IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JOSEPH PETERSEIL, APPELLANT,
v.
CAROL M. PETERSEIL, APPELLEE
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A husband appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage in which the trial court awarded the wife full custody of their two young children, authority to choose their schools, and child support/rehabilitative alimony. The appellate court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The paramount concern in custody matters is the best interests of the children, and split custody decrees for children of tender years are not encouraged. The mother's award of sole custody was supported by the record, and the school and support determinations were also proper.
[1] The paramount concern in child custody matters is the best interests of the children.
[2] Trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making child custody determinations.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The paramount concern in child custody matters is the best interests of the children.”
Establishes the foundational legal standard for custody determinations that guides the court's analysis.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe husband is an educator and headmaster of a private school; the wife sought to keep their two young children (ages 6 and 4) in their Miami Lakes ne…
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HENDRY, Judge.
This is an appeal by the husband from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. We affirm.
Three points have been raised by the appellant which in effect urge this court to substitute its judgment for that of the experienced trial judge.
The first two points we have considered together since they are interrelated. The husband argues that error was committed in awarding to the wife full custody of the two young children and also in giving the wife full authority to choose which schools the children should attend.
The husband is an educator. He is the headmaster of a private school in Miami Shores, the Heritage School. At trial, the husband expressed a strong desire to the trial court to have his children attend the school during the summer months. It was the wife’s desire, however, that the children, Dawn, age 6, and Todd, age 4, remain with her during the summer months in their neighborhood in Miami Lakes. The mother testified and a neighbor testified that the neighborhood is like a summer camp, providing ample facilities for children during the summer months.
Even were we to express a different opinion from that of the trial court, we think that based on the record in this case it cannot be shown that the court abused his discretion by awarding full custody to the wife and permitting her to determine which schools the children will attend.
The paramount concern in child custody matters is the best interests of the children. Keller v. Keller, Fla.App.1974, 302 So. 2d 795; Mueller v. Mueller, Fla.App.1975, 307 So,2d 195. The trial court is vested with broad discretion in making such determinations. Unger v. Unger, Fla.App.1975, 306 So. 2d 540.
The appellant cites three cases in which divided custody decrees have been sanctioned by appellate courts in this state. But, unquestionably split custody decrees, particularly for children of tender years, are not encouraged. Unger v. Unger, supra; Wonsetler v. Wonsetler, Fla.App.1970, 240 So. 2d 870; Rudolph v. Rudolph; Fla.App.1962, 146 So. 2d 397.1
The primary reason which the husband suggests for dividing custody in the cause sub judice is the fact that he is trained as an educator, and his wife is not. However, the record demonstrates that there are other facts and circumstances in this case from which the trial judge quite properly could conclude that sole custody should be given to the mother with reasonable visitation reserved to the father. With respect to the children’s schooling, the evidence also supports the trial court’s determination. The record shows that the children were attending a good school in the Miami Lakes neighborhood, and that the association with friends in their peer group was conducive to their well-being.
The appellant’s third point on appeal challenges the amount awarded by the trial court as child support and rehabilitative alimony. The husband asserts that he does not have the ability to pay the sum awarded by the court.
Appellant’s contention is not a wholly unusual point on appeal. Yet, we are persuaded from our review of the testimony as well as the appellant’s affidavit that the trial court did not abuse his discretion in awarding the sum which he did.
Therefore, for the reasons stated, the judgment appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed.
. See also, Anderson v. Anderson, Fla.1975, 309 So. 2d 1, in which our Supreme Court affirmed this court’s earlier opinion, indicating that where all else is equal, children of tender years usually should be placed in the custody of the mother, although there is no conclusive presumption that the mother must receive custody.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Bienvenu v. Bienvenu, 380 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…58 Fla. 43, 27 So. 2d 749. Divided custody which involves periodic removal from familiar surroundings is not desirable nor conducive to a child’s welfare, [citing cases] See also, e. g., Lee v. Lee, 43 So. 2d 904 (Fla.1950); Peterseil v. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Julian v. Julian, 188 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). This is not to say that a divided-custody arrangement may not be approved when justified by some particular circumstances which would tend to ameliorate its undesirable effects…
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Gerner v. Gerner, 529 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…rests. Frey v. Wagner, 433 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). See also Hurst v. Hurst, 158 Fla. 43, 27 So. 2d 749 (1946); Scott v. Scott, 401 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Bienvenu v. Bienvenu, 380 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Peterseil v. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). The case is remanded for the purpose of reinstating the custody provisions of the final judgment. On remand the trial court is directed to clarify the parties’ rights and obligations under the final judgment with respect to vis…
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Talarico v. Talarico, 305 So. 3d 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)…d. Child custody determinations are “some of the most difficult and sensitive problems [that] face the judiciary.” Waites v. Waites, 567 S.W. 2d 326, 330 (Mo. 1978). Thus, “the trial court is vested with broad discretion.” Peterseil v. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d 498, 499 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (citation omitted). However, “a trial court has far less discretion in modifying a custody order than in making the original determination.” Bartolotta v. Bartolotta, 687 So. 2d 1385, 1386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (citation omit…
Authorities Cited
- Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975)
- Robinson v. Mayme E. Monahan and Paul Hamersmid, 146 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Hanna Iris Rudolph v. Rudolph, 146 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Unger v. Unger, 306 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- The Fla. Nat'l Bank OF Jacksonville v. Bisson, 240 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)
- Keller v. Keller, 302 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Igna S. Mueller v. Mueller, 307 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)