OAKLEY RILEY GRIFFITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant sought discharge under Florida's Speedy Trial Rule after being arrested on July 10, 1973, and not tried until January 7, 1974. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of discharge, holding that delays caused by appellant's own requests for continuances and discharge of counsel tolled the speedy trial period.
Appellant was not denied speedy trial rights. Although oral rather than written motion was made, the court deemed it timely for purposes of appeal. The 180-day period was extended to January 7, 1974 (Monday) because the 180th day fell on Sunday. The 11-day delays caused by appellant's two continuance requests and discharge of counsel are chargeable to appellant, extending the permissible trial date to January 17, 1974.
[1] When the 180th day for trial falls on a Sunday, the time for trial is extended to the following day, unless that day is a legal holiday.
[2] A defendant is chargeable with delays caused by continuances requested by their counsel.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“appellant through his counsel is chargeable under Criminal Procedure Rule 3.191 with the 11-day delay caused by his request for the two continuances outlined above”
Establishes that delays caused by defendant's own requests for continuances toll the speedy trial period
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was arrested July 10, 1973. Trial was initially set for November 12, 1973 but no proceedings occurred. On December 10, 1973, appellant's att…
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HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant appeals an order denying his release under the Speedy Trial Rule, Rule 3.191, FRCrP. Appellant was arrested on July 10, 1973. Trial was set for November 12, 1973; however, the record is devoid of any proceedings occurring on that date. The cause came on for trial on December 10, 1973, at which time the appellant’s attorney was granted a continuance until December 14. On December 14, appellant’s attorney again requested a continuance for possible plea negotiations. Such continuance was granted for seven days.
On December 26, 1973, the trial was reset for January 7, 1974. One hundred eighty-one days elapsed between July 10, 1973 and January 7, 1974. The 180th day from appellant’s arrest fell on a Sunday, January 6, 1974. Prior to trial on January 7, 1974, appellant’s attorney orally moved for discharge pursuant to Rule 3.191, FRCrP. At this time the trial court denied appellant’s motion for discharge. During this court appearance appellant’s attorney announced to the court that appellant has discharged him. Subsequently, on January 14, 1974, the appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere, preserving the right to appeal the question of whether or not he had been denied a speedy trial.
The first question presented is whether or not under Criminal Procedure Rule 3.191(d)(1) it is mandatory that the motion for discharge be filed in writing.1 Although the rule requires that the motion shall be filed and served, in all fairness to the appellant for the purposes of this appeal we will deem that his motion was timely filed.
Next, the State contends that because the 180th day fell on a Sunday the time in which the appellant could be brought to trial under the rule was extended to the following day, January 7, 1974. We agree with the State that when the 180th day falls on a Sunday the time is extended until the next day unless it is a legal holiday. Rule 3.040, FRCrP. On Monday, January 7, 1974, the appellant took it upon himself to discharge his attorney which necessitated extending the disposition of his case until January 14, 1974.
In any event, the appellant through his counsel is chargeable under Criminal Procedure Rule 3.191 with the 11-day delay caused by his request for the two continuances outlined above. Swanson v. Love, Fla.App.2d 1974, 290 So. 2d 112. When the 11-day delay is added to the 180 days, the last permissible trial date would have fallen on January 17, 1974.
For the foregoing reasons the order denying appellant’s discharge is hereby
Affirmed.
McNULTY, J., and JOANOS, JAMES E., Associate Judge, concur. . “A motion for discharge shall be timely if filed and served on or after the expiration of the periods of time for trial provided for herein ; however, a motion for discharge filed before expiration of the period of time for trial shall be deemed effective only as of the date of expiration of the period of time for trial.
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State v. Dorian, 619 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…concur. . The 180th day from the defendant's arrest was November 16, 1981 which was a Sunday, so that the last day to try the defendant was the following Monday which was not a legal holiday, namely, November 17, 1981. See, e.g., Griffith v. State, 299 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). . This motion was made after the jury panel had been sworn for voir dire examination, but before the jury was selected and was therefore arguably untimely. The state, however, failed to raise this point below and has accordingly…
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The State of Fla. upon the relation of David Lee Williams & James H. Williams v. Bruce, 327 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)…l be counted, unless it is Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the period shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday. (Allen v. State, supra and Griffith v. State, Fla. App.2d 1974, 299 So. 2d 618) Petitioners have cited to us several of our own decisions and decisions of other appellate courts wherein the computations therein recited lead to the conclusion that the day the persons there charged were taken into custody was included in the pe…
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State v. Naveira, 768 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the period shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday. (Allen v. State, supra[275 So. 2d 238 (Fla.1973)] and Griffith v. State, Fla.App.2d 1974, 299 So. 2d 618). The information against Naveira was therefore filed within the time allowed by the speedy-trial rule, because the day of arrest is excluded from the 175-day calculation of time by rule 3.040.1 The court below thus erred in ruling to the contrary.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Swanson v. The Honorable William K. Love, 290 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)