WILLIAM R. SPENCER, PETITIONER,
v.
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, THE STATE OF FLORIDA ET AL., RESPONDENTS
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Prisoner Spencer, convicted of sexual battery and kidnapping, sought habeas corpus relief claiming double jeopardy based on a prior juvenile waiver hearing. The court held that the hearing was conducted solely on the waiver issue without adjudicating delinquency, so no second jeopardy violation occurred.
Spencer was not placed twice in jeopardy. The juvenile hearing addressed only the waiver issue, not adjudication of delinquency, so the subsequent adult trial did not constitute double jeopardy in violation of Breed v. Jones.
[1] A juvenile is not placed in jeopardy for an offense if the juvenile court hearing is solely for the purpose of determining whether to waive juvenile jurisdiction and tran…
[2] A hearing on a motion to waive juvenile jurisdiction and transfer a case to criminal court does not constitute an adjudication of delinquency.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While the "order of transferral" may be susceptible of an interpretation that it was preceded by a hearing in which Spencer was potentially subject either to adjudication as a delinquent juvenile or to transfer to the Felony Division, the transcript of hearing filed by the State clearly indicates that the hearing was conducted solely on the issue of whether juvenile jurisdiction should be waived and Spencer transferred to the Felony Division.”
The court's explanation that despite the ambiguous written order, the actual hearing transcript proved no adjudication occurred
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSpencer was initially charged as a juvenile with sexual battery and kidnapping arising from April 5, 1975 conduct. The juvenile division court held a …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Acting Chief Judge.
Prisoner Spencer, convicted, sentenced, and in custody for the felonies of sexual battery and kidnapping, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the criminal proceedings against him placed him twice in jeopardy, in violation of constitutional guaranties, in that Spencer previously was subjected as a juvenile to an adjudicatory proceeding which may have resulted in an adjudication that he violated the criminal laws. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). The petition and exhibits made a prima facie case, and we required a response from the State, including other records of the juvenile division of the circuit court showing the character of that court’s hearing on May 14,1975.
The hearing which Spencer asserts placed him in jeopardy of adjudication as a juvenile was preceded by a motion by the State to waive juvenile jurisdiction and to transfer the matter to the criminal division of the circuit court; and that hearing resulted in an order entitled “order of transferral to felony division circuit court”. On its face the “order of transferral” is somewhat ambiguous in its characterization of the preceding hearing: preliminarily it refers not to the motion for transfer but to the petition for delinquency adjudication; it recites that Spencer was a juvenile who, if an adult,
would be charged with a violation of Florida law constituting a felony, in this, to-wit: that on the 5th day of April, A.D., 1975 . . . said child
COUNT I
did then and there unlawfully commit a sexual battery . . .;
and the order continues to recite the essential elements of two sexual batteries and three kidnappings which would seem to constitute adjudication of the offenses described, were the recitals not introduced by the language above quoted. The recital under “COUNT V” includes a finding that “there is probable cause to believe that said child is guilty of such offenses and that it is for the best interest of the public welfare that said child be transferred to the Felony Division..."
While the “order of transferral” may be susceptible of an interpretation that it was preceded by a hearing in which Spencer was potentially subject either to adjudication as a delinquent juvenile or to transfer to the Felony Division, the transcript of hearing filed by the State clearly indicates that the hearing was conducted solely on the issue of whether juvenile jurisdiction should be waived and Spencer transferred to the Felony Division. Accordingly, Spencer was not adjudicated a delinquent, he was not in [*CXX] jeopardy of such an adjudication, his subsequent trial as an adult did not place him twice in jeopardy, and his petition for writ of habeas corpus is
DENIED.
BOOTH and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
McCARVER v. State, 379 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…the sentence set aside, and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court of Orange County, Florida, Juvenile Division, for further proceedings in that division, consistent herewith. DAUKSCH, C. J., and COBB, J., concur. . Cf. Spencer v. Wainwright, 377 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1979) where only a transfer hearing was held, so jeopardy did not attach.…
Authorities Cited
- Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (U.S. 1975)