GENERAL FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY AND AIRCRAFT SERVICE INTERNATIONAL, INC., APPELLANTS,
v.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF TAMPA AS GUARDIAN OF THE PROPERTY OF MARIO STASIO ET AL., APPELLEES
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McNULTY, Chief Judge.
Appellant insurance company, a workmen’s compensation carrier, seeks review of an order of “Equitable Distribution” in a successful action on behalf of an injured employee against a third-party tortfeasor. It complains that its pro rata share of the amount recovered was too low for the reason that the trial court erroneously construed § 440.39(3)(a), F.S.1973, as limiting a carrier’s pro rata share to past and future compensation payable by the carrier but to include only past medical payments made. We cannot agree that the trial court erred on the point.
We think a complete reading of § 440.39, supra, considered in pari materia with the entire Ch. 440, F.S.1973, reveals that said section does not provide for nor permit the inclusion of future medical payments in the discretionary determination by the court of an equitable pro rata distribution payable to a compensation carrier.1
Accordingly, there being no other matters meriting discussion, the judgment appealed from should be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
HOBSON and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur. . Cf. Baughman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company (Fla.1955), 78 So. 2d 694.
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Citator
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Gangler v. S. Fla. Crane Serv., 385 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…o future benefits, either wage loss or medical expenses, were provided for in the statute, so none could be recovered. We don’t believe Baughman is on point. However, the other case cited, General Fire & Casualty Co. v. First National Bank of Tampa, 306 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), does appear to hold that the statute in question there, the 1973 version of Section 440.39(3)(a), did not allow for recovery of future medical benefits even though future compensation benefits could be recovered. That case relied…
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Perez v. Pennsuco Cement & Aggregates & Cigna Ins. Grp., 529 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…cery, Inc., 125 So. 2d 837, 842 (Fla.1961). . Kerce v. Coca-Cola Co.-Foods Div., 389 So. 2d 1177, 1177 n. 1 (Fla.1980); Simmons v. City of Coral Gables, 186 So. 2d 493, 495 (Fla.1966). .See General Fire & Casualty Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Tampa, 306 So. 2d 193, 193-94 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); § 440.39(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1971). But cf. Gangler v. South Fla. Crane Serv., 385 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (interpreting 1977 version of compensation lien statute); § 440.39(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1977) and (1979).…
Authorities Cited
- Wilford A. Baughman v. The AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co., 78 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1955)