STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
IN THE INTEREST OF S. M. G., A CHILD, MRS. NORWOOD PROVOST, RESPONDENT
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The court held that the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction to order a parent's personal participation in a drug rehabilitation program for a delinquent child, and thus, a contempt order based on such an order was void.
[1] A juvenile court's contempt power over a parent is limited to situations where the parent interferes with a court order regarding the child's custody or support.
[2] A juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to order a parent to participate in a rehabilitation program for a delinquent child, absent statutory authority.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA mother was ordered to participate in a drug rehabilitation program for her delinquent daughter. She refused and was held in contempt. The District C…
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BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reported at 291 So. 2d 43.
Conflict has been alleged between the decision sought to be reviewed and Graham v. State1 and Hall v. State Department of Public Welfare.2 The petition for writ of certiorari reflected apparent jurisdiction in this Court.
We issued the writ and have heard argument of the parties.
Upon further consideration of the matter, we have determined that the cited decisions present no direct conflict as required by Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
The writ must be, and hereby is, discharged, for reasons which will be set out below.
The facts of the case are as follows.
Respondent petitioned the Juvenile Court for designation of her adopted fifteen-year-old daughter as a child in need of supervision.
Since then, the child has been the subject of numerous court orders resulting from her misconduct, and she remains within the court’s jurisdiction.
An order dated May 9, 1973, found the child delinquent for unlawful possession of marijuana and placed the child on probation in the custody of a legal custodian directing that she “participate in and successfully complete the Seed Program”.
The court order also directed Respondent, the child’s mother, to “participate in and fully cooperate with, the Seed Program”. (As noted by the District Court, the Seed Program is an innovative drug rehabilitation program in Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida; the success of the Seed Program depends greatly on the cooperation and personal participation on the part of the parents of the delinquent child.) Respondent refused to participate personally and, after a hearing, was found in contempt of court.
Respondent appealed that order and sentence of 30 days imprisonment.
The District Court held that the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction to enter the appealed order and, hence, that it was void; the order was reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to discharge the Appellant.
The District Court recognized that the Juvenile Court was a court of limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by authority of Section 39.02, Florida Statutes.
It was held that the only specific provision found granting power over a parent is Section 39.11(2) (b), paragraph 4, Florida Statutes, 1971.
Thereunder, where the delinquent child has been removed from the parent’s custody, a court is empowered to order the parents to pay the person or institution having custody reasonable sums of money for the child’s care, support and maintenance.
The District Court emphasized that, since there is no other power to order a parent to do anything as a matter of first instance, the Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings in this instance.
The District Court recognized that Graham v. State 3 illustrates an example of proper exercise of the contempt power (i. e., where a court enters a legal order placing a child in the custody of an institution and a parent, or for that matter, anyone, interferes with that order by removing or allowing the removal of the child from such custody, that person would be a proper subject of contempt proceedings).
Petitioner contends, inter alia, that the District Court overlooked the fact that the new Constitutional Article V, Section 20(c)(3), made the Juvenile Court a division of the Circuit Court with its accompanying jurisdiction and that Section 39.13, Florida Statutes, specifically provides the Juvenile Court with contempt powers.
We disagree; the District Court made particular reference to both these matters in footnotes 1 and 3 of its opinion. Turning our attention to the cases with which conflict allegedly exists, we note significantly factual differences.
In Graham v. State,4 the grandmother of the delinquent child was given exclusive custody by the Juvenile Court of Seminole County and violated that order by returning the child to its father, an act of direct interference with the court’s order. As the District Court below observed, the court properly exercised its contempt power in that case.
In Hall v. State Department of Public Welfare,5 the question involved the custody of children found to be dependent upon due hearing before the court and the propriety of a collateral attack on the court’s order by the uses of habeas corpus as an appeal vehicle.
Factually, both cases are distinguishable from the case sub ju-dice.
As recognized by the District Court below, where a delinquent child has been removed from the parent’s custody, a court is empowered to order the parents to pay the person or institution having custody reasonable sums of money for the child’s care, support and maintenance;6 nothing in the District Court’s opinion modifies that statute.
After a careful examination of Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, that court concluded that, other than the aforementioned financial support provision, the Juvenile Court lacked the power to order a parent of a delinquent child to do any other act.
Since the Juvenile Court attempted to act beyond its power, its contempt order attempting to enforce its initial order against Respondent was void, as found by the District Court.
Accordingly, no direct conflict having been demonstrated, the writ must be, and hereby is, discharged.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C. J., and McCAIN and ERVIN (Retired), JJ., concur. ROBERTS, J., dissents. . 144 So. 2d 97 (Fla.App.1962). . 226 So. 2d 39 (Fla.App.1969). .See Note 1, supra. .
Id. .
See Note 2, supra. .Section 39.11, Florida Statutes.
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Variety Child's. Hosp., Inc. v. Vigliotti, 385 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…had the primary duty to support his wife and children. Walborsky v. Walborsky, 197 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967). The mother could be called upon to provide for the family only when the father could not fulfill this obligation. See State v. S.M.G., 313 So. 2d 761 (Fla.1975); Copeland v. Copeland, 65 So. 2d 853 (Fla.1953); and Bullard v. Bullard, 195 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). Recently, however, “the unity concept of marriage has in a large part given way to the partner concept whereby a woman stands as a…
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Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Holland, 602 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…-volunteer stranger has a common law cause of action against either parent for the cost of necessities provided a child because of the parent’s neglect to meet his or her legal parental duties to support that minor child. See generally In re S.M.G., 313 So. 2d 761 (Fla.1975); Weinstein v. Weinstein, 148 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963); (5) a child of lawful age and under no legal disability has the legal right to make the decision to enforce, and when to enforce, or not to enforce, its own legal rights; and (6)…
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In re Contempt of Jack R. Elrod. In re The Interest of K.N.L., 455 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…urisdiction to order the adult male to refrain from any contact with the delinquent child; therefore, its attempt to enforce the order by adjudicating him in contempt of court for violating [*1327] would, on that basis, be void. See State v. S.M.G., 313 So. 2d 761 (Fla.1975), where the supreme court held that the juvenile court acted beyond its authority by issuing an order directing the mother of a delinquent child to participate in a drug rehabilitation program. In that case, the supreme court reasoned that…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Graham v. State, 144 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Hall v. Fla. State Dep't OF Pub. Welf. & Anne Curtwright, 226 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
- In the Interest of S. M. G. v. State, 291 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)