EDUARDO ESPINOSA ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
ALFRED ROBERT RACKI, A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, ALFRED R. RACKI, AND ALFRED R. RACKI, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLEES
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Defendants Eduardo and Angel Espinosa appeal a trial court's denial of their motion to vacate a default judgment. The appellate court reversed, holding that Florida's liberal policy on setting aside defaults favored vacatur where the plaintiff's attorney failed to provide agreed medical records, the defendant's case management system was lost, and the insurer was later found insolvent, preventing defendants from having their day in court.
The appellate court held that the trial court should have granted the motion to vacate and remanded the case for trial on the merits. Florida policy favors liberality in setting aside defaults, and the cumulative circumstances here—plaintiff's attorney's breach of the agreement to share medical records, loss of the defendant's file management system, the defendant insurer's subsequent insolvency, and the individual defendants' deprivation of their day in court—constituted sufficient grounds for vacatur.
[1] A trial court should liberally set aside defaults to permit a trial on the merits, considering the unique facts of each case.
[2] The failure of a plaintiff's attorney to provide agreed-upon medical records can be a sufficient ground to set aside a default judgment.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The policy in Florida in setting aside defaults in order to permit a trial upon the merits is one of liberality and the facts of each case are of singular importance in determining whether or not relief under RCP 1.540(b) should be granted.”
Establishes Florida's liberal standard for vacating defaults and the case-specific nature of the analysis.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAlfred Racki sued the Espinosas and their liability insurer Resources Insurance Company for injuries from an automobile-motorcycle collision. Resource…
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PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal an order denying their motion to vacate final judgment pursuant to RCP 1.540(b),1
As a result of injuries sustained in an automobile-motorcycle collision, plaintiff, Alfred Racki, on July 19, 1974 filed suit against Angel Espinosa, the operator of the automobile at the time of the accident, Eduardo Espinosa, its owner, and Resources Insurance Company, the liability insurer. A copy of the complaint and summons was mailed to the New York office of defendant Resources which then assigned the case to its Florida adjuster, Rocky Kuznik of General Insurance Adjusters, which was employed by Resources to help handle its backload of claims. Upon his first notice of the claim on August 16, Mr. Kuznik immediately contacted plaintiff’s attorney and at the attorney’s request sent a copy of the insurance coverage on the condition that he forward to Mr. Kuznik plaintiff’s medical records. In addition, Mr. Kuznik noted this file in his diary, obtained a statement from Eduardo Espinosa and sent out a witness statement to an independent witness whose testimony was favorable to the defense.
Plaintiff’s attorney did not forward the medical records of plaintiff to Mr. Kuznik, and on September 12 filed without notice a motion for default against the defendants for their failure to file a responsive pleading to the complaint. The motion was granted and on November 5 the trial court entered a final judgment in the total sum of $42,000. Having received notice of the judgment for the first time on December 13, Resources shortly thereafter filed an answer which alleged a meritorious defense and a motion to vacate the final judgment. The primary grounds for the motion to vacate was that (1) plaintiff’s attorney had failed to send the medical records as agreed, and (2) Mr. Kuznik used a diary system to keep abreast of the many files in his office and in addition to a large volume of cases and an administrative backup, the diary in which he entered the file in this cause disappeared. In January 1975 a hearing was held on this motion and the trial judge denied it.
The policy in Florida in setting aside defaults in order to permit a trial upon the merits is one of liberality and the facts of each case are of singular importance in determining whether or not relief under RCP 1.540(b) should be granted. See Imperial Industries, Inc. v. Moore Pipe & Sprinkler Co., Fla.App.1972, 261 So. 2d 540 and Edwards v. City of Fort Walton Beach, Fla.1972, 271 So. 2d 136.
We find that the failure of plaintiff’s attorney to forward the medical records as agreed, the disappearance of the diary, the large volume of cases, and the fact that Resources Insurance Company in January 1975 was adjudged insolvent thereby making Eduardo and Angel Espi-nosa liable for the $42,000 judgment (without having their day in court), to be sufficient grounds to set aside the judgment. Cf. Edwards, supra.
Accordingly, the order denying the motion to vacate is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
. “Rule 1.540. Relief from Judgment, Decrees or Orders.
“(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Eraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, decree, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; . . . ”
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B. C. Builders Supply Co., Inc. v. Maldonado, 405 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…er’s Insurance Co. v. Bryson, 341 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Flaxman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 340 So. 2d 515 (Fla.3d DCA 1976); Associated Medical Institutions, Inc. v. Imperatori, 338 So. 2d 74 (Fla.3d DCA 1976); Espinosa v. Racki, 324 So. 2d 105 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); Plotkin v. Deatrick Leasing Co., 267 So. 2d 368 (Fla.3d DCA 1972); Renuart-Bailey-Cheely Lumber and Supply Co. v. Hall, 264 So. 2d 84 (Fla.3d DCA 1972). We also agree with the court in Garcia Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Diaz, supra…
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Sec. Bank, N.A. v. Bellsouth Advertising & Publ'g Corp., 679 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…fense recognize the strong policy favoring trial on the merits and the severity of a default, where defenses on the merits are precluded. See, e.g., Cinkat Transp., Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 596 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Espinosa v. Racki, 324 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). The bank’s failure to offer any record evidence of excusable neglect, due to either misfeasance of counsel or the unavailability of such evidence, is unfathomable. We should not, however, allow the unfortunate results of this fai…
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Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Coral BAY Section C Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 979 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…rs Insurance Co. v. Bryson, 341 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Flaxman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 340 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Associated Medical Institutions, Inc. v. Imperatori, 338 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Espinosa v. Racki, 324 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Plotkin v. Deatrick Leasing Co., 267 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Renuart-Bailey-Cheely Lumber and Supply Co. v. Hall, 264 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). That the County acted with due diligence is also supported by the affidav…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kit C. Edwards v. City OF Fort Walton Beach, 271 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1972)
- Collie v. State, 261 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Imperial Indus., Inc. v. Moore Pipe & Sprinkler Co., 261 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)