THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND CITY PENSION FUND FOR FIREMEN AND POLICEMEN IN THE CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, A MUNICIPAL CORP. EXISTING UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANTS,
v.
ERNEST W. SISTRUNK, JR., APPELLEE
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The Board of Trustees of Miami Beach's City Pension Fund appealed a circuit court order granting a writ of certiorari that directed the Board to award Ernest Sistrunk a service-incurred disability pension. The court affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that because the Pension Act is silent on pre-existing conditions and there was no substantial evidence Sistrunk would have been disabled absent the work-related incidents, he qualified for the disability pension.
The circuit court properly granted the writ of certiorari and the Board erred in denying the pension application. Because the Pension Act is silent on pre-existing conditions and the evidence showed no substantial competent testimony that Sistrunk would have been permanently disabled absent the incidents in the line of duty, Sistrunk qualified for the service-incurred disability pension under Section VII of the Pension Act.
[1] A pre-existing condition does not preclude a disability pension if the condition was aggravated or caused by an injury incurred in the line of duty, absent substantial ev…
[2] A writ of certiorari is properly granted when an administrative agency denies a disability pension without providing a reason for the denial.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“On certiorari the sole function of the reviewing court is that it merely examines the record made below to determine whether the lower tribunal had before it competent substantial evidence to support its findings and judgment which also must accord with the essential requirements of the law.”
Establishes the limited scope of certiorari review—courts cannot substitute their judgment for the administrative agency's on conflicting evidence
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceErnest Sistrunk was employed as a policeman for Miami Beach for sixteen years. He had a pre-existing eye condition unknown to him at hire and experien…
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NATHAN, Judge.
This is an appeal by the Board of Trustees, City Pension Fund for Firemen and Policemen in the City of Miami Beach, from an order of the Circuit Court granting a writ of certiorari and remanding the cause to the Commissioners of the City of Miami Beach, with instructions to grant petitioner’s application for a disability pension.
Ernest W. Sistrunk, petitioner, has been employed as a policeman for the City of Miami Beach for sixteen years.
The evidence shows that he had a pre-existing eye condition which he alleges was unknown to him when he was hired; that he had no disability or problems prior to his 1966 accident in the line of duty and that* there occurred two incidents of trauma to his eyes in the line of duty supported by medical records, which either caused or aggra vated his eye condition.
The evidence is undisputed that the petitioner is suffering from a permanent impairment to his eyes, rendering him permanently and totally disabled. There is conflicting medital testimony as to the nature of the disease. There is no substantial or competent evidence that petitioner would have been permanently disabled regardless of the aggravation. Sistrunk’s application for a service-incurred disability pension was denied by the Board on October 4, 1972, in a letter to Sistrunk’s attorney, giving no reason for denial of the application for disability. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court which was granted by order of January 22, 1974, quashing the Board’s denial of the pension application and remanding the cause to the Board with directions to grant said application. Upon denial of rehearing, the Board filed the instant appeal, alleging, in essence, that there is no authority for payment to members for a permanent and total disability incurred in the line of duty where there is a pre-existing condition, and for this reason, the Board denied Sis-trunk’s application.
We note that the Pension Act is silent as to pre-existing condition.1 On appeal the Board contends that the circuit court erred in granting the petition for certiorari because it did not have the authority to try the cause de novo on the petition, particularly because in review on certiorari, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency, nor its own conclusion, even if the agency’s findings were based upon conflicting evidence and even though the court itself might have reached a different conclusion on the same evidence.
On certiorari the sole function of the reviewing court is that it “ . merely examines the record made below to determine whether the lower tribunal had before it competent substantial evidence to support its findings and judgment which also must accord with the essential requirements of the law.” De Groot v. Sheffield, Fla.1957, 95 So. 2d 912, 916.2
It is the opinion of this court that since there is no provision in the Pension Act for pre-existing condition and since there was no substantial competent testimony that petitioner would have had the permanent disability absent the incidents in the line of duty, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
. The section of the Pension Act governing policemen or firemen employed by the City of Miami Beach herein involved is Section VII, titled, “Service and Disability Benefits,” which provides:
“(A) The Board shall, upon application retire members meeting any one of the following requirements:
(3J Permanent and total disability, incurred in line of duty in the Police or Fire Department, or in the Unclassified Service as provided in Section 23, hereof, irrespective of the number of years of service.”
