EDDYE GRAY GILES, D/B/A TED GILES, REALTOR, APPELLANT,
v.
ANDREW NEWCOMB, APPELLEE
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Directed verdict for defendant broker was improper where evidence was ambiguous regarding whether seller withdrew property from market and whether conditions for earning commission were met.
A directed verdict for a broker defendant is improper when evidence is ambiguous regarding whether the seller withdrew the property from the market and whether the conditions for earning a commission were satisfied.
[1] A directed verdict is improper in a broker commission case when evidence is ambiguous regarding whether the seller withdrew the property from the market or whether condit…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There is sufficient evidence to submit the issue whether the withdrawal was, in fact, made.”
Court explaining why directed verdict was improper regarding property withdrawal from market.
Giles, a realtor, sued Newcomb to recover a commission for finding a buyer for Newcomb's property on agreeable terms. The trial judge granted a direct…
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MANN, Chief Judge.
Giles sued to recover a commission allegedly earned by finding a buyer for New-comb’s property on agreeable terms. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, the trial judge granted a directed verdict, stating that the uncontroverted evidence was that the seller had removed his property from the market and, therefore, was not obligated to pay a commission to the broker for later finding a ready, willing and able buyer. If this were so, the case would be like Kernjack v. Joe Cotton Realty Corp.1 We do not think that the evidence of removal of the property from the market is uncon-troverted. There is sufficient evidence to submit the issue whether the withdrawal was, in fact, made. There is some evidence from which the trier of fact might believe that after Newcomb told the prospective buyer that the property had been sold (although it had not been sold), he told the broker that it was still for sale to that buyer. The second reason given by the trial judge for directing a verdict for the defendant was that the conditions were not met. Again, we found the evidence ambiguous and not susceptible of resolution on motion for directed verdict. Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is Reversed and remanded.
HOBSON and BOARDMAN, JJ„ concur. . Fla.App.2d 1968, 216 So. 2d 18.