GUSTAV GLECER ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
W. C. FLETCHER ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1974-06-26
No. 73-1311
Before HENDRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ., and SMITH, SAMUEL, Associate Judge.
299 So. 2d 134 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1974) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

In this negligence action arising from an automobile accident, the trial court reinstated the jury's first verdict after the jury had rejected it and returned a second verdict before it was formally published. The Florida appellate court reversed, holding that a jury may amend its verdict before it is published and signed by the foreman, and the second verdict should have been entered.


Holding

The court held that the trial court erred in reinstating the original verdict. A jury's verdict does not become final until it is received and published by the clerk of the court, and it is proper and customary for a jury to amend its verdict before it is signed and published.


Headnotes

[1] A jury's verdict is within its control until it is received and published by the clerk of the court.

[2] A jury may be permitted to withdraw and deliberate further to reconsider its verdict before it is received and published.

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Key Quotes

“It is well established that until a verdict is received and published by the clerk of the court, it is within the control of the jury.”

Establishes the fundamental principle that verdicts are not final until formally published by the clerk

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Facts & Procedural History

Plaintiff Fletcher sued defendant Glecer for motor vehicle damage from an automobile accident. Glecer counterclaimed for personal injuries and propert…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant-defendants seek review of the trial court’s order reinstating the original jury verdict in this negligence action.

Plaintiff W.

C. Fletcher filed a complaint against the defendant Gustav Glecer for motor vehicle damage sustained as a result of an automobile accident. Defendant Glecer counterclaimed for personal injuries and property damage. The original trial having resulted in a “hung jury”, the case was retried and at the close of this second trial, the judge instructed the jury on the law of comparative negligence and then furnished four verdict special interrogatories to the jury. These interrogatories asked the jury to determine the per centage of negligence attributable to the defendant/counterplaintiff and the plaintiff/counterdefendant, and further the total damages sustained by each party as a result of the accident.

The jury answered the interrogatories in which it found that defendant Glecer was 25% negligent and plaintiff Fletcher 75% negligent.

The jury further found therein that the total damages sustained by Glecer were $4,000 and those sustained by Fletcher $600. After the jury read its verdict, but prior to the clerk publishing it, the trial judge based upon the above answers applied the required mathematic computations and set-offs and then informed the jury that the ultimate sum received by Glecer in accordance with the jury’s verdict would be $2,850.

The jury then unanimously refused to allow the foreman to sign the verdict and thereupon, the judge permitted the jurors to return to the jury room to deliberate and to reconsider their verdict. Subsequently, the jury returned and announced a new verdict finding Glecer’s damages to be $6,000 and Fletcher’s damages to be $1,500. The foreman signed this verdict and the jury' was polled. Plaintiff-appellee Fletcher filed a post trial motion to reinstate the original verdict. The trial judge granted the motion and entered final judgment on the original verdict. Defendant-appellants appeal therefrom.

Appellants contend the trial judge erred in reinstating the original verdict and entering final judgment where the jury properly was allowed to amend their original verdict before it was recorded. We find this point well taken.

It is well established that until a verdict is received and published by the clerk of the court, it is within the control of the jury. 32 Fla.Jur. Trial § 270 (1960) and cases cited therein. Further, it is customary and proper practice for verdicts to be signed by one of the jury as foreman. 32 Fla.Jur. Trial § 256(1960).

Turning to the case sub judice, it affirmatively appears from the record that before the original verdict was published and signed by the foreman, the jury sought and was granted permission to withdraw and deliberate further. Thus, we conclude that the original verdict did not become final and it was error to have granted plaintiff-appellees’ motion for reinstatement thereof. Accordingly, we reverse the trial judge’s order reinstating the original verdict and the final judgment entered thereon and remand the cause to the trial court to' reinstate the second verdict and enter judgment in accordance therewith.

Reversed and remanded.

Other
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

On petition for rehearing, appellees contend that this court erred in finding that the original jury verdict entered in this cause was not signed by the foreman of the jury and in support thereof cites to the page in the record which contains the Verdict Special Interrogatories signed by the foreman of the jury. In order to dispel any confusion, we wish to emphasize that on page two of our original opinion we pointed out that after the trial judge had made the necessary computations and set-offs based upon the answers to the special interrogatories and then informed the jury of the result thereof, the jury then refused to allow its foreman to sign this ultimate verdict.

Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is hereby denied.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Sweeney v. Lorene Wiggins & Allstate Ins. Co., 350 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
    …irst unaccepted and unrecorded verdict is a nullity. See Stevens Markets, Inc. v. Markantonatos, 189 So. 2d 624 (Fla.1966); Wohlfiel v. Morris, 122 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960); Tobin v. Garry, 127 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961); Glecer v. Fletcher, 299 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Affirmed. . Finding for Sweeney and assessing his damages in the sum of zero dollars.…
  • Cent. Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Greenberg, 418 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
    …to the contrary. Schumer v. Becker, 389 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). . Because the first verdict was not in fact published and, since it was incomplete, could not in any event have been deemed final or beyond its control, see Glecer v. Fletcher, 299 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), we recognize that the jury would have retained the theoretical authority to alter even its answers to questions 1-3, although it had been asked only to fill in the damages blank. Stevens Markets, Inc. v. Markantonatos, 189 So. 2d…

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