. See also Florida State Board of Dental Examiners v. Graham, Fla.App.1966, 187 So. 2d 104, 106; State Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services v. Strickland, Fla.App.1972, 262 So. 2d 893, 894; In re Estate of Kant, Fla.1972, 272 So. 2d 153, 155; 1 Fla.Jur.1974 Supp., Administrative Law § 181; and the dissenting opinion in the very recent case of Allstate Mortgage Corporation of Florida v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App., 308 So. 2d 629, opinion filed January 21, 1975.
CHARLES CARROLL (Ret)., Associate Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I do not agree with the holding of the majority that there was no competent substantial evidence to support the decision of the board adverse to the claimant. Although the evidence was in conflict, in my view there was medical evidence from which the board could find that the scratches or abrasions on the claimant’s eyes caused by blowing sand while on duty, which aggravated his disease, was a condition that would heal and was of temporary character, and that the disability resulted from the disease in which blisters formed on the eyes from time to time with consequent peeling off of the membrane of the eyes.
The trial court, reviewing the board’s decision on certiorari, was not entitled to reweigh and re-evaluate the evidence. Osceola Fruit Distributors v. Mayo, Fla.App.1959, 115 So. 2d 760; State Beverage Dept. v. Ernal, Inc., Fla.App.1959, 115 So. 2d 566.
Also I am unable to agree with the holding of the trial court, and of the majority, that this claimant would be entitled to prevail on his claim before the board if it was the pre-existing eye disease, by its progression during the employment of the claimant, rather than the sand blowing incident aggravation, which caused his disability. In my opinion that would not be a disability “incurred in line of duty” within the meaning of the pertinent provision of the Pension Act.
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City OF N. Miami Beach v. Flora, 315 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…s not entitled to re-weigh and re-evaluate the evidence. Osceola Fruit Distributors v. Mayo, Fla.App. 1959, 115 So. 2d 760, and State Beverage Department v. Bernal, Inc., Fla.App.1959, 115 So. 2d 566. Cf. Board of Trustees v. Sistrunk, Fla.App.1975, 310 So. 2d 405. We hold that reversible error is demonstrated because the trial judge incorrectly substituted his judgment for that of the Committee in a matter upon which there was conflicting evidence and upon which the Committee, as the trier of fact, was enti…
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Police Pension Bd. v. Gaines, 389 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…No. 79-1803 (Fla. 5th DCA October 1, 1980). The Board contends that the court departed from the essential requirements [*678] of law by reweighing the evidence and by adopting, as controlling precedent, the decision in Board of Trustees v. Sistrunk, 310 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975). We disagree. After undergoing surgery for a herniated disc in his back, Gaines was employed by the City of Hollywood as a police officer. He served several years during which he incurred new injuries to his back and he applied…
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Fla. Water & Utils., Inc. v. Metro. Dade Cnty. Envirmonental Quality Control Bd., 46 Fla. Supp. 59 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1977)…on competent, sub [*65] stantial evidence. Fitzpatrick v. City of Miami Beach, 328 So. 2d 578 (3d DCA Fla. 1976); Fla. Dept. of Health & Rehab. Services v. Career Service Commission, 289 So. 2d 412 (4th DCA Fla. 1974); Board of Trustees v. Sistrunk, 310 So. 2d 405 (3d DCA Fla. 1975). Constitutionality Under the provisions of Article VIII, Section 11 of the Home Rule Amendment to the constitution of the state of Florida, Dade County was authorized to adopt a charter and enact ordinances.' relating to the aff…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- de Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957)
- Allstate Mortg. Corp. of Fla. v. City OF Miami Beach, 308 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- State Bev. Dep't of Fla. v. Ernal, Inc., 115 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Graham v. Honorable Ray Pearson, 115 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- In re Est. of Seymour J. Kant v. Kant, 272 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1972)
- State of Fla. Dep't OF Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Strickland, 262 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Osceola Fruit Distribs. v. Mayo, 115 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)
- The Fla. State Bd. OF Dental Exam'rs v. Graham, 187 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Lata v. Exclusive Rests., Inc., 187 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)