STATE OF FLORIDA
v.
MC LAIN
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The State of Florida appealed the quashing of an indictment charging McLain with violating a statute prohibiting the theft and injury of dogs. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the quashing, holding that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction because the offense charged (dog theft/injury) fell under a statute cognizable only in County Judge's Court, not Circuit Court.
The Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to try the case because section 7242, which applies specifically to dogs, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the County Judge's Court, unlike section 7360 which applies to horses, cattle, and other animals and is cognizable in Circuit Court.
“Sec. 7360, supra, is not applicable because that section applies to "horses, cattle and other animals," while Sec. 7242, supra, applies in terms to "dog" only and thus the legislative intent is evidenced to leave dogs out of the contemplation of Sec. 7260, supra, regardless of the contents of Section 7071, supra.”
Establishes the Court's interpretation that dogs are specifically excluded from section 7360 and instead governed exclusively by section 7242, demonstrating legislative intent through textual differentiation.
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The appeal is by the State under the Criminal Procedure Act Chapter 19554, Acts of 1939, from a judgment quashing an indictment.
To determine the question presented we must construe in paria materia three statutes which are as follows:
7071 C.G.L. (4982) “Meaning of the word ‘animal’ ... In this Chapter, and in every law of the State relating to or in any way affecting animals, the word ‘animal’ shall be held to include every living dumb creature; ...”
7242 C.G.L. (5141) “Larceny of and injury to dogs . . . Any person who shall steal or maliciously injure, wound or kill any dog, the property of another, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction of the theft of a dog shall be punished as for larceny of other property and upon conviction of maliciously injuring, wounding or killing a dog shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined not more than one hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than sixty days, and all dogs owned and domiciled within the State of Florida are hereby declared to be domestic animals and ownership of and property rights therein shall exist and be asserted and protected in the same manner and under the same conditions as ownership and property rights in other domestic animals.”
7360 C.G.L. (5241) “Wantonly killing, etc., animals of another . . . Whoever willingly or wantonly and without malice towards the owners kills, maims or disfigures any horse, cattle or other animals belonging to another person shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars.
*594The indictment in this case sufficiently charged the violation of Sec. 7242, supra.
Sec. 7360, supra, is not applicable because that section applies to “horses, cattle and other animals,” while Sec. 7242, supra, applies in terms to “dog” only and thus the legislative intent is evidenced to leave dogs out of the contemplation of Sec. 7260, supra, regardless of the contents of Section 7071, supra.
The jurisdiction to try a case in which violation of Sec. 7360 supra, is charged, is in the Circuit Court of Taylor County, while the jurisdiction to try a cause in which the violation of Sec. 7242 is charged is in the County Judge’s Court.
The motion to quash was properly granted because the circuit court was without jurisdiction to try the case made by the indictment.
There is no provision for the certifying of such indictments to the County Judge’s Court for disposition.
The order quashing the indictment is affirmed.
So ordered.
BROWN, C. J., WHITFIELD and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
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State v. Connelly, 192 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See State v. McLain, 150 Fla. 592, 8 So. 2d 392 (1942). ALLEN, C. J., and LILES and PIERCE, JJ., concur.…
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Daniels v. State, 351 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…shooting of a dog in the leg falls within the felony coverage of the Florida Statutes. We hold that under the prevailing circumstances, the appellant could not have been charged and convicted of a felony. Therefore, we reverse. In State v. McLain, 150 Fla. 592, 8 So. 2d 392 (1942) the court held that then applicable Section 7360, Florida Statutes did not apply to dogs because the legislature had evidenced its intent that a separate statute govern injuries to dogs. (Section 7242) Thus, the court held that…