RICARDO C. MILLER, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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An illegal alien arrested on federal charges confessed to murder after being interrogated by state officers. The defendant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing his confession should have been suppressed as fruit of an illegal arrest and as involuntary, but the court affirmed the conviction, finding the confession was properly obtained and voluntary.
The court held that Miller's confession was admissible because the Miranda warnings and subsequent confession were sufficiently separated from the federal interrogation that the confession cannot be considered fruit of a poisonous tree, and because the state proved the confession was voluntary with no promises or inducements offered to the defendant.
[1] A confession is not the fruit of a poisonous tree when the Miranda warnings and the confession are sufficiently separated in time from any potentially illegal arrest or i…
[2] A confession is voluntary when the defendant is fully advised of their rights and chooses to confess due to personal reasons, such as a preference to remain in prison rat…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is clear that the appellant was fully advised as to his rights on three occasions.”
Establishes that Miranda warnings were properly given, which is a prerequisite for admissibility of a confession.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRicardo Miller, an illegal alien, was arrested at the request of a U.S. customs agent who informed state officers that Miller had bragged about commit…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant is an alien who entered this country illegally. A United States customs agent requested state officers to arrest the appellant and hold him for federal examination. The customs agent also informed the state officers that the appellant was bragging that he had committed a homicide. Appellant was picked up on a federal charge, interrogated by federal of ficers and thereafter, upon interrogation by state officers, he confessed to a murder committed in the process of a robbery. He was tried in a state court, found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. This appeal followed.
Appellant here urges that his motion to suppress his confession should be granted for two reasons: (1) that the confession was the fruit of a poisonous tree, that is, incident to an illegal arrest; and (2) that the preponderance of the evidence before the court showed that the confession was not voluntary. We find neither point presents error on this record. It is clear that the appellant was fully advised as to his rights on three occasions. He was not questioned by the state officers until after the federal officials had interviewed him and had requested that he be held upon the charge of illegal entry. Thereafter, when questioned about the killing, he confessed, stating that he would rather spend the rest of his life in prison than be deported to Jamaica. We hold that the giving of the Miranda warnings and appellant’s subsequent confession, both of which occurred after the appellant had been interviewed by federal officers, were sufficiently separated from each other so that the confession cannot be said to be the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Appellant’s argument that the court should have suppressed his confession because the state did not prove it to be voluntary also lacks merit. There is in this record no testimony of a promise. Appellant did not choose to testify at the hearing on the motion to suppress. See Dempsey v. State, Fla.App.1970, 238 So. 2d 446. The testimony before the court clearly showed that there was no promise or inducement given to the defendant. His own statement that he chose to confess because he did not want to return to his native land is sufficient to show that he was not offered the inducement “that the officers would speak in his behalf” which he claims appears from the evidence before the court.
In conclusion, we think it should be pointed out that appellant’s confession was only collateral proof of his commission of the crime, inasmuch as there were eyewitnesses to the killing and the only purpose of the confession was to corroborate the in-court identification of the appellant as the murderer. Affirmed.