DORIS NIEMI, AS MOTHER OF ROBERT NIEMI, DECEASED, ETC., PLAINTIFF,
v.
MEBANE OIL COMPANY, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, ET AL., DEFENDANTS
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal declined to answer a certified question from the trial court regarding whether conscious pain and suffering remains a compensable element of damages under Florida's wrongful death statute following its 1972 amendment. The court held that the certified question did not meet the strict requirements for certification because it would not be dispositive of the entire cause.
The court denied the certification because answering the certified question would not be dispositive of the entire cause. The question involved only one element of damages among several claimed by the appellant, and therefore did not satisfy the requirement that a certified question be 'determinative of the cause.'
[1] A certified question must be determinative of the entire cause, not merely one element of damages.
[2] Appellate courts should strictly construe and apply rules governing certified questions.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the essential facts must be agreed upon thereby producing a single determinative question of law the answer to which would be dispositive of the entire cause”
Establishes the first and primary requirement for a properly certified question under Rule 4.6(a)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDoris Niemi, as mother of deceased Robert Niemi, brought a wrongful death action against Mebane Oil Company and others. The trial court certified a qu…
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DOWNEY, Judge.
The Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit has certified to this court a question which it is stated will be determi native of the cause and which is without controlling precedent. Said question is:
With the enactment of the new Wrongful Death Statute § 768.16-.27, effective July 1, 1972, is conscious pain and suffering still a compensable element of damage recoverable under Florida Statute 45.11 [now § 46.021] ?
Examination of the briefs, confirmed at oral argument, convinces us that an answer to the question involved will not be disposi-tive of the cause. Appellant claims several elements of damage but only one, conscious pain and suffering, is involved in the question presented. Accordingly, the answer to the question presented would determine one such element only.
Rule 4.6(a), F.A.R., provides:
“When Certified. When it shall appear to a judge of the lower court that there is involved in any cause pending before him questions or propositions of law that are determinative of the cause and are without controlling precedent in this state and that instruction from the Court will facilitate the proper disposition of the cause, said judge, on his own motion or on motion of either party, may certify said question or proposition of law to the Court for instruction.”
Said rule is to be strictly construed and applied. Newcomb v. Roarty, Fla.1957, 93 So. 2d 373. Incidental questions occurring throughout the litigation, the resolution of which might be helpful, if not dispositive of the entire case, are not properly the subject of a certified question. Newcomb v. Roarty, supra; Gordon v. Norris, Fla. 1956, 90 So. 2d 914. In the latter case the Supreme Court pointed out that in order to avoid intruding on established areas of judicial procedure the exercise of jurisdiction under the certified question rule necessarily has its limitations, some of which are:
“(1) the essential facts must be agreed upon thereby producing a single determinative question of law the answer to which would be dispositive of the entire cause; (2) [the appellate] court must not be required to speculate on the existence or nonexistence of essential facts in order to formulate its legal conclusion; (3) [the appellate] court should not be requested to advise private litigants on the nature or extent of what their claims should be; and (4) [the appellate] court should not be requested to answer questions involving fundamental property rights of persons who are not parties to the cause.”
An example of a case ideally suited for application of the rule is Brown v. Palmer, Fla.App. 1970, 233 So. 2d 459* There the trial court certified a question raised on motion for new trial and the answer disposed of the entire case.
Accordingly, the certificate is denied.
WALDEN and MAGER, JJ., concur. *
Quashed on other grounds. Brown v. Palmer, Fla.1971, 245 So. 2d 860.
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Citator
Cited By
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In re Connors, 332 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1976)…, 326 So. 2d 441 (1976). Similarly, questions certified for appellate review pursuant to Rule 4.6, Florida Appellate Rules, 1962 Revision, go unanswered unless they are “determinative of the cause.” Rule 4.6(a), supra; Niemi v. Mebane Oil Co., Inc., 303 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 4th App.Dist.1974); Iorio v. State, 297 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th App.Dist.1974). In the present case, likewise, the Court is asked to resolve a difference of opinion with no assurance that its mandate will have any concrete effect. Here as in Erv…
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State v. Gamble, 330 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)…ate Rule 4.6, subd. a. In view of the factual statements, which are sparse in certain material respects, it is clear that this court’s answer to the question would not be dispositive of the entire cause. Niemi v. Mebane Oil Co., Fla.App. 4th, 1974, 303 So. 2d 661; Iorio v. State, Fla.App.4th, 1974, 297 So. 2d 116; University of Tampa, Inc. v. Hillsborough County, Fla.App.2d, 1974, 287 So. 2d 708. CERTIFICATE DENIED. McNULTY, C. J., and HOBSON and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.…
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Goodnight v. Capiello, 340 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)…related to the death. Therefore, the answer to the certified question would determine but one of such elements of damage. This being true, the answer to the question would not be determinative of the question. In Niemi v. Mebane Oil Company, Inc., 303 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 4th. DCA 1974), the identical situation was presented wherein the answer would determine only one of the elements of damage. In Niemi the court stated: “Rule 4.6(a), F.A.R., provides: ' “ ‘When Certified. When it shall appear to a judge of t…
Authorities Cited
- Gordon v. Norris, 90 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1956)
- Curtis S. Newcomb and wife v. Edward P. Roarty and wife, 93 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1957)
- Brown v. Palmer, 233 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)
- Reynolds v. Cir. Court OF the Fourteenth Jud. Cir. FOR Jackson Cnty., 245 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1971)