STATE EX REL. JUAN FERRERA, AUGUSTO SIMON, JOSE DE LA VINA LOPEZ, OFELLA BARCIA, FRANCISCO ROSADO, MANUEL FERNANDEZ, MANUEL SARDINAS, GERARDO SANCHEZ, FRANCISCO SAN MARTIN, MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, LUIS DIAZ, MANUEL HUERTA, JOSE M. MARTINEZ, JESUS CHAPU, FELICIDAD HERNANDEZ, CESAREO ALVAREZ, LUCAS RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO PEREZ LENDIAN, MARIO JORGE, MARIANO RODRIGUEZ, FRANK DIEZ, ALSO KNOWN AS FRANCISCO DIEZ, PEDRO PEREZ ALMENGUAL GASPAR BENAVIDEZ, VINCENTE GALLO, ALFREDO FERNANDEZ, MANUEL GUTIERREZ, AND ALVARADO R. PEREZ,
v.
HON. HARRY N. SANDLER, AS JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA

Fla. | 1943-03-05
BUFORD, C. J., CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
152 Fla. 517 Florida Supreme Court (1943) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 12 So. 2d 298
Cited by 3 cases

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Synopsis

In this mandamus proceeding, the Florida Supreme Court compels a circuit judge to continue hearing a case after he disqualified himself, holding that the relators' motion to disqualify was untimely filed and insufficiently pled under Florida law.


Holding

The trial judge was not required to disqualify himself. The motion was untimely under Florida statute Chapter 38.02, which requires disqualification suggestions to be filed within thirty days of knowledge of the ground therefor. Additionally, the suggestion was insufficient as a mere bald statement that the judge is a material witness does not satisfy the requirement to state in what the disqualification consists.


Key Quotes

“The suggestion was not sworn to.”

Establishes that the motion to disqualify lacked the formality of a sworn affidavit

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Facts & Procedural History

The relators brought a suit to restrain enforcement of certain suspension orders. During trial, they moved to disqualify the judge on the ground that …

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Opinion of the Court
TERRELL, J.:

TERRELL, J.:

The relators brought suit to restrain respondents from enforcing certain suspension orders against them. In the midst of the trial, the qualification of the trial judge was challenged on the ground that he was a material witness for defendants. Objections to the suggestion of disqualification were heard and the trial judge entered an order disqualifying himself to further hear the case.

The order of disqualification is challenged by mandamus to require the trial judge to proceed with the cause notwithstanding the order.

It is not alleged that the judge is prejudiced or incompetent but the sole basis of the move to disqualify is that some time between August 19 and August 29, 1942, the trial judge received by mail a certain letter from one Mr. Trainor postmarked at Jacksonville, Florida, copy of which was attached to the motion. It was also alleged that said letter was received by the judge “several weeks” after it wa,s sent but that *519the movant had only recently procured a copy of it. The suggestion was not sworn to.

The trial judge admitted that he received a letter from Mr! Trainor consisting of two or three pages of typewritten matter, pamphlets, and leaflets which he did not read except enough to find out that it had to do with the controversy in question and then consigned it to the waste basket, that he knew nothing of its contents, but feeling that he was without authority to pass on the admissibility of his own testimony, there was no alternative for him- but to enter an order of disqualification.

The statute involved is Chapter 38.02, Florida Statutes 1941, and requires that suggestions of disqualifications must be filed within thirty days after knowledge of the ground therefor is brought to the attention of the party or his attorney. The letter in question was received by the judge almost three months before the notice of disqualification was filed November 18, 1942, and it does not affirmatively appear why it was not filed sooner as the law requires. We think for this unreasonable delay and the fact that the cause was in ■progress, the objection was too late and to all intents and purposes waived. Mizner Land Corp v. Gray, Judge, 117 Fla. 294, 157 So. 663.

We are also of the view that the showing made by the suggestion of disqualification was entirely insufficient. The bald statement that a judge is disqualified because he is a material witness in the cause is not sufficient. It must be stated in what the disqualification consists and when stated it becomes the duty of the trial judge to pass on its sufficiency. Measured by this test, there was no theory whatever for the judge holding himself disqualified in this case.

It follows that the motion for peremptory writ notwithstanding the return must be and is hereby granted.

It is ordered.

BUFORD, C. J., CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Wilisch v. Wilisch, 335 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
    …ial witness in a cause merely because he has knowledge of what occurred before him in a prior proceeding. See Wingate v. Mach, [*866] 117 Fla. 104, 157 So. 421 (1934); and cases cited at 22 A.L.R.3d 1198 et seq. Cf. State ex rel. Ferrara v. Sandler, 152 Fla. 517, 12 So. 2d 298 (1943). There is no basis in this record for the allowance of an attorney’s fee to the former husband in these combined proceedings. There was no partition; therefore, there is no statutory authority for an attorney’s fee even if the…

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