STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. JOE CAPIBIANCO AND DEBBIE MATTHEWS, PETITIONERS,
v.
R. A. GREEN, JR., AS JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR GILCHRIST COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENTS; CARMEN J. CAPIBIANCO, PETITIONER, V. THE HONORABLE R. A. GREEN, JUDGE OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, RESPONDENT
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Petitioners were charged with trafficking in stolen property and sought writs of prohibition alleging violation of Florida's 180-day speedy trial rule. The trial judge excused five seated jurors and set the trial over to a later date after the entire venire was exhausted during jury selection. The court held that trial commenced when the jury panel was sworn for voir dire on July 9, 1979, within the 180-day deadline, and denied the petitions for writs of prohibition.
Trial commenced when the jury panel was sworn for voir dire on July 9, 1979, within the 180-day deadline. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing the five seated jurors and beginning anew with a new venire on the rescheduled trial date.
[1] A trial commences for speedy trial rule purposes when a jury panel is sworn for voir dire in a specific trial.
[2] The exhaustion of a jury venire due to challenges by both the state and defense does not automatically violate the speedy trial rule if the trial is reset within the pres…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In accordance with our decision in Stuart, [v. State, 360 So. 2d 406, Fla.1978] we hold that under Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(3) a trial commences when a jury panel is sworn for voir dire in a specific trial.”
Establishes the legal standard for when trial commences under the speedy trial rule
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioners were arrested on February 2, 1979, for trafficking in stolen property, with a trial deadline of August 1, 1979. On July 9, 1979, within th…
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PER CURIAM.
The motion of respondent to consolidate these cases is granted. Petitioners in both cases were charged with the same crime and were brought on for jury trial before the same court on the same date to be heard by the same trial jury. Petitioners in both cases seek writs of prohibition alleging that they were not brought to trial within 180 days from the date of their arrest in violation of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191, the speedy trial rule. Petitioners were first taken into custody on charges of trafficking in stolen property, a felony, on February 2, 1979. The final date for commencing trial under the foregoing rule was August 1, 1979. On July 9, 1979, within the period allowed by the rule, a jury venire for the specific trial of petitioners was seated in the jury box and voir dire examination was started. Before a trial jury could be empaneled, however, the entire venire was exhausted due to the challenges both by the state and defense attorneys. The trial judge then set the trial over until September 4, 1979, and excused five jurors who were seated in the jury box. On August 15, 1979, petitioners’ [*MLX] motion for discharge pursuant to the aforesaid rule was denied.
The only question before us on the petitions for writs of prohibition is whether or not the trial was begun within the 180-day period allowed by the rule. The Supreme Court settled this question in Moore v. State, 368 So. 2d 1291 (Fla.1979), ruling as follows:
“ . . .In accordance with our decision in Stuart, [v. State, 360 So. 2d 406, Fla.1978] we hold that under Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(3) a trial commences when a jury panel is sworn for voir dire in a specific trial. . . . ”
While it would have been better practice for the trial court to instruct the five jurors who had been seated in the box to return on the date to which the trial was set over, we find no abuse of discretion insofar as the speedy trial rule is concerned in his excusing them and beginning anew with the selection process with a new venire on the date to which the trial was set over. The petitions for writs of prohibition are denied.
McCORD, Acting C. J., and ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr. and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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LOY v. Leone, 546 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…l case commences with the selection and swearing of the jury. Moore v. State, 368 So. 2d 1291 (Fla.1979); McDermott v. State, 383 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Brannan v. State, 383 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); State ex rel. Capibianco v. Green, 377 So. 2d 979, 980 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1110 (Fla.1980). There is no logical reason to formulate a different rule for civil cases. It has been held in other states that the trial of a jury case commences when a jury panel is selected and…1 / 2
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State v. Vukojevich, 392 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…f prospective jurors began on January 2, 1980 below, appellee was brought to trial within 180 days for the purpose of the rule. Moore v. State, 368 So. 2d 1291 (Fla.1979); Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla.1979); State ex rel Capibianco v. Green, 377 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). We hold that the granting of ap-pellee’s motion for change of venue at that time to be equivalent to a mistrial, which gave the State 90 days within which to retry appellee. The court properly set trial for January 21, and prop…
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Harrell v. State, 700 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…ee Guzzetta v. Hamrick, 656 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 663 So. 2d 630 (Fla.1995). Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s order because Harrell’s claim of error relating to his speedy trial rights lacks merit. See Capibianco v. Green, 377 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1110 (Fla.1980). AFFIRMED. COBB, HARRIS and ANTOON, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Alphonso Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978)
- Moore v. State, 368 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 1979)
- Entenmann's Bakery OF Fla., Inc. v. Loughlin, 368 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 1979)