at 639;
plaintiff did not plead facts sufficient to make a clear case for fraud and deceit, see Fla.R.C.P. 1.120(b) (1975); plaintiff did not sufficiently plead any agency relationship between owner and contractor, see King v. Young, 107 So. 2d 751 (Fla.App.2d 1958):
“The status of an independent contractor, as distinguished from that of an agent, consists of a contractual relationship by one with another to perform something for him, but the one so engaged is not controlled or subject to the control of the other in the performance of the engagement but only as to the result. Conversely, a principal in an agency relationship retains the right to control the conduct of an agent in regard to the engagement intrusted to him. It may be said that the recognized distinction between an agent and an independent contractor relationship is determined by whether the person is subject to or whether he is free from control with regard to the details of the engagement.” Id. at 753.
Although plaintiff pled he had given notice in conformance with the Mechanic’s Lien Statute requirement for lienors not in privity, Fla.Stat. § 713.06 (1973), there is conflict within the complaint as to what that notice was. Such conflict, unclarified, renders the notice allegation insufficient. Plaintiff’s complaint is further lacking in that it does not allege improper payments by the owner, or that the owner is in possession of amounts due the contractor, to which sums plaintiff would have at least a partial claim whether or not notice was filed. Crane Co. v. Fine, 221 So. 2d 145 (Fla.1969). Plaintiff claims an equitable lien, but such claim is also plead insufficiently. See Marshall v. Scott, 277 So. 2d 546 (Fla.App.2d 1973).
We, therefore, affirm the dismissal of the complaint, but reverse that portion of the order dismissing with prejudice and remand with respectful directions to permit plaintiff to amend his complaint if he so wishes. See Fla.R.C.P. 1.190 (1975).
Affirmed in part; reversed in part, with directions.
OWEN, J., and ALDERMAN, JAMES E., Associate Judge, concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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E. v. Constr. Co., 418 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…ectly solely with United Five, was therefore in privity only with that concern, and was not in privity with the Newmans, e.g., Foley Lumber Co. v. Koester, 61 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1952); Economy Suppliers and Fabricators, Inc. v. Centennial Homes, Inc., 325 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), during the pertinent 45-day period after commencement provided for giving the notice, Sec. 713.-06(2)(a), the determinative issue is a still-narrower one. It is simply whether — in the present unusual context in which legal owne…
Authorities Cited
- Crane Co. v. Fine, 221 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1969)
- Foley Lumber Co. v. Koester, 61 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1952)
- King v. Young, 107 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Marshall v. Scott, 277 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)