FLORIDA MORTGAGE FINANCING, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
FLAGLER PLAZA CORP., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1975-02-11
No. 74-591
Before PEARSON and NATHAN, JJ., and CHARLES CARROLL (Ret.), Associate Judge.
308 So. 2d 571 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1975) Negative Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Florida Mortgage Financing, Inc. appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claim for a broker's commission on a failed loan transaction. The court affirmed, holding that the two loans constituted an indivisible contract package, and since the broker failed to obtain both loans as required, no commission was earned.


Holding

The court held that the two loans constituted an entire and indivisible contract where both segments were necessary to fulfill the parties' arrangement, and therefore the broker earned no commission when both loans were not produced.


Headnotes

[1] A contract is considered entire and indivisible when its parts are interdependent and common to one another, with the parties contemplating the entire fulfillment of the…

[2] A mortgage broker is not entitled to a commission when the loan commitment application requires the procurement of multiple, interdependent loan segments, and the broker…

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Key Quotes

“A contract should be treated as entire and indivisible when, by consideration of its terms, subject matter, nature and purpose, each and all of its parts appear to be interdependent and common to one another and to the consideration; a contract is indivisible where the entire fulfillment of the contract is coritemplated by the parties as the basis of the arrangement.”

States the governing legal standard for determining when a contract is indivisible, which is the key principle applied to the loan package.

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Facts & Procedural History

A mortgage broker sought a $950,000 permanent end loan and an $850,000 condominium conversion loan on behalf of Flagler Plaza Corp. The broker obtaine…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff, Florida Mortgage Financing, Inc., appeals a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Flagler Plaza Corp., a Florida corporation.

The plaintiff mortgage financing company sued the defendant for a broker’s commission growing out of a loan commitment application in which the defendant requested that the plaintiff mortgage broker obtain a $950,000.00 permanent end loan and an $850,000.00 condominium conversion loan. The purpose of the purchase money acquisition loan was to provide mortgage money for the acquisition of the property involved, whereas the permanent end loan was to be used to further develop the property. The plaintiff broker obtained and the defendant accepted the permanent end loan, but the plaintiff was unable to obtain the condominium conversion loan, such being necessary in order to purchase the property. The defendant notified the plaintiff that the commitment application was formally cancelled and requested a return of the $5,000.00 good faith deposit being held in escrow. The plaintiff, then, sued the defendant for the one per cent brokerage commission, and the defendant proceeded to defend on the basis that the loans were dependent and in one “loan package” and, therefore, no brokerage fee had been earned. The trial court agreed with the defendant and entered summary final judgment in its favor, and ordered the plaintiff to return the $5,000.00 deposit as well.

A contract should be treated as entire and indivisible when, by consideration of its terms, subject matter, nature and purpose, each and all of its parts appear to be interdependent and common to one another and to the consideration; a contract is indivisible where the entire fulfillment of the contract is coritemplated by the parties as the basis of the arrangement. Local No. 234 of United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of United States & Canada v. Henley & Beckwith, Inc., Fla. 1953, 66 So. 2d 818, 821; Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F. 2d 962, 969 (5th Cir. 1970).

From a reading of the loan commitment application, together with the affidavits and depositions of the witnesses, we are of the opinion that the trial court was eminently correct in finding there to be no issue of material fact that it was necessary for the plaintiff to produce both segments of the loan and, therefore, the summary judgment was properly entered.

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Amec Civil, LLC v. State, 41 So. 3d 235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
    …e, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Hollywood v. Freedman, 244 So. 2d 183, 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971) (holding a contract was “divisible in its nature ... if the intention is expressly stated in the contract”); Fla. Mortgage Fin., Inc. v. Flagler Plaza Corp., 308 So. 2d 571, 572 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (“A contract should be treated as entire and indivisible when, by consideration of its terms, subject matter, nature and purpose, each and all of its parts appear to be interdependent and common to one another and to the cons…
  • Fla. Power Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 487 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1986)
    …C is not a signatory to the EFC/Dravo partnership agreement which bestows this right upon FPC. However, we choose to read the two contemporaneously executed agreements together as a whole. See Florida Mortgage Financing, Inc. v. Flagler Plaza Corp., 308 So. 2d 571 (Fla.3d DCA), cert. denied, 317 So. 2d 443 (Fla.1975). Further, EFC stipulated in the hearing below that it would not charge FPC for the use of the improved technology in the future. The Commission, with its broad regulatory powers, can assure that…
    1 / 2
  • Levenson v. Am. Laser Corp., 438 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
    …vor. Overton v. Overton, 259 N.C. 31, 129 S.E. 2d 593 (1963); Connor v. City of Seattle, 82 Wash. 296, 144 P. 52 (1914). See Local No. 234 v. Henley & Beckwith, Inc., 66 So. 2d 818 (Fla.1953); Florida Mortgage Financing, Inc. v. Flagler Plaza Corp., 308 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 317 So. 2d 443 (Fla.1975). We emphasize that the provision dealing with attorney’s fees is one part of an entire agreement. The proposed agreement was entered into after negotiation by the parties. In the “give and take…

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