STATE OF FLORIDA AND THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
ESTHER F. NEGRIN, APPELLEE
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The Florida District Court of Appeal resolved a venue dispute in a negligence action against the State of Florida arising from an accident on the Sunshine State Parkway. The court held that F.S. 337.19(3), which governs venue for actions against the Department of Transportation, does not apply to tort actions and therefore does not waive the State's immunity from suit in venues other than Leon County.
F.S. 337.19(3) does not apply to tort actions. Because the concluding clause of F.S. 337.19(1) explicitly states that no suit sounding in tort shall be maintained against the Department, the Legislature did not intend for F.S. 337.19(3) to govern tort actions, and therefore it does not constitute a waiver of the State's right to be sued in Leon County.
[1] Statutes governing venue for suits against the state or its agencies must be read in pari materia with other related statutes.
[2] A statute that explicitly states no suit sounding in tort shall be maintained against a department indicates legislative intent that the statute does not apply to tort ac…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An examination of Chapter 337 Florida Statutes readily reveals that it does not purport to govern tort actions nor tort liability.”
Establishes that the statutory framework does not apply to tort claims
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEsther Negrin filed a negligence action in Alachua County against the State of Florida and Travelers Insurance Company, alleging she was injured when …
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BOYER, Acting Chief Judge.
We here again resolve an issue relating to the proper venue of suits against the State of Florida or one of its agencies.
Appellee filed a negligence action in Alachua County against appellants, alleging that she was injured when an unknown person threw a brick from an overpass through the windshield of her car as she was traveling on the Sunshine State Parkway in Palm Beach County. Appellants moved for a change of venue to Leon County and appellee moved for a change of venue to Palm Beach County. The trial judge entered an order transferring the case to Palm Beach County, relying on F. S. 337.19(3).
It is axiomatic that statutes must be read in para materia with other related statutes and other related portions of the same statute. An examination of Chapter 337 Florida Statutes readily reveals that it does not purport to govern tort actions nor tort liability. Indeed, the concluding clause of F. S. 337.19(1) specifically provides “That no suit sounding in tort shall be maintained against the department.” Appellee urges that the latter provision is unconstitutional and therefore should be ignored as a part of the statute. (State ex rel. Davis v. Love, Sup.Ct.1930, 99 Fla. 333, 126 So. 374) It is not necessary for us here to determine the constitutionality of that provision. Whether or not the quoted clause from subsection (1) of F.S. 337.19 is constitutional, it clearly reveals that the Legislature did not intend for that statute, F.S. 337.19, to be applicable to tort actions. It is apparent therefore that the language of F.S. 337.19(3) that “All actions and suits brought against the department * * * shall be brought in the county or counties where the cause of action accrued or in Leon County” was intended to relate to actions contemplated by Chapter 337 Florida Statutes and not tort actions. F.S. 337.-19(3) may not therefore be construed as a waiver by the State or the Department of Transportation to be sued in Leon County. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Com. Sh., Inc. v. State, Fla.App. 1st 1974, 295 So. 2d 314.)
Appellants’ motion for change of venue to Leon County should have been granted.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
McCORD and MILLS, JJ., concur.
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Abbott Labs. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 15 So. 3d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…that statute clearly states the legislative intent that the statute was not meant to override section 465.025. “It is axiomatic that statutes must be read with other related statutes and other related portions of the same statute.” State v. Negrin, 306 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). “Where possible, courts must give effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.” Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla.199…
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Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n of the State of Fla. v. Carlile, 341 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)…the long standing venue rules pertaining to state agencies, in view of the reasons underlying those rules and in the absence of any specific statutory change. In addition we think the attempt of the Chothen majority to distinguish State v. Negrin, 306 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), is unavailing. The Negrin opinion clearly followed the general venue rules quoted above and clearly held that the proper venue of the case, a tort action, was not Ala-chua County (where it was filed), nor Palm Beach County (wher…
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State v. Bertie Chothen, 328 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)…he motion to dismiss for improper venue in which it sets out statutory and case law in support of the denial. Thereupon, the Department of Transportation took this interlocutory appeal. The appellant relies heavily on State v. Negrin, Fla.App.1975, 306 So. 2d 606, as authority for its position. In our opinion, Negrin is inapposite to the case at bar since it treats § 337.19(1), Fla.Stat., which was intended to relate to actions contemplated by Chapter 337, Fla.Stat., “and not tort actions.” The appellant fur…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State of Fla. on the relation of Fred H. Davis v. The Honorable E. C. Love, 99 Fla. 333 (Fla. 1930)
- Ringling BROS.-BARNUM & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. State, 295 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)