610 LINCOLN ROAD, INC., D/B/A A. TAYLOR & SONS, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
MILTON KELNER, P.A., A PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, APPELLEE
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A Florida appellate court adheres to its original opinion in a dispute regarding contingent fee agreements between an attorney and client, and certifies the matter to the Florida Supreme Court rather than deferring to allegedly established Supreme Court precedent, finding that the cited precedent involved fixed fees rather than contingent fees.
The District Court of Appeal adheres to its original opinion and certifies the matter to the Supreme Court because the Supreme Court has not clearly established applicable principles regarding contingent fee agreements. The court rejected the appellee's reliance on Goodkind v. Wolkowsky because that case involved a fixed fee contract, not a contingent fee arrangement.
[1] A District Court of Appeal must follow established law from the Supreme Court and should certify cases to the Supreme Court if it disagrees with established law.
[2] A fixed fee agreement is distinct from a contingent fee agreement for the purpose of determining attorney's rights and responsibilities upon client discharge.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a District Court of Appeal, should not overrule previous decisions of the Supreme Court, but should follow the law established by the Supreme Court and, if it differed with such established law, it should make its views known and certify the case to the Supreme Court”
Establishes the proper standard for appellate court deference to Supreme Court precedent under Gilliam v. Stewart
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing the release of the court's original opinion, both parties requested additional time to file petitions for rehearing. The appellee argued tha…
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PER CURIAM.
Following the release of our original opinion, 289 So. 2d 12, both sides requested additional time to file petition for rehearing and a reply thereto.
In the various papers filed, the appellee has called our attention to the recent opinion by the Supreme Court of Florida in Gilliam v. Stewart, Fla.1974, 291 So. 2d 593 wherein the Supreme Court pointed out that a District Court of Appeal, should not overrule previous decisions of the Supreme Court, but should follow the law established by the Supreme Court and, if it differed with such established law, it should make its views known and certify the case to the Supreme Court and, therefore, because of Gilliam v. Stewart, supra, we should affirm the final judgment under review and certify the matter to the Supreme Court to consider the views expressed in the original opinion.
If the Supreme Court had clearly established the applicable principles of law pertaining to the rights and responsibilities of the parties when a client discharged an attorney who had been employed under a contingent fee agreement, we would certainly agree with the appellee and would recede from our earlier opinion, affirm the final judgment, and certify the matter in accordance with the procedure outlined in Gilliam v. Stewart, supra. However, the principle case relied on by the appellee in his petition for rehearing to indicate that the Supreme Court had established the law as to contingent fee agreements is Goodkind v. Wolkowsky, 132 Fla. 63, 180 So. 538. However, upon a reading of Good-kind v. Wolkowsky, supra, it is clear that the contract involved was for a fixed fee.
Therefore, having reviewed the authorities set forth in the petition for rehearing and the more recent authorities that have appeared since our original opinion [see: Johnson v. Long, 1973, 15 Ill.App.3d 506, 305 N.E. 2d 30; see, also the recent opinion of the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, upholding a court rule fixing the maximum fee permitted on a contingent fee agreement in American Trial Lawyers Ass’n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 126 N.J.Super. 577, 316 A. 2d 19, Opinion filed February 14, 1974] the court adheres to its original opinion and its original determination to certify this matter to the Supreme Court of Florida.
Therefore, the petition for rehearing is hereby denied.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974)
- Goodkind v. Wolkowsky, 132 Fla. 63 (Fla. 1938)
- 610 Lincoln Rd., Inc. v. Milton Kelner, P.A., 289 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)