STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. DIANE SUMNER, BY AND THROUGH HER ATTORNEY AND NEXT FRIEND, RELATOR,
v.
HON. ROBERT L. WILLIAMS AND THE HON. RAY E. ULMER, JR., AS JUDGES OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR PASCO COUNTY, RESPONDENTS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction and certification for trial as an adult is mandatory upon the minor's demand, not discretionary.
[1] A minor charged with careless driving has a right to demand waiver of juvenile jurisdiction and certification for trial as an adult.
[2] The provisions of Rule 8.100(b), R.J.P., requiring waiver of juvenile jurisdiction upon demand are mandatory.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA minor charged with careless driving demanded to be tried as an adult under Rule 8.100(b). The respondent juvenile court judges refused, holding the …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Fla. Const. Art. I, § 22 cases and more on FLexlaw
McNULTY, Chief Judge.
The relator, a minor charged with careless driving, seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent judges of the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court for Pasco County from exercising jurisdiction over her. She made a timely demand pursuant to Rule 8.100(b), R.J.P., for a waiver of juvenile jurisdiction and a certification for trial as an adult. The pertinent portions of Rule 8.100(b), supra, read as follows:
“On demand, the Court shall waive juvenile jurisdiction and certify the case for trial as if the child were an adult. He shall thereafter be treated in that case in all respects as an adult.”
Respondents refused the demand holding that a transfer is not mandatory under the rule but is at the discretion of the juvenile court judge. We disagree.
Section 22 of our Declaration of Rights 1 provides that the right to jury trial “shall be secure to all and remain inviolate.” Additionally, even more precisely on the point here, § 15(b) of the Declaration of Rights reads in pertinent part:
“[A] child . . . may be charged with a violation of law as an act of delinquency instead of crime and tried without a jury . . . . Any child so charged shall, upon demand made as provided by law before a trial in a juvenile proceeding, be tried in an appropriate court as an adult.”
Nothing in these provisions suggests a distinction between adults and juveniles with respect to rights so guaranteed. Indeed, a full reading indicates to the contrary. We think, therefore, that these two fundamenta are absolute and must control the interpretation of Rule 8.100(b), supra. We accordingly hold that the provisions of the rule are mandatory.2
Prohibition is appropriate, therefore, and the rule heretofore issued herein should be, and it is hereby, made absolute.
BOARDMAN and GRIMES, JJ., concur. . Art. I, § 22, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, 1968.
. Wolff v. Culbreath (Fla.App.3d, 1964), 168 So. 2d 339; cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1967)
- State of Fla. ex rel. David Craig Wolff v. Honorable W. R. Culbreath, 168 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)