STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. ANGEL DAVID LUGO, RELATOR,
v.
HONORABLE ALFONSO SEPE, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, RESPONDENT
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A 16-year-old charged with second-degree murder by information after his original first-degree murder indictment was dismissed sought to prevent the circuit court from trying him as an adult. The Florida appellate court held that once the indictment was dismissed and a lesser charge filed, the defendant was entitled to juvenile court jurisdiction unless the judge held a hearing and waived jurisdiction.
The court held that once the first-degree murder indictment was dismissed and the juvenile was charged with the lesser offense of second-degree murder, he was entitled to proceed in the juvenile court division unless the judge held a hearing, gave due notice, and affirmatively waived jurisdiction to transfer the case to adult court.
[1] A juvenile charged by grand jury indictment with a capital offense is to be treated as an adult, not in juvenile court jurisdiction.
[2] When a grand jury indictment charging a juvenile with a capital offense is dismissed, and the juvenile is subsequently charged by information with a lesser offense, the j…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“By § 39.02(5) (c) Fla.Stat, F.S.A., a juvenile charged by a grand jury indictment with violation of a Florida law punishable by death or life imprisonment is to be handled as if he were an adult, and not in the juvenile court jurisdiction.”
Establishes the general rule that juveniles charged with serious felonies by indictment may be tried as adults
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe relator was 16 years old at the time of the alleged offense and was initially charged with first-degree murder by grand jury indictment on January…
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CARROLL, Judge.
This is an original proceeding in prohibition. The relator alleged he was charged with the crime of murder in the first degree by a grand jury indictment issued on January 15, 1974; that he was 16 years of age on the date of the alleged offense; that thereafter the indictment was dismissed, and on March 8, 1974, he was charged by an information with the crime of murder in the second degree; that his motion to the circuit court claiming lack of jurisdiction to try him therein as an adult, and for transfer of the matter to the juvenile division for prosecution proceedings therein as provided for in Chapter 39 Fla. Stat., F.S.A., was denied.
This court issued a rule nisi in prohibition, to which the respondent filed a motion to quash and respond. After hearing thereon, and upon consideration of the pleadings, briefs and argument, we hold that good cause has not been shown why prohibition should not issue, and that the relator is entitled to judgment in prohibition.
By § 39.02(5) (c) Fla.Stat, F.S.A., a juvenile charged by a grand jury indictment with violation of a Florida law punishable by death or life imprisonment is to be handled as if he were an adult, and not in the juvenile court jurisdiction. Here, however, the indictment by which he was so charged was dismissed, and the juvenile was charged with a different offense (second degree murder) by an information. In that circumstance the law does not provide for the juvenile to be treated as an adult, but for proceedings thereon to be held in the juvenile court (or, now, in the juvenile division of the circuit court) as provided for in Chapter 39, unless after due notice and hearing a judge of the latter shall waive jurisdiction for prosecution of the matter under Chapter 39 and order transfer of the juvenile to “the court which would have jurisdiction of the child if the child were an adult”, as provided for by subsection (5) (a) of § 39.02 Fla.Stat., F.S. A. Accordingly, the rule nisi in prohibition is made absolute. It is assumed the issuance of a formal writ of prohibition will not be necessary to effectuate compliance with the above holding.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Johnson v. State, 379 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…trial court determined that the statute was not applicable because it became effective on October 1, 1978, and the criminal transaction for which the appellant was found guilty occurred in October of 1977. It was held in State ex rel. Lugo v. Sepe, 296 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), that when a juvenile is charged by grand jury indictment with a violation of law punishable by death or life imprisonment (which charge is dismissed) and thereafter is charged by information with murder in the second degree, the…
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King v. State, 425 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…dult treatment of juveniles to the exceptions delineated above. Robidoux v. Coker, 388 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), Pet. for rev. den., 389 So. 2d 1108 (Fla.1980); A. D. T. v. State, 318 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); State ex rel. Lugo v. Sepe, 296 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Whidden v. State, 374 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). A juvenile, therefore, may not be indicted unless the crime charged is one punishable by death or life imprisonment. Otherwise, a state attorney could circumvent Chapter 39 by…
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Robidoux v. Honorable Thomas M. Coker, 383 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…legislature had intended for an indictment to be used in the place of a delinquency petition in any other situations, it would have so provided. Similar conclusions have been reached in the Third and Fifth Districts. See State ex rel. Lugo v. Sepe, 296 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Johnson v. State, supra; Collins v. State, supra. We believe these decisions are correct in strictly limiting adult treatment of juveniles to the four exceptions contained in Chapter 39. While it might be more convenient to disp…