STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT G. BEACH, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1975-03-17
No. V-326
McCORD and MILLS, JJ., concur.
309 So. 2d 179 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1975) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

State Farm appeals an equitable distribution order requiring it to reimburse an accident claimant $500 under Florida's Automobile Reparations Reform Act. The court affirms, finding that without clear jury verdict findings on comparative negligence, the trial court's equitable distribution cannot be reviewed for error.


Holding

The judgment is affirmed. The court cannot determine whether the jury applied comparative negligence to reduce the plaintiff's recovery because the verdict forms do not clearly reflect this. Absent the primary figure (the full extent of damages before comparative negligence reduction), equitable distribution cannot be properly reviewed.


Headnotes

[1] A jury verdict must clearly indicate whether the plaintiff's recovery was reduced due to comparative negligence to allow for appellate review of equitable distribution.

[2] Equitable distribution under the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act requires a determination of the full value of a plaintiff's claim before any reduction.

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Key Quotes

“The record on appeal does not reveal whether appropriate verdicts were submitted to the jury by which it might have been ascertained whether or not the jury reduced the plaintiff's recovery by application of the comparative negligence doctrine. Without that information it is impossible for us to determine whether or not the plaintiff received a recovery to the extent of the full value of his claim.”

Establishes the core issue preventing appellate review—lack of clear jury findings on comparative negligence reduction

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Facts & Procedural History

Beach sued George Rogers for automobile accident damages. Rogers pleaded comparative negligence as an affirmative defense. The jury returned a $5,000 …

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Opinion of the Court
BOYER, Acting Chief Judge.

BOYER, Acting Chief Judge.

We here again consider the propriety of equitable distribution under the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act. (See White v. Reserve Insurance Company, Fla.App. 1st 1974, 299 So. 2d 661; certiorari denied, Sup.Ct.Fla.1975, 308 So. 2d 113.

In the case sub judice appellee filed a suit in the Circuit Court in and for Volu-sia County against one George Rogers seeking damages resulting from an automobile accident. The defendant filed an affirmative defense alleging contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff (appellee here), thus bringing into operation the doctrine of comparative negligence. (See Hoffman v. Jones, Sup.Ct.Fla.1973, 280 So. 2d 431) A verdict was returned in the sum of $5,000 which recited “We, the jury, find for the plaintiff and assess the plaintiffs damages at $5,000.00.” The record on appeal does not reveal whether appropriate verdicts were submitted to the jury by which it might-have been ascertained whether or not the jury reduced the plaintiff’s recovery by application of the comparative negligence doctrine. Without that information it is impossible for us to determine whether or not the plaintiff received a recovery to the extent of the full value of his claim. (See White v. Reserve Insurance Company, supra)

The parties stipulated in the trial court to the entry of a final judgment reducing the plaintiff’s recovery to the sum of $4,910.00 as a result of costs incurred by the defendant subsequent to a prior offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 1.442 RCP. The parties further stipulated that appellant here had paid to the plaintiff personal injury protection benefits in the sum of $1,678.80 and that the plaintiff had expended the sum of $2,028.28 for costs and attorney’s fees. Pursuant to timely and appropriate proceedings the learned trial judge entered an “Order for Equitable Distribution” ordering the plaintiff, appellee here, to reimburse appellant, as equitable distribution, the sum of $500.00. The learned trial judge, in said order, indicated that he had taken into consideration the various factors set forth as guidelines in Reyes v. Banks, Fla.App. 4th 1974, 292 So. 2d 39. Those guidelines were quoted verbatim by this Court in White v. Reserve Insurance Company, supra.

Although the facts in the case sub judice differ from those in White v. Reserve Insurance Company, supra, in that there the recovery was based on an agreed settlement whereas here' the recovery was based upon a jury verdict, the principles announced in the White case are applicable here.

As above recited, there is no way for us to determine from the record before us whether the jury returned a verdict for the full extent or value of appellee’s claim. Therefore, even were equitable distribution subject to mathematical exactitude (which we do not here hold: See Arex Indemnity Co. v. Radin, Sup.Ct.Fla.1954, 72 So. 2d 393; Hardware Mutual Insurance Co. v. Roth, Fla.App. 3rd 1969, 222 So. 2d 768; Reyes v. Banks, supra) we would nevertheless be here without the primary figure required for application of the equation.

Appellant having failed to demonstrate prejudicial error, the judgment appealed is

Affirmed.

McCORD and MILLS, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 319 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
    …., Fla.App. 1st 1964, 162 So. 2d 916; Smith v. Ryan, Fla.App. 2nd 1962, 142 So. 2d 139; and Ray v. Earl, Fla.App. 2nd 1973, 277 So. 2d 73. . See Rule 3.6, subd. b F.A.R. . See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Beach, Fla.App. 1st 1975, 309 So. 2d 179. . Arex Indemnity Co. v. Radin, Sup.Ct.Fla.1954, 72 So. 2d 393, Reyes v. Banks, supra; White v. Reserve Insurance Company, supra and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Beach, supra.…
  • 121 Golden Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Buckley, 46 Fla. Supp. 201 (Broward Cty. Ct. 1977)
    …ty to adopt arbitrary or capricious rules and regulations bearing no relationship to the health, happiness and enjoyment of life of the various unit owners. On the contrary, the test is one of reasonableness. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc., v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). As held in the Norman case, inherent in the condominium concept is the principle that, to promote the health, happiness and peace of mind of the majority of the unit owners, each unit owner must give up a certain degree of free…

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