CHARLES ALBERT LAW, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the appellant is entitled to the benefits of the Miller v. California decision regarding obscenity standards.
Appellant was convicted of selling obscene materials in violation of Florida Statute Section 847.011. The offenses occurred before the U.S. Supreme Co…
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PER CURIAM.
This cause was transferred to us by the Fourth District Court of Appeal pursuant to the provisions of Florida Appellate Rule 2.1, subd. a(5)(d), after an examination of the record' revealed that the trial court entered an order initially and directly passing upon the validity of a State statute.1 Ac-, cordingly, we have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. Appellant was charged by information with three separate counts of sale of obscene materials in violation of Florida Statute Section 847.011. The offenses allegedly occurred during the months of April and May of 1972. A jury found appellant guilty of all three offenses on June 9, 1972. This appeal seeks a reversal of those convictions based, inter alia, upon a challenge to the constitutionality of Florida Statute Section 847.011. From the above dates, it is evident that this is another conviction that was pending at the time the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. California.
Thus, in light of Hamling v. United States and Jenkins v. Georgia, appellant must be accorded any benefits of the Miller decision.
Accordingly, in view of these decisions and in light of our recent holding in Fon-tana v. State, this cause is reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in which the standards established in Miller, supra, can be applied.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, Mc-CAIN, OVERTON and ENGLAND, JJ., concur. . As grounds for a motion to dismiss, the appellant contended that the statute was unconstitutional on its face and unconstitutional as applied to appellant.
The trial court denied the motion. . 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). . 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). . 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). . Fla., 316 So. 2d 543, opinion filed July 9, 1975.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Balint Papp, 316 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1975)…llowing him to seek post-conviction relief either under Rule 3.850, Rules of Criminal Procedure, or pursuant to a petition for habeas corpus filed in the appropriate court. In passing we note that we are currently considering Fontana v. State, Fla., 316 So. 2d 545, in which we have under review “Memoirs”,3 Hamling, supra, and Miller,4 reference to which cases was made by the Judge of the United States District Court in his order. The petition for reconsideration of these consolidated cases is visited to the o…
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Caplan v. State, 336 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 1976)…he United States Supreme Court in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974), and Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). See Fontana v. State, 316 So. 2d 543 (Fla.1975); Law v. State, 316 So. 2d 545 (Fla.1975). The State argues that the proper procedural method for petitioner to demonstrate that application of the Miller standard would alter the judgment of the trial court is through filing a motion to vacate under Rule 3.850, Fla.R.Crim.P. How…
Authorities Cited
- Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (U.S. 1974)
- Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (U.S. 1973)
- Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (U.S. 1974)
- Fontana v. State, 316 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1975)